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LINKING UP BHARTRHARI AND THE BAUDDHAS

Chr. Lindtner, Copenhagen

1. There is, as will be recalled, a good tradition (Punyarāja and Simhasūri) to the effect that Vasurāta was at one time the *guru* of Bhartrhari. According to another source (Paramārtha), the Bauddha teacher Vasubandhu was attacked by Vasurāta, the grammarian, i.e. Bhartrhari's teacher.¹

On the basis of these pieces of independent external evidence only, it would be natural to conclude that Bhartrhari cannot have been absolutely ignorant about at least some of the writings of "the master of 1000 *śāstra*-s", as the Chinese sources occasionally speak of Vasubandhu (thus, probably, not implying more than that Vasubandhu was an extremely prolific author). When I here speak of Vasubandhu, I am, to be sure, speaking of the author of *Abhidharmakośa*, *Karmasiddhi*, *Pañcaskandhaka*, *Vimśatikā*, *Trimśikā*, *Vyākhyāyukti*, etc. – to mention only the most important of his authentic works.

Naturally, the question then arises, whether we can detect any palpable pieces of influence from Vasubandhu in Bhartrhari's *magnum opus*, the *Vākyapadīya* (VP).² We might then find ourselves in a position to understand what I-ching had in mind when he reported that Bhartrhari was "intimately acquainted with the doctrine of *viññaptimātratā* (Chinese: *wei-shih*)".³

1 For the references, see E. Frauwallner, *Kleine Schriften*, Wiesbaden 1982, p. 857 (= "Landmarks in the History of Indian Logic", in *WZKSO* 5 (1961), pp. 125-148).

2 I am here mostly using Rau's critical edition, *Bhartrharis Vākyapadīya*, Wiesbaden 1977, and his most useful *Bhartrharis Vākyapadīya. Vollständiger Wortindex zu den mūlakārikās*, Wiesbaden/Stuttgart 1988. In addition to these, K.A. Subramania Iyer's standard edition with the extant commentaries: VP I, Poona 1966; VP II, Delhi 1983; VP III, Poona 1963 (i) and 1973 (ii). – For Bhartrhari and the Buddhists, see also (somewhat outdated) D. Seyfort Rugg, *Contributions à l'histoire de la philosophie linguistique indienne*, Paris 1959, pp. 57-93.

3 This is the translation of John Brough in "I-ching on the Sanskrit grammarians" in *BSOAS* 36 (1973), pp. 248-260. The old translation of Takakusu was "sole knowledge (*Vidyāmātra*)", which is impossible. But *wei-shih* could also, and more likely, be rendered *viññānamātra*, or even *cittamātra*, any of which is preferable to Brough's *viññaptimātratā* (*ibid.*, p. 260). Brough (*ibid.*, p. 259) gives further ref. to the question of Bhartrhari and the Buddhists, which he, absurdly, regards as a "dead issue". – See also H. Nakamura's "Buddhist influence upon the *Vākyapadīya*", in *Journal of the Ganganatha Jha Research Institute* 29 (1973), pp. 367-388.

I think there is sufficient evidence to show that I-ching was right. Perhaps it is superfluous of me to quote the first verse of Vasubandhu's *Trīṃśikā* (T).⁴ Anyhow, here it is:

*ātmadharmopacāro hi vividho yaḥ pravartate /
vijñānaparīṇāme 'sau parīṇāmaḥ sa ca tridhā //*

Also, T 17 and 18ab should be kept in mind:

*vijñānaparīṇāmo 'yam vikalpo yad vikalpyate /
tena tan nāsti tenedam sarvaṃ vijñaptimātrakam //
sarvabījaṃ hi vijñānaṃ (parīṇāmas tathā tathā /)*

Of these verses I cannot help hearing an echo in VP I.124:

*śabdasya parīṇāmo 'yam ity āmnāyavido viduḥ /
chandobhya eva prathamam etad viśvaṃ pravartate //*⁵

If required to describe the philosophy of Vasubandhu and Bhartṛhari in a single word, it could well be *vijñānaparīṇāma*- and *śabdaparīṇāma*, respectively. No doubt Bhartṛhari deliberately alludes to Vasubandhu. This would have been recognized immediately by the contemporary learned reader.

For Bhartṛhari the absolute, Brahman, is *eka* (I.29), but as a result of various powers (*śakti*, I.2c) and forces (*kratu*, I.52b, a Vedic term never used by the Bauddhas) it develops (*vivartate*, I.1c = *vartate*, I.2d = *pravartate*, I.124b) so as to *appear* manifold. The ultimate reason for this, as in Buddhism, is *avidyā*. As a grammarian Bhartṛhari likes to call the absolute *śabdatattva*, and he speaks of its manifestation, also in grammatical terminology, as *prakriyā*, formation. When VP I.4 furthermore says of Brahman that it is *sarvabīja*, and that it appears as *bhoktr*, *bhoktavya* and *bhoga*, we again hear Buddhist echoes. Vasubandhu makes a distinction between *grāhya* and *grāhaka*. So does Bhartṛhari. Bhartṛhari speaks of the three (or four?) forms of *vāk*, viz. *vaikharī*, *madhyamā* and *paśyanṭī* (VP I. 159-

4 There are, as known, many editions and translations of Vasubandhu's *Trīṃśikā*. See, most recently, S. Anacker, *Seven Works of Vasubandhu*, Delhi 1984. Here the Sanskrit text is given on pp. 422-423. See also the facsimile edition given in K. Mimaki *et al.* (eds.), *Three Works of Vasubandhu in Sanskrit Manuscript*, Tokyo 1989. (There are no significant variants.)

5 In the *Viṣṇupurāṇa* (as quoted in PW, s.v. *parīṇāma*) there is an interesting variant, probably of VP:

haviṣāṃ parīṇāmo 'yam yad etad akhilaṃ jagat /

170).⁶ Likewise Vasubandhu speaks of three kinds of *parināma* (*vipāka*, *mananā* and *viśayavijñapti*), and of three characters (*parikalpita*-, *paratantra*- and *pariniṣpannasvabhāva*). Both are concerned about three forms of the absolute. The terminology and the details certainly differ, but the structural similarity is too striking to be purely coincidental. Moreover, technical terms such as *saṃghāta* and *upalabdhi*, so common in Vasubandhu, may also have been borrowed by Bhartrhari in whose VP they are quite common, too.⁷

It is true that Bhartrhari never uses the term *vijñapti*(-*mātratā*). Even *vijñāna* rarely occurs. One could perhaps go as far as to say that he carefully avoids it! In any case, internal evidence certainly supports I-ching's remark about Bhartrhari being intimately acquainted with the doctrine of *vijñaptimātratā* (or *vijñāna-mātra*), i.e. with the philosophical works of Vasubandhu.

2. Paul Hacker, in particular, has stressed that there is an important distinction to be drawn between *vivarta*- and *parināmavāda* in Indian philosophy.⁸ In case of *parināmavāda*, the material cause and its product is held to be essentially the same. In case of *vivartavāda* (...ist vom monistisch-illusionistischen Vedānta ausgebildet worden), we are here dealing with the concept of "Scheinentfaltung". As Hacker points out, Bhartrhari uses the term *vivarta* in the sense of "Scheinentwicklung", and one can characterize his point of view "als illusionistischen *Bhedābheda-vāda*". To Bhartrhari *vivarta* (also *vikāra*) and *parināma* are more or less synonyms. Finally, Hacker suggests that Bhartrhari's usage of *vivarta* has a Buddhist background.⁹

Unfortunately, Hacker only gives a few vague references to the use of *vivartate*/*vivarta* in Buddhist sources. Hacker is quite right, though, that *vivartate* (Pāli: *vivattati*) belongs to a cosmological context. Though it cannot be said to be very common in the Buddhist *sūtra*-s the idea is known from several early *sūtra*-s of Mahāyāna. We have a nice example

6 On all this, see K.A. Subramania Iyer's classical work, *Bhartrhari. A study of the Vākyapadīya in the light of the Ancient Commentaries*, Poona 1969. – For a discussion of *śabdādvaita*, etc., see also the same author's *The Vākyapadīya – Some Problems*, Poona 1982.

7 For the references, see Rau's *Wortindex*, s.s.v.

8 See his *Vivarta. Studien zur Geschichte der illusionistischen Kosmologie und Erkenntnistheorie der Inder*, Wiesbaden 1953.

9 *Op. cit.*, p. 16.

from a most important chapter of the *Samādhirājasūtra*, recently edited by C. Cüppers (IX.1-2):

yada lokadhātūna vivartu bhoṭi
ākāśu bhoṭi ayu sarvaloke /
yathaiva taṃ pūrvi tathaiva paścāt
tathopamāṃ jānatha sarvadharmān // (IX.1)
idaṃ jagad yāvata kiñci vartate (v.1.: kim vivartate!)
adhastam eṭi ayam āpaskandhaḥ /
yathaiva taṃ heṣṭi tathaiva ūrd(h)vam
tathopamāṃ jānatha sarvadharmān // (IX.2)¹⁰

Here then, in an early and influential Mahāyāna text, we are clearly confronted with a *vivartavāda* according to which the entire world (*loka-dhātu*, *idaṃ jagat*) evolves from one single principle, *ākāśa*, into which it also, in the course of time, reverts again. This sort of “monistic illusionism” is most characteristic of Mahāyāna. In Vasubandhu, however, *ākāśa* is replaced by *viññāna*, in Bhartṛhari by *śabda(-tattva)*. The concepts of *vivarta* and *pariṇāma* were certainly not invented by Bhartṛhari.

Since we are here dealing with the Buddhist sources that may have influenced Bhartṛhari, it is reasonable to ask whether there is any evidence that would allow us to say anything about his knowledge of Buddhist *sūtra*-s. There is no definite answer to this question, at least on the basis of the VP. There is a nice case, though, which shows Bhartṛhari using specific Buddhist terminology. This is, in Rau’s critical edition, VP II.238ab:

upāyāḥ śikṣamāṇānām bālānām upalāpanāḥ /

The reading *upalāpanāḥ* is significant. It is given in the *Mūlakārikā*-s and in the Commentary of Puṇyarāja (ed. K.A.S. Iyer, Delhi 1983, p. 98). In the *Vṛtti*, however the reading has been changed to *apalāpanāḥ*.¹¹ This is definitely a wrong reading. If the author of the *Vṛtti* actually did write (or read) *apalāpanāḥ* (which is not certain, for it could be a scribal error), we can be quite sure that its author was *not* Bhartṛhari. How so?

First of all, it may be noted that Iyer has misunderstood the meaning of the verse in his translation: “These *śāstras* which are a means (of attaining knowledge) are really misleading to ignorant people.”¹² The version

10 C. Cüppers, *The IXth Chapter of the Samādhirājasūtra*, Stuttgart 1990, p. 17.

11 Thus also, e.g. K. Raghavan Pillai, *The Vākyapadīya*, Delhi 1971, p. 91.

12 K.A. Subramania Iyer, *The Vākyapadīya of Bhartṛhari, Chapter II*, Delhi 1977, p. 103.

of K. Raghavan Pillai is also on the wrong track: “Means are intended as a concealment of the truth for the sake of the unwise who are learning”.¹³

In Buddhist texts we occasionally find expressions such as *bālalāpana*, *bālollāpana*, *bālapralāpa*, *bālopalāpana* and *bālālāpana*.¹⁴ The expression is used about a teaching which is not really true, but nevertheless useful and good for beginners. In other words something that is true *vyavahā-rataḥ*, but not *paramārthataḥ*.¹⁵ In Mahāyāna texts it belongs to the context of *satyadvaya*, as indeed it also does in the VP. Hence *upāyāḥ ...upalāpanāḥ*, in VP, should be translated with a positive connotation, e.g.: “When dealing with young students still learning (“freshmen”) (their teacher may use) pedagogical means”.

There can hardly be any doubt that Bhartṛhari derived the expression *bālānām upalāpanāḥ* from some Buddhist text, and therefore, of course, the reading *apalāpanāḥ* must be erroneous.

We cannot be sure precisely from *which* Bauddha text Bhartṛhari borrowed this expression, but it may be worthy of note that *bālalāpana* occurs in Nāgārjuna’s *Acintyastava* 7, especially so since it is not impossible that VP III. 2.1.:

*ātmā vastu svabhāvaś ca śarīram tattvam ity api /
dravyam ity asya paryāyās tac ca nityam iti smṛtam //*

is moulded upon *Acintyastava* 45ab:

svabhāvaḥ prakṛtis tattvam dravyam vastu sad ity api /¹⁶

Whether this be so or not, the fact remains that there are numerous echoes of typical Madhyamaka arguments and doctrines to be found scattered around in Bhartṛhari’s VP.

It may, incidentally, be pointed out that Nāgārjuna’s *Acintyastava* shows a considerable influence from *Samādhirajasūtra* IX, not just with regard to *vivartavāda* (see above), but also, among other things, with

13 See n. 11.

14 See my *Nagarjuniana. Studies in the Writings and Philosophy of Nāgārjuna*, Copenhagen 1982, p. 143, n. 7. For the idea cf. also *Yuktisāstikā* 30, *ibid.*, p. 110.

15 This *satyadvayavibhāga* is about as common in the VP as in Mahāyāna texts in general – not to speak of other Vedānta texts.

16 This seems first to have been pointed out by O. Qvarnström, *Hindu Philosophy in Buddhist Perspective*, Lund 1989, p. 130.

regard to the question of *pramāṇa*-s, a topic to which we shall revert soon. For now I shall just point out that *Acintyastava* 20:

*jadatvam apramāṇatvam athāvyākṛtātām api /
viparītaparijñānam indriyāṇām tvam ūcivān //*¹⁷

without any doubt is based on *Samādhirājasūtra* IX.24:

*yasmād ime indriya apramāṇā
jadāḥ svabhāvena avyākṛtāś ca /
tasmād ya nirvāṇapathena arthikah
sa āryamārgena karotu kāryam //*¹⁸

We here have an early canonical source to the effect that *indriya-pratyakṣa* cannot be considered a *pramāṇa*.¹⁹

3. We are on safer ground when we turn to Buddhist authors *after* Bhartṛhari. The first to come into consideration would be Dignāga.

As already pointed out long ago, Dignāga, towards the end of his *Pramāṇasamuccaya* (PS) V, quotes at least two verses from VP, viz. II. 158 and 155.²⁰ There are numerous other references to VP in the PS, and there can, therefore, be no doubt that Dignāga knew Bhartṛhari, and that he should also be placed *after* that author in time.²¹

17 Quoted from my *Nagarjuniana*, p. 146, where I failed to identify the original source.

18 Cüppers, *op. cit.*, p. 39.

19 Nāgārjuna accepts four *pramāṇa*-s (as does e.g. Candrakīrti, his celebrated commentator), but, naturally, only *vyāvahāratāḥ*. This is clear from his *Vigrahavyāvartanī* and *Vaidalyaprakaraṇa*. Probably also from his **Upāyahrdaya* (?), provided Y. Kajiyama is justified in accepting its authenticity, see his recent paper "On the Authorship of the *Upāyahrdaya*" in E. Steinkellner (ed.), *Studies in the Buddhist Epistemological Tradition*, Wien 1991, pp. 107-117. I still regard my hesitations as valid, see *Nagarjuniana*, p. 17, n. 44.

20 Frauwallner, *op. cit.*, p. 856, with ref. – See also M. Hattori (ed.), *The Pramāṇasamuccaya-vṛtti of Dignāga. Chapter Five*, Kyoto 1982, pp. 147 & 149, for the Sanskrit and Tibetan.

21 Many examples in R. Herzberger, *Bhartṛhari and the Buddhists – An Essay in the Development of Fifth and Sixth Century Indian Thought*, Dordrecht 1986, *passim*. Apart from this very problematic book, one may refer to M. Hattori's "Apoha and Pratibhā", in M. Nagatomi et al. (eds.), *Sanskrit and Indian Studies. Essays in Honour of Daniel H.H. Ingalls*, Dordrecht 1980, pp. 61-73. In the opinion of Hattori, Dignāga "adopted" his concept of *pratibhā* from VP. – See also, F. Tola and C. Dragonetti, "Some Remarks on Bhartṛhari's Concept of Pratibhā", in *JIP* 18 (1990), pp. 95-112. – There is no single word to cover all the meanings of this important term in VP. It covers notions such as:

Quite interesting in this connection is Dignāga's *Traikālyaparīkṣā*, a text in 33 verses available in an old Tibetan translation. Or rather, since (apart from its initial and final verses) it is but an extract from the *Sambandhasamuddeśa* (VP III.3.53-85, with some omissions), it is also still available as such in Sanskrit.²²

The final verses occur in the *Vṛtti* to VP I.1. They are often quoted, and Frauwallner may be right in suggesting that their original source was Bhartṛhari's now lost *Śabdadhātusamīkṣā*:

yathā viśuddham ākāśam timiropapluto janah /
 samkīrnam iva mātṛābhis citrābhir abhimanyate //
 tathedam amṛtaṁ brahma nirvikāram avidyayā /
 kaluṣatvam ivāpannam bhedarūpaṁ vivartate //

There is, as already pointed out by Frauwallner, a small and significant change introduced here by Dignāga, who replaces Bhartṛhari's subject (*amṛtaṁ*) *brahma* with *nam śes*, i.e. *viññānam* (and *hi?*). It is hard to say exactly what Dignāga wished to achieve by adapting Bhartṛhari's verses, but by replacing *brahma* with *viññāna* he at least affirms that Bhartṛhari's monism is acceptable to the Bauddhas, i.e. to Yogācāra, provided *viññāna*, not *brahma*, is read. By making this replacement Dignāga brings the verses closer to the idea expressed e.g. in *Madhyāntavibhāga* (I. 16, 21-22, especially), which may indeed have been one of Bhartṛhari's original sources for the distinction between *brahma/viññāna/citta* as originally pure, but under normal circumstances rendered impure by *kleśa*-s, above all *avidyā*. In a word, Dignāga brings the verses back into their original Buddhist form. Dignāga was, like I-ching, very much aware of Bhartṛhari's Buddhist leanings.

Later on we find Bauddhas such as Bhavya and Śāntarakṣita accusing Gauḍapāda and others of having "stolen" their ideas from the Buddhist texts.²³ Dignāga is saying the same thing in a more diplomatic language.

The fact that Dignāga's *Traikālyaparīkṣā* is thus based on Bhartṛhari's *Prakīrṇa(ka)* (VP III), tallies very nicely with the tradition that the celebrated Dharmapāla wrote a commentary (*vṛtti*) on that very chapter

intelligence, instinct, intuition, bright idea, and the like. Thanks to experience and intelligence, some people are more "bright" than others. Even animals and children possess *pratibhā* telling them what to do in a given situation.

22 Sanskrit and Tibetan texts in Frauwallner, *op. cit.*, pp. 821-828.

23 The charge of having stolen from the Buddhists is almost a *locus communis*, cf. Qvarnström, *op. cit.*, pp. 101-104.

of the VP. Its title was, according to Durvekamiśra, *Prakīrṇavṛtti*.²⁴ Apart from fragments, and as opposed to Dharmapāla's incomplete commentary on Dignāga's *Ālambanaparīkṣā*, it now, as known, seems to have been irreparably lost. But all this is nevertheless sufficient to show that by the time of Dignāga the works of Bhartṛhari were carefully studied by the Bauddhas, especially by those belonging to Yogācāra.

4. Kambala and Dharmakīrti are among those Bauddhas in whose extant works we can detect traces of their having read Bhartṛhari. A few obvious instances must be sufficient to establish this point.

First Kambala (ca. 450-525 A.D.). In his *Navasloka* 9ab:

yoginām api yaj jñānam tad apy ākāśalakṣaṇam /

has a nice parallel in his *Ālokamālā* 110ab:

yoginām api yaj jñānam tad apy ajñānam eva hi /

This is based on VP I.30cd:

ṛṣinām api yaj jñānam tad apy āgamapūrvakam /

Likewise, there can hardly be any doubt that *Ālokamālā* 111:

*sarvaṃ samvṛtimaj jñānam paṇḍitasyetarasya ca /
grahane vyapadeśe ca samam eva pravartate //*²⁵

is based on VP III.3.55:

*rūpanavyapadeśābhyām laukike vartmani sthitau /
jñānam praty abhilāpam ca sadṛśau bālapaṇḍitau //*

Whether Kambala got it directly from VP, or from Dignāga's *Traikāhyaparīkṣā* (where it comes as verse 4) is difficult to decide.

Ālokamālā 19 and 20 run:

*abhinnaṃ api bhedenā bahiś cāpy abahirgatam /
viśayākāraḥ kluṣaṃ khyāti cittaṃ anekadhā //*

24 Frauwallner, *op. cit.*, p. 857, n. 27.

25 Kambala's *Ālokamālā* was edited by me in *Miscellanea Buddhica*, Copenhagen 1985, pp. 109-221.

*sūryacandramasau vyoma tārācakram vasumdhara /
saritsāgaradikśailāś cittasyaitā vibhūṭayah //*

We are here, when it comes to *kāluṣya*, *kaluṣatva*, not just reminded of VP III.3.57 (= *Traikālyaparīkṣā* 6, cf. 4), but especially VP III.7.41:

*dyauḥ kṣamā vāyur ādityaḥ sāgarāḥ sarito diśaḥ /
antahkaranatattvasya bhāgā bahir avasthitāḥ //*

See also *Āloka-mālā* 85, 146, 157, 162, 177 and 193 for further references etc. to Bhartrhari by Kambala.

Dharmakīrti, too, knew his Bhartrhari. Not only does the style and the very title of his *Sambandhaparīkṣā*²⁶ recall Bhartrhari's *Sambandha-samuddēśa*, but especially in Dharmakīrti's own commentary to the first chapter of the *Pramānavārttika* there are numerous places reminiscent of VP.²⁷ The learned readers in those days would, of course, immediately recognize such allusions and they would appreciate them, just as one cannot fail to appreciate what in poetics is called *dhvani*. Indeed, as I have now tried to point out, such *sat sapienti* allusions must have been a characteristic and much cherished feature of sophisticated Sanskrit literature in the period we are here dealing with. A failure to recognize this device can easily lead to wrong judgements about the proper historical context.

I would not here want to go into the problem of the authenticity of the collection of poems ascribed to Bhartrhari, i.e. the *Śatakatraya* (or *Subhā-ṣitatriśaṭī*, etc.).²⁸ Personally, I have no hesitation at all in accepting its authenticity whatever its *original* form may have been. Dharmakīrti, too, composed poems, including some very nice ones in the *śṛṅgāra* style.²⁹ He may, indeed, have been inspired by the example of Bhartrhari to do so. In any case, by the time of Dharmakīrti, Bhartrhari was almost a part of the Buddhist heritage.

When Dharmakīrti in the *Pramānasiddhi* chapter of his PV discusses *pramāṇa*, reliable knowledge, he also deals with language, which, for him,

26 Edited and translated by Frauwallner, *op. cit.*, pp. 490-529. The original Sanskrit text (including the *Tīkā* of Vinītadeva) was recently discovered in Tibet, but still awaits publication.

27 R. Gnoli (ed.), *The Pramānavārttikam of Dharmakīrti. The First Chapter with the Auto-commentary*, Roma 1960, *passim*.

28 For a discussion (with further ref.) see e.g. Harold G. Coward, *Bhartrhari*, Boston 1976, pp. 95-104.

29 The references are listed in L. Sternbach, *Poésie sanskrite conservée dans les anthologies et les inscriptions, Tome II*, Paris 1982, pp. 130-132.

can be reduced to *anumāna*. (Or rather: which for him *must* be reduced to *anumāna*, since his system does not, for various reasons, permit more than two *pramāṇa*-s.) Language, speech and communication can be reliable for practical purposes to the extent that it tells us what other people have in mind. But how things actually are is not something we can be sure of merely on the basis of what other people tell us. Reliable knowledge is knowledge we can actually use for some meaningful practical purpose. We always have to try out whether it works. Dharmakīrti defines reliability, *avisamvādana*, as *arthakriyāsthiti*, the ability of being of any practical use. When he says, PV II.2cd:

(*prāmāṇyam tatra śabdasya*) *nārthatattvanibandhanam* /

we are not wrong in taking this as an allusion to VP I.13ab:

arthapravṛttitattvānām śabdā eva nibandhanam /.

Of course, it is not quite fair of Dharmakīrti to refute Bhartrhari in this way, because *śabda* means much more than just words and language in the VP. So Dharmakīrti's criticism is here a bit onesided.³⁰

When Dharmakīrti defines reliable knowledge in terms of *arthakriyā* he certainly has Bhartrhari in mind, even though the term can be traced back as far as Nāgārjuna.³¹ The idea that real things are *arthakriyā-samartha*, or *kāryakriyā-samartha*, is an old one in Indian thought.

In his PVin II.5-6, Dharmakīrti quite clearly has VP I. 33-35 in mind. The "hints" are given by the example of the *maṇi*-, and by VP 33b: *tām tām arthakriyām prati*, which in PVin II.5d becomes: *viśeṣo 'rthakriyām prati*.

Bhartrhari's argument is that real things (*dravya*) may have the ability to do this or that (*arthakriyā*), but under various circumstances other things may prevent them from doing so. This, however, is *not* something we can be sure of by means of *anumāna*. It requires a sort of expertise,

30 Cf. my paper "The Initial Verses of the *Pramāṇasiddhi* Chapter of the *Pramānavārttika*", in the volume of proceedings edited by E. Steinkellner (see n. 19), pp. 155-159. Dharmakīrti, to be sure, was not the first to employ *avisamvādana* as a criterion of valid knowledge. The term *avisamvāda* is found in *Pramāṇasamuccaya* II. 5ab, *Ślokavārttika*, *Śūnyavāda*, *Codanā* 80, *Tarkajvālā* ad MHK IV.38 (...*bslu ba med pa ni bden pa yin par rigs kyi*...), and even as early as *Ratnāvalī* II.35 (ed. M. Hahn, Bonn 1982, p. 52).

31 In the author's own commentary to VV 2 we thus read: *atha śūnyāḥ sarvabhāvā na ca kāryakriyā-samarthā bhavanti mā bhūd*... This implies that something real must be *kāryakriyā-samartha*, which is much the same as *arthakriyā-samartha*.

such as the one that a jeweller has based on long experience (*abhyāsa*). Such an expertise is inherited from a long cultural tradition, it depends on *āgama*. For Bhartṛhari *āgama* has things in common with perception, but is clearly a third *pramāṇa* in its own right apart from *pratyakṣa* and *anumāna*.³² For Dharmakīrti, on the other hand, the validity of cognition is not a question of *abhyāsa* (at least in this context!) but rather one of seeing whether our ideas actually work:

arthakriyānurodhena pramāṇatvaṃ vyavasthitam /³³

In Dharmakīrti there is no room for *āgama* as a third sort of *pramāṇa*. He therefore has to adapt, or interpret, this passage in the VP (with which, as we shall see, Buddhist philosophers were very much concerned) so as to suit the demands of his own system of two *pramāṇa*-s.

I have no doubt that future research will show that Dignāga and Dharmakīrti are heavily indebted to Bhartṛhari for much of their technical terminology. Here I just want to point out one such case. Speaking of an ignoramus with a “limited horizon”, Dharmakīrti at least twice uses the expression *tshu rol mthoñ ba*. This corresponds in Sanskrit to *arvāgdarśana*, a term which can be traced back to the *Vṛtti* to VP I.134, which may well, directly or indirectly, be Dharmakīrti’s source.³⁴

5. The term *arvāgdarśana* also occurs in another Buddhist author before Dharmakīrti, namely Bhavya, to whom I shall now turn my attention.

That Bhavya knew Bhartṛhari has already been established long ago. Let us briefly review some of the evidence before we try to determine the

32 Cf. A. Aklujkar “The Number of Pramāṇas according to Bhartṛhari” in WZKS 33 (1989), pp. 151-159. – See also Aklujkar and Potter’s summary of the VP in H.G. Coward and K. Kunjunni Raja (eds.), *Encyclopedia of Indian Philosophies. Volume V: The Philosophy of the Grammarians*, Delhi 1990, pp. 121-172.

33 PVin II.6cd, quoted from E. Steinkellner (ed.), *Dharmakīrti’s Pramāṇaviniścayaḥ. Zweites Kapitel: Svārthānumānam. Teil I*, Wien 1973, p. 27.

34 *Ibid.*, p. 66: *de la tshu rol mthoñ ba bdag ñid kyi mñon sum log pa tshad mar byed pa ni des gzuñ bar ’os pa ñid dgag pa pa rigs kyi thams cad ni de lta ma yin pa’i phyir thams cad ’gog pa ni ma yin no.* – In PVin III (Peking ed., Ce 319b6) we read: *tshu rol mthoñ ba ’dis...* In the *Vṛtti* to VP I. 134. (ed. Iyer, p. 221) we have what is probably the source of Dharmakīrti (and, as we shall see, Bhavya): *arvāgdarśanānām tu puruṣānām prāyena sātiśayāḥ pratighātīnyāḥ sāparādhāḥ śaktayāḥ*. The term also occurs in the *Vṛtti* to VP I. 151 (ed. Rau), see Iyer, *op. cit.*, p. 205 (ad VP I. 127). Cf. also E. Steinkellner (trans.), *Dharmakīrti’s Pramāṇaviniścayaḥ. Zweites Kapitel: Svārthānumānam. Teil II*, Wien 1979, p. 79, n. 258 for some later references. No source earlier than VP seems to be known.

extent to which Bhartṛhari exerted a positive influence upon Bhavya's way of thinking. As we shall see, it was very considerable.

In his *Madhyamakahrdayakārikā* (MHK) IX.13-14 Bhavya has these two verses presenting the view of Mīmāṃsā:

*dūṣayitvā trayīmārgam hetubhir hetuvādinah /
anumānapradhānatvāt svanayam dyotayanti ye //
pādasparśād ivāndhānām viśame pathi dhāvatām /
anumānapradhānānām pātah teṣām na durlabhah //*³⁵

This includes an almost literal quotation from VP I.42:

*hastasparśād ivāndhena viśame pathi dhāvatā /
anumānapradhānena vinipāto na durlabhah //*

The same verse, to be sure, is also cited by Bhavya in his *Prajñāpradīpa* IX, which, incidentally, confirms the variant readings:

*/loñ ba rkañ pa'i tshod dpag kyi(s)//nam ña'i lam du rgyug pa ltar/
'rjes su dpag pa gtsor 'dzin pa//mam par lhuñ ba mi dka' 'o*³⁶

On the basis of this there can be no doubt that Bhavya knew the VP. Before proceeding further it may be useful briefly to recall the ideas expressed in VP I.30-42. Bhartṛhari's fundamental position is that *dharma* can only be established by means of *āgama*. Even the cognition of saints is based on *āgama*. It is impossible to figure out what *dharma* is merely by *tarka* or *anumāna* (VP I.30):

*na cāgamād rte dharmas tarkena vyavatiṣṭhate /
rjñānam api yaj jñānam tad apy āgamapūrvakam //*³⁷

What Bhartṛhari disavows is not *tarka* or *anumāna* as such, but merely its limitations, and therefore also those philosophers who put too much emphasis on "reason", those who are *anumānapradhāna*. As long as *tarka* is ancillary to *āgama* it is fully acceptable to Bhartṛhari (VP I. 151ab):

vedaśāstrāvirodhī ca tarkaś caksur apaśyatām /

35 Quoted from S. Kawasaki (ed.), *The Mīmāṃsā Chapter of Bhavya's Madhyamaka-hrdaya-kārikā: Sanskrit and Tibetan Texts*, Tsukuba 1976, 1987, 1988, p. 12 (with a few changes).

36 Cf. Kawasaki, *op. cit.*, p. 13, n. 7, for the source of the Tibetan.

37 As will be recalled, Kambala also referred to this verse, in *Navasloka* 9ab and *Āloka-mālā* 110ab, both quoted above (p. 202).

Bhartrhari's view can certainly be considered "orthodox". In the verse just quoted he seems to have had in mind *Manu* XII.106 (or some such passage):

*ārṣam dharmopadeśam ca vedaśāstrāvirodhinā /
yas tarkenānusamdhātī sa dharmam veda netarah //*

He has nothing against *tarka* or *anumāna* as such, but only against those who are *śuskatarkānusārin* (VP II. 484b, cf. *Mahābhārata* III. 13463, quoted in PW, s.v.),³⁸ or *anumānapradhāna*. Logic and reason are all right as long as they are not in conflict with the holy tradition.

The hostile attitude towards "dry logicians" (*tārkika*) is by no means specific to *Manu* and the VP. According to Nāgārjuna, for instance, even the Buddha took exception to *tārkika*-s.³⁹ And let us not forget that in early Buddhist texts *nirvāṇa* is said to be inaccessible to reason (*atarkāvacara*).⁴⁰

To sum up Bhartrhari's position: He accepts three *pramāṇa*-s, true, but they are by no means on a par. When one has to make the right decision (*dharma*, *itikartavyatā*) in matters of religion, ethics and grammar (!) one must resort to *āgama*. As we would say, *āgama* has to do with *values*, with good and bad, rather than with "facts". *Āgama* can be supported by *anumāna* and *tarka*, but never challenged or questioned by reason and logic. *Āgama* works as a sort of perception, but it covers much more than normal perception. This sort of *āgama* is the most fundamental of the three *pramāṇa*-s accepted by Bhartrhari.

When it comes to Bhavya the situation is much the same, at least in principle. His attitude towards *āgama* is partly inherited from Bhartrhari though it certainly also has a Buddhist background, and, of course, his conception of what *dharma* is has nothing in common with Bhartrhari. Moreover, it should not be forgotten that the antithesis *āgama-tarka* expressed by *Manu* and VP has an old parallel in the Buddhist distinction between *āgama* and *yukti*.⁴¹

38 The expression is also known to Śaṅkara, see *Adyar Library Bulletin* 54 (1990), p. 147. See also *Manu* II. 12.

39 See *Lokāṭītaśta* 21, in my *Nagarjuniana*, p. 134.

40 Cf. *A Critical Pāli Dictionary* for ref.

41 This distinction is already known to Nāgārjuna, cf. his *Ratnāvalī* III.14a: *rīgs pa dan ni lun bstan pa...yukti* and *āgama*...

Let us now look at some of the most significant passages in question. To Bhartrhari, *āgama* is, roughly speaking, the Veda with all its *upāṅga*-s, etc., and those civilized people (*śiṣṭa*) who follow it. With Bhavya it is otherwise. The correct teaching is to be found in the Buddhist scriptures, the Buddha being the most competent authority. How can we be sure? Because it is the least unreasonable of all teachings, according to Bhavya. (This again implies that one has to check all other teachings, to see that they are unreasonable. This again explains the doxographical nature of Bhavya's main works.) See MHK V.8-9:

(atrocyate) *pramāṇam naḥ sarvaṁ tāthāgatam vacaḥ /*
āptopadeśaprāmāṇyād bhadro hi pratipadyate //
nāgamāntarasamdigdhaviparyastamatih parah /
*tasmāt tatpratipattiyartham tanmrgyo yuktimannayah //*⁴²

The Buddhist scriptures tell us what *tattva* is, and what *dharma* is. "Reason", on the other hand, shows us that all other opinions entertained by our opponents, are, in the final analysis, wrong. Still, the ultimate *tattva* of the Bauddhas (*śūnyatā*, *anutpāda*, *dharmakāya*, etc.) is beyond the range of reason (but not, as we shall see, beyond the range of "personal experience"). This is clear from MHK V. 104-105:

tattvasyātarkagocarāt tadbodho nānumānataḥ /
nātas tarkena dharmānām grhyeta dharmateti cet //
ihānumānān nirdoṣād āgamānuvidhāyinaḥ /
kalpitāśeṣavividhavidhikalpāpām nirākrteḥ //

When Bhavya here speaks of *anumāna* as having to be *nirdoṣa* and *āgamānuvidhāyin*, it is in principle similar to Manu's *tarka* which must be *vedaśāstrāvirodhi(n)*, a term taken over, as we have seen, by VP I.151. Bhavya can therefore say, MHK V.107:

ato 'numānaviśayam na tattvaṁ pratipadyate /
tattvajñānavipakṣo yaḥ tasya tena nirākrīyā //

One can, on this basis, speak of Bhavya's "negative dialectics", and in this sense Bhavya's *tattva* is, as he says in MHK V. 113, *yuktāgamopeta*, i.e. based on *āgama*, supported by logic.

42 Quoted from the critical edition of the text (in prep. by myself and M.D. Eckel). It is based on the only available Sanskrit Ms., for which see Qvarnström, *op. cit.*, p. 23. (The following verses come from the same source.)

In the commentary to MHK IX.7 the Bauddhas are accused of reducing *āgama* to *anumāna*.⁴³ This would, at least in a sense, apply to Dignāga and, later on, Dharmakīrti, but not to Bhavya. The issue is taken up by Bhavya later on in his *Prajñāpradīpa*. Here, he agrees that *āgama* and *anumāna* have the same *viśaya*. They deal with the same thing. There is nothing wrong with *anumāna* as such, but one must not place too much emphasis on *anumāna*. This is exactly the position of Bhartṛhari, as we have already seen.⁴⁴

What, then, is the relationship between *āgama* and *tattva*, for, surely, *āgama* is not identical with *tattva*? Bhavya attempts to solve this problem by saying that the words of the Buddha are *ji lta ba bžin*, or *yathāvat*, they are adequate in the sense that they “correspond” to reality. This idea comes very close to VP I.5 which describes the Veda (i.e. *āgama*) as a *prāptiupāya* and an *anukāra* (“image, imitation”) of (*śabda*-)*tattva*. The scriptures are valid because they somehow reflect true reality. The rest is logic, and it is yoga, in Bhartṛhari as well as in Bhavya.

We would have liked to know what exactly Bhartṛhari has in mind when he refers to *śabdapūrvayoga* (VP I.20c) and to *adhyātmaśāstra* (VP I.174c). Is it the sort of “OM-mysticism” mentioned e.g. in Patañjali’s YS I. 25-27, or in the first chapter of the *āgamaśāstra* of Gaudapāda?

43 TJ IX ad MHK IX.7 (Peking ed. Dsa 311b5): *gañ yañ sañs rgyas pas luñ gis rjes su dpag pa'i khoñs su gtogs so źes btags pa de ni bden pa ma yin te/ gañ gi phyir/ pratyaksam anumānam ca śābdam copamayā saha / arthāpattir abhāvaś ca hetavañ sādhyasādhakāh //*

Cf. Kawasaki, *op. cit.*, p. 9, n.5. See also TJ ad IX.18 for *āgama*.

44 *Prajñāpradīpa* IX (Peking ed. Tsha 154a 4), just after the citation of VP I. 42...*luñ ni rjes su dpag pa las don tha dad pa ma yin par gzuñ bar bya ste/ mñon sum ma yin pa'i don rtogs pa'i rgyu yin pa'i phyir/ dper na/ rjes su dpag pa'i rañ gi bdag ñid bžin no// kha cig na re/ luñ ni rjes su dpag pa las don tha dad pa kho na yin te/ de las yul tha dad pa'i phyir dper na mñon sum bžin no// de ltar yañ rjes su dpag pa ni dbañ pos gzuñ ba'i don gyi yul can yin la/ sgra'i mtshan ñid kyi tshad ma ni dbañ po las 'das pa mtho ris dañ byañ grol gyi yul can yin pas/ de'i phyir luñ ni rjes su dpag pa las don tha dad pa kho na yin no/ źe na/ luñ ni rjes su dpag pa las yul tha dad pa ñid ma yin te/...yañ na mtho ris dañ thar pa yod do// źes bya ba/ de bžin gśegs pa'i luñ gañ yin pa de ni ji lta ba bžin te...* Bhavya, in MHK IX. 19-20, goes as far as to say that everything that is handed down and makes sense, is *āgama*:

yat parīkṣāksamam yuktyā vacanam cet tad āgamah /

With this in mind, it is understandable why Candrakīrti would accuse Bhavya of *priyānumānatā* (*Prasannapadā*, p. 16), a predilection for logic. Cf. also the very title Bhavya chose for his work: *Tarkajvālā*. Still, the accusation is not quite fair, as we see once we also keep MHK V. 104-107 in mind (quoted above). Bhavya is also very much aware of the limitations of logic.

We cannot be sure. In any case, Bhavya's position is clear enough. The ideal is to obtain *vajropamasamādhi*, or *tattvajñāna*, i.e. to experience *śūnyatā* and *anutpāda* personally. First one learns the doctrine of *anutpāda* etc. from Buddhist *āgama* (esp. *Prajñāpāramitā*). Then one refutes all other *āgama*-s with the help of *yukti*, *tarka* and *anumāna*.⁴⁵ This brings one to the truth. Finally one realizes the reality behind truth through "auto-suggestion", or *bhāvanā*. This reflects the old Buddhist distinction between three degrees of *prajñā*, partly modified by Bhavya himself.

Of course Bhavya accepts a *tattvajñāna*, as all Mādhyamikas always do. This *jñāna*, however, is neither *savikalpa* nor *avikalpa*, see e.g. MHK III.285cd (speaking of the *dharmakāya*):

savikalpāvikalpena jñānenāpy eṣa durdrśaḥ //⁴⁶

or MHK III.265:

*nirvikalpārthaviṣayā nirvikalpāpi dhīr mṛṣā /
anātmādisvabhāvatvāt tadyathā savikalpadhīḥ* //⁴⁷

or MHK VIII.104:

*savikalpāvikalpā ca yadā buddhir nivartate /
dhiyām aviṣaye tasmin prapañcopaśamaḥ śivah* //⁴⁸

This is a bit surprising, and this terminology – neither *savikalpa* nor *nirvikalpa* (*avikalpa*) – ought to strike us as odd. One would have expected Bhavya to say that *tattva* was the object of some sort of *nirvikalpajñāna*, as Mahāyāna texts otherwise invariably do. Bhavya seems to be the only Bauddha to express himself in this curious way, if I am not mistaken.

There is a very specific historical background for this oddity. The clue is to be found in the commentary to MHK III.285. Here we are told that *anumāna* is *savikalpa* and determined by *vikalpa* and *anusmṛti*, whereas *pratyakṣa* is *nirvikalpa* and grasps *vastumātra* as its object.⁴⁹ The *dharmā-*

45 See e.g. MHK IX. 18 with TS.

46 Quoted from the edition of Y. Ejima, *Chūgan-Shisō no Tenkai-Bhāvaviveka Kenkyū*, Tokyo 1980, p. 340.

47 *Ibid.*, p. 334.

48 Quoted from Qvarnström, *op. cit.*, p. 48 (cf. p. 153 for Tib.). Cf. *ibid.*, p. 95, n. 118 for further references.

49 TJ ad MHK III.285: *rtog pa dan bcas pa ni rjes su dpag pa ste/ rtog pa dan rjes su dran pa'i mam par rtog pa yod pa'i phyir ro// mam par rtog pa med pa ni mñon sum gyi śes*

kāya, according to MHK III.286, is *tārkikānām agocarah*. Bhavya obviously has certain *tārkika*-s in mind when he says that *tattva* cannot be known by *anumāna* or *pratyakṣa*. Logicians who accept only two *pramāṇa*-s. That Bhavya here has Dignāga (to whom he explicitly refers in MHK V) in mind is quite clear. His terminology is a reaction against the epistemology of Yogācāra *sākāravāda*.⁵⁰ In other words, Bhavya does not accept merely two *pramāṇa*-s, as does Dignāga etc. To him, as to Bhartṛhari, *āgama* is the most fundamental *pramāṇa*, provided, naturally, that one does not forget to practise yoga.

When Dignāga speaks of a *yogipratyakṣa(-jñāna)*, Bhavya speaks of *jñānakṣaṇa* (MHK III.291), *ekakṣaṇajñāna* (ad MHK I.6, and MHK 268), *svayambhūjñāna*, or the like. The difference, of course, is hardly more than one of terminology in the final analysis.

Finally, in the first chapter of the *Madhyamakaratnapradīpa*, there are some unmistakable echoes of VP when Bhavya opines that *tārkika*-s who are *anumānapramāṇapradhāna* are unable to understand *tattva*, etc., because their cognition is too limited, being that of *arvāgdarśana*.⁵¹

6. Also in later Buddhist literature we find references to Bhartṛhari's opinion about the limitations of *anumāna*. In his *Tattvasamgraha* (TS) 1460-1462, for instance, Śāntarakṣita quotes VP I.32-34. But a little later (TS 1476-1477) Śāntarakṣita, by adding *na*, indicates that he does not agree:

pa ste/ dños po tsam la dmigs pa'i phyir ro//. This is based on Dignāga. The idea that *pratyakṣa* has *vastumātra* as its "object" comes up again in Dharmakīrti. The scriptural origin of the term *vastumātra* (or *paratantrasvabhāva*, as the "object" of *pratyakṣa*) seems to be the *Tattvārthapatala* of the *Bodhisattvabhūmi*. The terms *svalakṣaṇa* and *vastumātra* thus become almost interchangeable, depending on the context. – See also TJ ad MHK IV.67.

50 See my "Bhavya's Critique of Yogācāra in the *Madhyamakaratnapradīpa*, Chapter IV", in B.K. Matilal and R.D. Evans (eds.), *Buddhist Logic and Epistemology*, Dordrecht 1986, pp. 239-263.

51 MRP I: 'di ltar rjes su dpag pa'i tshad ma gtso bor byed pa'i rtog ge pas ni de kho na ñid dan/ sañs rgyas kyi sku dan ye śes śin tu lkog tu gyur pa dag brtags śin dpyad pas śes par mi 'gyur te/ tshu rol mthoñ ba'i śes par yin pa'i phyir ro//

ñi ma dmus loñ yul min bñin//mtho ris sdig can yul ma yin/

/de ñid dan ni bsgrub bya de//rtog ge pa yi yul ma yin/

/nor bu rin chen brtag pa la//loñ ba tshad ma yin nam ci/

These verses contain echoes of MHK III. 286 (Ejima, *op. cit.*, p. 340) and (as later on also *Pramānaviniścaya*, as we have seen, II.5-6) VP I.35cd: *manirūpyādivijñānam tadvidāṃ nānumānikam*. Cf. also the *Vṛtti* to VP I.127 (ed. Iyer, p. 205).

*avasthādeśakālānām bhedād bhinnāsu śaktiṣu /
bhāvānām anumānena nātaḥ siddhiḥ sudurlabhā //*
*yatnenānumito 'py arthaḥ kuśalair anumātrbhiḥ /
nānyathā sādhyate so 'nyair abhiyuktatarair api //*⁵²

Another late Buddhist author who often quotes the VP, is Jñānaśrībhadrā, who composed a *Vṛtti* to the *Laṅkāvatārasūtra*. He was active in the 11th century A.D., and is quoted by Jñānavajra, the author of the only other Indian commentary on the *Laṅkāvatārasūtra* that has come down to us. Both seem now to have been lost in the original Sanskrit. All in all Jñānaśrībhadrā quotes about forty verses from Bhartṛhari ("Bha ta hari") and other grammarians. Among these it will here be sufficient to cite a sample which, when compared with the corresponding Sanskrit original, shows a few interesting variants, but otherwise serves to corroborate the *textus receptus*.⁵³

This list of extracts can be seen as a supplement to the useful preliminary set of testimonia in K.V. Abhyankar and V.P. Limaye's edition of the *Vākyapadīya*, Poona 1965.

1. *anādinidhanam brahma śabdatattvam yad akṣaram /
vivartate 'rthabhāvena prakriyā jagato yataḥ //*
/ thog ma med pa'i tshaṅs pa rtag//yaṅ dag sgra ni yig 'bru gaṅ/
/ gaṅ las don dños 'byuṅ ba daṅ//gro ba'i rab tu byed pa yaṅ /
2. *yah sarvaparikalpānām ābhāse 'py anavasthitah /
tarkāgamānumānena bahudhā parikalpitah //*
/ gaṅ yoṅs rtogs pa thams cad la//snaṅ bar yaṅ ni mi gnas te/
/ rtog pa luṅ daṅ rjes dpag pas//rnam pa du mar kun brtags pa'o/
3. *vyāṭito bhedasamsargau bhāvābhāvau kramākramau /
satyānṛte ca viśvātmā pravivekāṭ prakāśate //*

52 Quoted from A. Kunst, *Probleme der buddhistischen Logik in der Darstellung des Tattva-saṅgraha*, Kraków 1939, p. 100. (To Śāntaraksita *tattva* is also beyond *anumāna*, as in case of Bhavya. But *vyavahārataḥ* both accept an *anumāna* that is *nir-doṣa*, which, in case of Śāntaraksita, means that it follows the rules of Dharmakīrti.)

53 For Jñānaśrībhadrā, who also wrote a commentary on *Pramāṇaviniścaya*, see E. Steinkellner, *op. cit.*, 1973, p. 15. His commentary on the *Laṅkāvatāra* is also mentioned in the splendid (but often rather uncritical) work of H. Nakamura, *A History of Early Vedānta Philosophy*, Delhi 1983, pp. 257-258. – In the verses here quoted from VP (*Vṛtti* – or *Śabdadhātusamīksā*?) I & III, there seem to be some variant readings, e.g., in 1, *anādi hi nityam ... 'rthabhāvaś ca*, etc. – In the Tibetan I have corrected in 4b 'gram daṅ riṅ (for 'gran daṅ rim) and 8a rig (for rigs). Read, perhaps, also *nam yaṅ* for *mam dag* in 8d. – Other quotations from various grammarians are found 74a2 (2 v. from VP), 74a4 (11 v. from VP), 74b1 (1 v. from gzon nu can gyi mur byed pa), 133a (2 v. from VP), 140a2 (3 v. from VP), 140a8 (1 v. from VP), 242b5 (2 v. from VP), and 276a6 (6 v. from VP).

- / 'das kyañ 'du 'dzi byed pa dañ//dños dañ dños med rim mi rim/
 / bden dañ brdzun par sna tshogs bdag//dben pa las ni rab tu snañ/
 4. *antaryāmī sa bhūtānām ārād dūre ca drśyate /*
so 'tyantamukto moksāya mumukṣubhir upāsyate //
 / 'byuñ po rnam kyis nañ rgyu ba// 'gram dañ riñ du'añ snañ ba ste/
 / thar pa rab tu grol ba de//grol 'dod rnam kyis bstan par byed/
 5. *prakṛitvam api prāptān vikārān ākaroti sah /*
rtudhām eva gr̥smānte mahato meghasamplavān //
 / de yi tshor ba gcig po yañ//rnam pa mañ por rab tu 'byed/
 / 'jig pa 'byuñ ba'i me mdag dañ//chu yi phuñ por chu bzin du/
 6. *tasmād ākṛtigotrasthād vyaktigrāmā vikāriṇaḥ /*
mārutād iva jāyante vṛstīmanto balāhakāḥ //
 / de phyir da rod rigs gnas pa// gsal ba'i groñ rnam 'gyur ba ni/
 / sprin rnam char dañ ldan pa rnam//rluñ las 'byuñ ba bzin du 'o/
 7. *trayirūpena tajjyotih paramam parivartate /*
prthakfīrthapravādesu dr̥stibhedanibandhanam //
 / gsum gyi gzugs su de snañ ba//mur smra tha dad rnam la ni/
 / mchog gi yoñs su 'gyur ba ste// lta ba tha dad kyis ni bcins/
 8. *śāntavidyātmako yo 'mśaḥ tad uhaṭad avidyayā /*
tayā grastam ivājasram yā nirvaktum na śakyate //
 / ži žiñ rig bdag tshañs pa ste// de las byuñ ba'i ma rig pa/
 / des ni srin po bzin du med//gañ smra mi nus rnam dag go/
 9. *yathā viśuddham ākāśam timiropapluto janah /*
samkīram iva mātṛābhīś citrābhir abhimanyate //
 / ji ltar nam mkha' rnam dag par//rab rib 'khrul pa'i skyes bu yis/
 / ri mo rnam pa sna tshogs kyis//kun tu gañ bar sems pa pa/
 10. *tathedam amṛtaṁ brahma nirvikāram avidyayā /*
kaluṣatvam ivāpannam bhedarūpam vivartate //
 / de ltar tshañs pa bdud rtsi 'di// 'gyur ba med pa ma rig pas/
 / rñog pa lta bur byas pas na//tha dad gzugs su snañ ba ste/
 11. *dyauḥ kṣamā vāyur ādityaḥ sāgarāḥ sarito diśaḥ /*
antahkaranatattvasya bhāgā bahir avasthitāḥ //
 / lha sa rluñ dañ nam mkha' dañ//ri dañ chu dañ phyogs rnam kyañ/
 / nañ du byed pa'i yañ dag gi// cha rnam phyi rol bzin du gnas/
 12. *ekam eva yad āmnātaṁ bhinnasaktivapāśrayāt /*
apṛthakte 'pi śaktibhyaḥ prthaktvene va vartate //
 / tshul ni gcig ñid gañ yin las// tha dad mthu ni rnam gnas pas/
 / mthu las tha dad ma yin yañ// tha dad bzin du 'byuñ ba'o/
 13. *brahmedam śabdanirmānam śabdaśaktinibandhanam /*
vivṛtaṁ śabdamātṛābhyas tās v eva pravīṇyate //
 / tshans sgra'i 'di ni sprul pa ste//sgra yi mthu las gnas pas ni/
 / sgra tsam las ni byuñ ba yañ//de dag ñid du ža bar 'gyur/
 14. *yad ekam prakriyābhedair bahudhā pravibhajyate /*
tad vyākaraṇam āgamyā param brahmādhigamyate //
 / rab tu byed pa gcig 'byed la//mañ por rab tu phye ba pa/
 / de ni luñ ston rtogs pa las//tshañs pa mchog ni chud par 'gyur/

