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## BUCHBESPRECHUNGEN/COMPTE RENDUS

BAKKER, Hans T. *The Vākāṭakas. An Essay in Hindu Iconology*. Groningen: Egbert Forsten. 1997. (Gonda Indological Studies V.) xiv + 211 pp.; xlvii numbered plates; 3 maps. ISBN 90 6980 100 0.

This book consists of two parts. Part I deals with "The History and Religion of the Vākāṭakas". Part II is "A Catalogue of Vākāṭaka Hindu Sculpture". A Preface and an Introduction precede, and various Appendixes, a Bibliography, two Indexes, forty-seven Plates and three Maps follow these two parts.

The connection between the two main parts is explained in the Introduction, and in a way already in the subtitle of the book. Iconology is the synthetic method of investigation which uses as far as possible textual and archaeological sources in combination. Part II presents a number of archaeological sources, which are used in Part I, along with textual sources, to weave together a picture of the political and religious history of the Vākāṭaka kingdom.

In addition to the textual material already known, the author has utilized two sources which have only recently become available: the original Skandapurāṇa which is at present the object of a research project at his institute at the University of Groningen; and an inscription in the Kevala-Narasimha Temple on Ramtek Hill. A revised edition of the latter is presented in an appendix.

Johannes Bronkhorst

DEMMER, Ulrich. *Verwandtschaft und Sozialität bei den Jenu Kurumba. Von Arbeiten, von Teilen und von (Un)gleichheit in einer südindischen Sammler- und Järgergesellschaft*. Stuttgart: Franz Steiner Verlag, 1996 (Beiträge zur Südasiensforschung 173), 193 pp.

The book under review is the rework of the author's Ph.D. thesis at Heidelberg (1993). This ethnographic study of the Jenu Kurumba (JK) tribe of gatherer-hunters in South India is divided into five chapters beside introduction and conclusions. Chapter II describes the territories where the Jenu Kurumba live; Chapter III places the JK in the wider Indian society; chapter IV presents the JK's kinship network; in chapter V their interpersonal system of behaviour is described and chapter VI deals with the practices of honey collecting being the chief engagement of the tribe.

The study is the result of the author's long term personal field work (22 months) and as such it is rare nowadays. It is a sincere and at times affected report. It is described (in the Summary) as an ethnographic study concerned with constructing the JKs sociality and the moral concepts that the JK employ in the process. However, there are surprisingly few JK concepts which seem to me of crucial importance such as the indigenous concept of labour, gift, money, honey and group. Demmer has collected a few but ethnologically rich ballads and narratives. However, he restricts their anthropological use to the rather narrow focus of kinship and affinity relationships. He refutes the "reified concept of society and replaces it by a concept of sociality, i.e. the construction of interpersonal social life, as a base for description and analysis."

Although this is a legitimate starting point it leads him to say that his approach "is especially useful in a culture like that of the Jenu Kurumba where people do not present to the anthropologist context-free or reified models of their society, structures, rules etc." (p. 189). I wonder which culture Demmer has in mind which has produced a model of its society which is *context free*? Such a culture, free from any epistemological bias, only exists in an academic utopia.

The kinship system is critically described with the help of Carrithers' concept of sociality. Demmer finds support for Strathern's concept of "unmediated exchange" and makes corrections to Dumont's "affinity as a value". He rightly devotes one chapter (VI) to the tribe's chief engagement: the collection of honey.

Dr Demmer's main contribution may be summarized thus: the Jenu Kurumba tribe represents a "quasi endogamous network" of about 300 couples; the kinship sphere is characterized by asymmetric and hierarchical relationship, while the affinal sphere is symmetric and guided by a principle of equality. The "unity and equality of the affines" is the dominant principle of the tribe's *society*. It can be seen 'at work' in the marriage system as well as in the economic system. For the JK "things have no social life".

Demmer gives a neat description of the kinship and affinity networks. The kinship relations are dominated by the asymmetrical and hierarchical opposition between the senior and the junior whether male or female. However, prestations made within the kinship network (*ba-mayika*) are always made from the male to the female (pp. 83-85). Gender inequality is also seen at the time the JK collect honey. Here it is the male who uses the knife, never females (p.134). This is interesting for among Hindu artisan castes I found that only the females use knives.

Reporting on the structure of all honey collecting groups, Demmer distinguishes type A consisting of affines of two possible dyades, namely ZH+WB or WF+DH, from type B consisting of conjugal pairs and classificatory kin. Although in general the descriptions do not lack clarity, the position of the brother-in-law (*bavan* [ZH;WB]) is not made clear. He belongs to the *ba-mayika* (p.77) and between the *ba-mayidan* and the *bavan* exists a relationship of mutual support, unlike the situation among the others (p.125).

Demmer's pre-occupation with process and his tirade against structuralism (p. 106) made him overlook a structure which seems to be fundamental for the JKs. The brother-in-law's position between kin and affines is also seen at the time of honey collecting. Here he stands between the honey bees and the other JKs. The other binary oppositions which Demmer observed are those between eB and yB (pp. 45 and 154). In my view it is the female figure of the stories who binds the opposed elements. In the praxis the conjugal pairs—the "Leute der Gottheit"—are held together by the deity. It would follow that the brother-in-law (WB-ZH) and the deity occupy a similar structural position. One of the most interesting features of the JKs is the division between the married and the unmarried (approx. 8-18 years of age peer groups). Demmer rightly supports Bird's view that "in having these shifting, temporary associations and moving from one

family to another and from one single person to another, the single persons manage to be independent of any one family in particular, or any one single person, thus maximizing their independence in general. The contractual nature of their cooperation with conjugal families, and the tendency to avoid kin or any particular category of persons, further enhance their relative autonomy and independence.” (N. Bird-David, 1987:95). The cohesion of the JK as an endogamous group (tribe) seems then to be expressed in not only the deity, but also in the unmarried. Demmer calls the status of the unmarried as marginal, but I feel that their status as well as that of the deity is rather central. Similarly the status of the brother-in-law is central for the cohesion of the JK.

The cultural ideology of the JK is thus marked by two sets of binary oppositions (married/unmarried and eb/yb), while their praxis is characterized by trinary structures (kin-*bavan*-affines; bees-*bavan*-JKs; JKs-deity-others). How is it that Demmer, who otherwise is so sensitive to the thought and world of the JKs, has failed to recognize this? The answer, at least in part, lies in his starting point.

Demmer set out to the field with basically two types of literature in his baggage: monographs on the JKs by Bird, Misra and others and those by Carrithers (general anthropology) and Strathern (on Melanesia). This narrowed his scope in two directions. He largely by-passes the fact that the worldviews of non-brahmin castes and tribes are not so much different from each other as is generally assumed. For example, the JK story of the Ash Boy (p. 54) and the Visvakarma artisans' origin story (Brouwer 1995:217) have a striking structural similarity. Even at the level of praxis, I find many similarities between the JK and non-brahman castes of the Karnataka plains.

According to Demmer the JKs have no cultural ideology and yet they have their own model of society, distinct from those of the caste Hindus. In his view all the other (caste) models are hierarchical (p. 41), but that of the JK tribe is based on “unity and equality”. The author considers the larger Indian Society as an arena wherein several models of social order co-exist, one of them is the JK model. It seems to me that he means anthropological models and not indigenous models, while the JK model is treated as being unique and standing in isolation although the JK “have a long history of contact with other groups” (p. 190). Surprisingly Dr Demmer did not see significant correspondences between the “JK model” and the dominant

cultural ideology of the sub-continent. On the level of praxis the observed “ethic of affinity” can also be found among various caste groups of Karnataka. What makes the JK really different, I feel, is their apparent lack of a concept of exchange.

It is a pity that Demmer did not consult Levi-Strauss’ “From Honey to Ashes” and F.G. Bailey’s works on tribals of Central India in his discussion of existing literature. The book will therefore be of interest mainly to anthropologists specializing in marriage and kinship systems and who believe in the universal validity of anthropological concepts.

Jan Brouwer

ERB, Felix. *Śūnyatāsaptativṛtti. Candrakīrtis Kommentar zu den “Siebzig Versen über die Leerheit” des Nāgārjuna [Kārikās 1-14]. Einleitung, Übersetzung, textkritische Ausgabe des Tibetischen und Indizes*. Stuttgart: Franz Steiner Verlag, 1997. (Tibetan and Indo-Tibetan Studies 6). ISBN 3-515-07020-6.

In his *Yuktiṣaṣṭikāvṛtti*—the relevant passage is translated in Erb’s PhD thesis: *Die Śūnyatāsaptati des Nāgārjuna und die Śūnyatāsaptativṛtti [Verse 1-32] (unter Berücksichtigung der Kommentare Candrakīrtis, Parahitas und des Zweiten Dalai Lama)*, Hamburg 1990: pp. XVIf.— Candrakīrti considers Nāgārjuna’s *Śūnyatāsaptati* [ŚS] to be a mere appendix or amendment to the *Mūlamadhyamakakārikā* [MMK] VII,34: “Like an illusion, a dream, a Gandharva-city; in such a way origination, duration and cessation are taught.” This view seems to have been taken over by both the Indian and the Tibetan tradition, e.g., by Parahita, rMa bya ba brtson ‘grus seng ge, Tsong kha pa, mKhas grub rje, Rong ston shes bya kun rig or Klong rdol Lama (see Erb, PhD thesis p.XVII, n. 2). Tsong kha pa, however, in his *rTsa she ṭik chen* (Peking edition fol. 148a5-b7) adds that the full meaning of MMK XXIV,8ab: “Based upon the two [levels of] reality are the Buddhas’ proclamations of the *dharma*” and of the fact that the entire multitude of the appearing world exists merely as worldly convention due to pragmatic designation cannot be understood without the explanations of ŚS. With this statement, Tsong kha pa approaches Candrakīrti’s own valuation of ŚS expressed in his *Śūnyatāsaptativṛtti* [ŚSV],

where he clearly considers it an important independent treatise (see Erb, PhD thesis pp. XVIIIff.).

In the concluding verses of ŚSV Candrakīrti states: “That which has not been said in the *Madhyamakāvātāra* [MAv] and that which is not clear in the *Stanzas on Madhyamaka* (= MMK), the true state of these topics I have made totally clear in this commentary on the [*Śūnyatā*]*saptati*” (p. 2). This statement appears somewhat strange, insofar as he is saying that he here explains topics not sufficiently clarified in verse texts other than the one on which he is commenting. In the case of his own MAv it is easy to imagine that the statement implicitly also refers to Candrakīrti’s own *bhāṣya* [MAvBh] on it. According to Erb’s analysis, however, Candrakīrti had already written the *Prasannapadā* [Pras], his detailed commentary on Nāgārjuna’s MMK, when he composed ŚSV, and it is there that one would expect to find an explanation of “that which is not clear in MMK.” Perhaps, then, in this case too, Candrakīrti actually had the root text plus his own commentary on it in mind, and he is thus referring to unclear passages in MMK not sufficiently clarified in Pras.

In fact, Candrakīrti does elaborate in the ŚS on topics not, or only briefly, touched upon in his MAvBh (listed in note 23). These include, for example, the investigation of worldly conventional usage (*laukikavyavahāra*) and the aims and method of the Buddha’s teaching of “I,” “mine” and real phenomena, despite the fact that he himself does not observe any of these. The latter topic, of course, is part of the discussion of the problem of provisional and definitive meaning (*neyārtha* and *nītārtha*), which constitutes—together with the two levels of reality (*satyadvaya*)—the main topic of Nāgārjuna’s ŚS and thus also of ŚSV. Another topic not treated in MAvBh and discussed in some detail in ŚSV is the cognition of nonexistent things (*abhāva*). In this context (on kārikā 2, pp. 48ff.) Candrakīrti argues against the *sākāra* theory brought forward by the opponent, according to which cognition assumes the mode (*ākāra*) of its object. This fact is noteworthy, since in his other works Candrakīrti seemingly approves of this theory on a conventional (*saṃvṛti*) level (n. 400). Within the part of the text translated and edited in the present work under review, the same topic is taken up again in the commentary on kārikā 9 (pp. 87f.). Again it is the opponent who formulates the theory, but it is utilised by Candrakīrti to show the nonexistence of the (four) false views (*mithyādarśana*). Neither

Erb (n. 26) nor the present reviewer are able to identify the “unclear” passages from MMK clarified in ŚSV.

All this would provide sufficient preconditions for ŚSV to have become an important text, extensively studied in the tradition of Madhyamaka exegesis. This, however, does not seem to have been the case, either in India or in Tibet (p. 32). Presumably there was no tradition for this text in Kashmir, as Pa tshab Nyi ma grags is neither reported to have studied it there nor to have translated it. In Bengal, too, it could not have been very popular, as Atiśa, for many years the abbot of Vajrāsana and Vikramaśīla, does not mention it among Candrakīrti’s works. The only known—and rather poor—Tibetan translation was made by sNur Dhar ma grags and Abhayākaragupta at the beginning of the twelfth century, partly, but without noticeable result, revised by Pa tshab. Still it remained virtually unknown in Tibet, as shown for example by the widespread estimation of ŚS mentioned above. Although arguments *ex silencio* are always problematic, the absence of any quotations from ŚSV in the writings of Tsong kha pa, further strengthens the argument for its obscurity in Tibet. The passage: “Although the sentence: ‘Conventionally the eye exists, but in an absolute sense it does not’ is certainly conclusive, accepting and dismissing an intrinsic characteristic (*svalakṣaṇa*) [within the same argument] is not conclusive” (*yang na kun rdzob tu mig yod la don dam par med do zhes pa’i tshig gi rigs pa yang gdon mi za bar nus pa rung na yang / de lta na yang rang gi mtshan nyid khas len pa dang spong ba dag nus pa dang ldan pa ma yin no //* p. 225,32-34; translation p. 56) would doubtlessly have been among the best Tsong kha pa could have found to authorise his interpretation of “neither existent nor non-existent.” Candrakīrti’s ŚSV seems to have been unknown even to the second Dalai Lama, who composed a commentary on ŚS in 1537.

Thus Erb’s statement is problematic when he expresses the hope, “daß die hier vorgelegte Arbeit weitere tiefergehende, philologische und ideengeschichtliche Studien über den Beitrag Candrakīrtis zur buddhistischen Philosophie einen weiteren Schritt voranbringt, indem der Śūnyatā-saptativṛtti den [sic] ihr gebührenden [sic] Platz innerhalb der Werke Candrakīrtis *wieder* [my emphasis] eingeräumt wird” (p. vii). Nevertheless it is to be hoped, or rather expected, that Erb’s excellent work will contribute considerably to the promotion of the study of Candrakīrti’s impact on Buddhist philosophy. Further studies based on Erb’s pioneering



work might—though the chances are certainly not very high—even reveal some reasons why this text was largely ignored in the Buddhist tradition for many centuries. The poor quality of the Tibetan translation might very well, to some extent at least, have been the reason for the lack of attention the text received in Tibet. This, in turn, together with the fact that no other translation has ever been made, could be due to the bad condition of the only (?) Sanskrit manuscript available. However, there could be further reasons for these conditions, apart from that of sheer coincidence.

The work under review provides a richly annotated translation and a critical edition of ŚSV on kārikā 1-14. Within the elaborate commentaries on kārikā 1 and 2 Candrakīrti gives a detailed discussion of the *neyārtha* / *nītārtha* problem and the theory of the two realities (Erb prefers the term “Wahrheiten—truths”), and he refutes the *ātma* theory of the brahmanic systems and the *śūnyatā* interpretation of the Hīnayāna, the Yogācāra and Bhāvaviveka. Thus the section of the ŚSV presented here comprises about half of the entire text.

The introduction is comprised of the following sections:

I. Discussion and proof of Candrakīrti’s authorship of ŚSV by external and internal evidence. As the former is scarce and of rather late date—the oldest dating from ca. 1362 (n. 10)—the latter attains greater importance. In this regard, the careful comparison of the quotations in Candrakīrti’s works and a stylistic and contextual analysis deserve special mention (pp. 2-9).

II. By investigating the relationship between ŚSV and Candrakīrti’s other writings, Erb establishes the following hypothetical sequence of composition: MAvBh, Pras, *Yuktiṣaṣṭikāvṛtti*, ŚSV, *Catuḥśatakaṭīkā* (pp. 9-14).

III. Synopsis of ŚSV on kārikā 1-14 (pp. 14-27). Here, a short overview of the structure of ŚS as a whole would be desirable in order to understand why the author restricted his work to the passage chosen. As it consists of the discussion of causality, i.e., interdependent origination (*pratītyasamutpāda*), contextually—not to mention practical reasons—this restriction is certainly justified. Although such a synopsis is missing in the published work, the same can be found in Erb’s PhD thesis (pp. xxvii-xxxv and lxii-lxiii), where he gives the Second Dalai Lama’s *sa bcaḍ*.

IV. Biographical data on the translators Abhayākaragupta and sNur Dharma grags and the reviser Pa tshab Nyi ma grags (pp. 27-30).

V. [in one of the very few and insignificant misprints given in a single instance as IV]. Evaluation of the Tibetan translation and its reception in Tibet (pp. 30-32). As a general remark on the translation Erb says, “Beim ersten Durchlesen dieser tibetischen Übersetzung fällt auf, daß in vielen Fällen einzelne Sätze, manchmal sogar ganze Passagen zwar in sich einen Sinn ergeben, daß aber die so gewonnene Bedeutung oft zum Verlauf der Argumentation nicht paßt, ja sogar gelegentlich widersprüchlich ist. Der rote Faden des gedanklichen Fortschreitens der Argumentation wird ständig unterbrochen. Dies ist besonders auffallend bei philosophischen Diskussionen, die über die Kommentierung der Kārikās hinausgehen und den Eindruck eines Patchwork einzelner Sätze ohne logische Kohärenz erwecken” (p. 30).

In his careful philological analysis, Erb identifies three categories of mistakes that contribute to the large-scale and overall corruption of the text: a) mistakes due to the condition of the Sanskrit text, presumably a palmleaf manuscript, e.g. re-establishing a broken leaf incorrectly or misreading and confusing certain *akṣara*; b) mistakes of the translators, such as the misinterpretation of Sanskrit compounds, negations either misplaced or omitted, misunderstanding of syntactic coherence, violating the Tibetan syntax by word for word rendering of the Sanskrit, etc.; c) corruptions that appear in the course of the Tibetan tradition.

The section on the reception of ŚSV in Tibet discusses the late dates of its translation (12th c.) and its inclusion in the canonical collection (16th c.), which Erb gives as a reason for the secondary role of this text in the Tibetan tradition, the main reason, however, being the poor quality of the Tibetan translation, the fact that “die mangelhafte Qualität der tib. Übersetzung das Verständnis dieses Textes nicht nur erschwert, sondern sogar gelegentlich geradezu verhindert hat” (p. 32).

The annotated translation (pp. 33-204) as well as the edition—based on the canonical editions of Peking, Derge, Narthang, Cone, Ganden, and a Mongolian version—(pp. 205-268) provide an excellent example of the sound and well-founded philological work for which the Hamburg school of Indian and Tibetan studies is renowned. In this way, Erb traces and identifies the various kinds of corruptions mentioned above and manages to a large extent to establish what might have been the original meaning in a comprehensible fashion. In some cases this would not have been possible without reconstructing the original Sanskrit of whole passages. This, of

course, is true for the grammatical interpretation and explanation of the word *śūnya* (text pp. 224,29ff., translation p. 54), for example, but also in various other cases, too numerous to be listed here.

In his introductory remarks to the edition (p. 207), Erb states that the particular condition of the text with its large degree of every possible sort of corruption made it virtually impossible to follow the principle of textual criticism, according to which the more suitable variant should be chosen for the edition. This, however, in effect leaves only the frequency of a reading's appearance as the criterion for or against it. Consequence with regard to this can occasionally lead to slight inconsequences of some other kind. In *kārikā* 2b for example, Erb (p. 218) gives *rjod 'ga' 'ang med* ("no designation whatsoever does exist") against the single appearance of *brjod* ..., in the commentary, however, where the same is used as a *pratīka* several times (p. 231), we find *brjod 'ga' med* against *rjod* ... In general, Erb leaves the text unchanged as far as possible, with only slight but necessary corrections such as the addition of negations or casus particles being included in the edition; major emendations such as the rearranging of sentences or replacing of terms are suggested and thoroughly discussed in the notes to the translation. Within the edition corrupt or unclear expressions or passages are indicated as such. Occasionally not everybody will agree with Erb's assessment in that respect. One example will suffice here:

Within the discussion of the nature of *śūnyatā*, the Vijñaptivādin objects: *gzhan dbang ni yod pa kun brtags ni med pa'i phyir kho bo cag kho na la stong pa 'thad kyi / gang zhig stong pa nyid gang zhig gis stong par khas mi len pa'i phyir (/) dbu ma pa rnams la ni ma yin te / stong pa des ci zhig bya ste / des stong pa dang de nyid kyi stong par mi rung ngo zhes bya'o //* (p. 226,14-17, underlining mine)—“Weil [nach unserer Meinung] einerseits das abhängige [Wesen] (*paratantrasvabhāva*) existiert, andererseits das vorgestellte [Wesen] (*parikalpitasvabhāva*) nicht existiert, ist die [Lehre der] *Śūnyatā* nur bei uns stimmig, weil nicht angenommen wird, daß etwas, das selbst leer ist, von etwas [anderem] leer ist; sie ist aber nicht [stimmig] bei den *Mādhyamikas*, denn es heißt [in der *Bodhisattvabhūmi*]: ‘Was soll [dann] leer von jenem [anderen] sein? Denn es ist nicht logisch richtig, daß [etwas] leer von etwas [anderem] und daß es [zugleich] selbst leer ist’” (p. 57). In the edition *pa* is indicated as “corrupt or unclear,” and note 506 to the translation proposes *la* instead; while this certainly would make the sentence clearer (“as the *para-*

*tantra[svabhāva]* exists, **and/but** the *parikalpita [svabhāva]* does not”), it is by no means necessary. The translation and note 508 suggest the whole passage up to *phyir (/)* as a reason for the validity of the Vijñaptivādin’s own position, as otherwise, if ... *mi len pa’i phyir* was the reason for the invalidity of the Mādhyamika’s position, the negation— representing the Vijñaptivādin’s view—would be wrong. In this case, of course, the *kyi* after *’thad* has to be considered wrong and after *phyir* a *shad* is to be inserted. These emendations, however, are unnecessary as the text reads very well in the given form: “As the *paratantra(svabhāva)* exists, but the *parikalpita(svabhāva)* does not, [the interpretation of] *śūnyatā* is acceptable only according to our [position], not, however, according to [the position of] the Mādhyamika, as one [can] not accept that something, being empty itself, is empty of something [else]. ...” The following *stong pa des ci zhig bya ste*, however, is not indicated as “unclear” and its rendition: “Was soll [dann] leer von jenem [anderen] sein?” is clearly a translation of the passage from the *Bodhisattvabhūmi* obviously meant to be quoted, or at least referred to: *gang du ci zhig gang gis stong par ’gyur te*. However, it is not as clear how Erb’s rendition translates the sentence from ŚSV.

In general the translation is reliable as far as a “plain translation” seems possible; frequently, however, this is not the case, and an understanding of the text can be gained only by means of extensive interpretation and major emendations, occasionally via the reconstruction of the Sanskrit. In such cases the translation is carefully done, plausible and based on careful comparison with parallel passages in other works by Candrakīrti or with the Sanskrit originals of texts quoted. Naturally there remain parts where, despite all painstaking efforts, no definite certainty with regard to establishing and interpreting the text can be gained and the results are arguable. Erb himself considers both text and translation as mere working hypotheses in such cases: “... in vielen Fällen aber handelt es sich dabei um von mir vorgenommene, z.T. recht freie, sich aus der Logik des Kontextes ergebende, gelegentlich über den Umweg des Versuchs einer Rekonstruktion des Sanskrittextes eruierte hypothetische Korrekturen, die daher nur den Wert einer Arbeitsgrundlage haben, durch die der korrupten Stelle doch noch ein einleuchtender Sinn gegeben werden könnte, sind aber sicherlich nicht das letzte Wort” (p. 207). It is one of the great merits of this work that it actually provides easily accessible points of departure for future investigation in such cases; they are clearly indicated and discussed

in detail (e.g., nn. 519, 542, 865). In the same way, cases where different versions of the Tibetan text allow for different but equally possible interpretations are also pointed out and discussed (e.g., n. 244).

The translation of the verses depends to a large extent on Candrakīrti's explanations, which results in minor or major deviations from the rendition given in Erb's PhD thesis. Two examples will suffice to illustrate this fact and at the same time convey an idea of how Erb's work can promote Madhyamaka and Candrakīrti studies and serve as a point of departure for further investigations where itself does not give the "final" answer (which, in fact, it does not claim to do at any point):

For kārikā 2, e.g., Erb offers two different versions of the first part of the stanza: *bdag min bdag med min bdag dang / / bdag med min pas*, given as reason for the fact that "no designation whatsoever exists" (*rjod 'ga' 'ang med*). The first one takes into account Candrakīrti's interpretation of entities (*dharma*) being by nature none of these alternatives: "Weil [die Daseinsfaktoren ihrem Wesen nach] nicht das Selbst sind noch ohne Selbst sind, noch sowohl das Selbst als auch ohne Selbst sind." This is a smooth translation of the verse as it is given and, to my knowledge, it is the first translation of this verse into a western language that considers the fact that the words *med* and *min* convey different meanings. The second version stresses the sheer nonexistence of all alternatives: "Weil weder das Selbst noch das, was ohne Selbst ist, noch das Selbst und das, was ohne Selbst ist [zusammen], existieren," and this, too, is very well justified by Candrakīrti's commentary.

It is, however, to be doubted whether this distinction is one of implicative negation (*paryudāsa*) and mere negation (*prasajyapraṭiśedha*), as Erb classifies it (pp. 16f. and n. 435). Tsong kha pa in his *Legs bshad snying po* remarks that the use of the negations *ma yin* or *med* is not a criterion for this distinction (Drepung Loseling Library Society 1992, p. 221,6f.: *ma yin zhes pa dang med zhes pa'i tshig gis bkag pa ni de gnyis kyi khyad par min te*); and Candrakīrti as well as Bhāvaviveka both consider even the negation of the four alternatives of origination, "The entities do not originate from themselves" etc., as mere negations (Pras p. 13,4f.: *nanu ca, naiva svata utpannā, ity avadhāryamāṇe parata utpannā ity aniṣṭaṃ prāpnoti / na prāpnoti, prasajyapraṭiśedhasya vivakṣitatvāt ...*; Prajñāpradīpa, Derge edition 3853, fol. 48b6: *bdag las ma yin zhes bya ba'i dgag pa 'di ni med par dgag pa'i don du lta bar bya ste*). By analogy,

even Candrakīrti's first interpretation of ŚS 2 could be taken as *prasajya-pratiṣedha*.

However, the accumulation of negations together with the fact that an assumed *anātma* of the Sanskrit original can be interpreted in various ways (discussed in detail in n. 435) and rendered into Tibetan by *bdag med* as well as by *bdag min*, seems to have caused some confusion within the Tibetan tradition—the various versions of *kārikā* 2 extant give evidence thereof—and also the structure of ŚSV on this passage does not seem as clear as Erb describes it in note 435 and in his translation (pp. 45-64). Without intending or being able to offer a “final” solution, the present reviewer suggests considering not just two but three different sets of explanations given by Candrakīrti.

1) Text pp. 218,16-229,41 / translation pp. 45-63: Here Candrakīrti discusses the concepts of Self (*bdag*) (p. 218,16 / 45) and Non-self (*bdag med*) (p. 218,32 / 46). He then turns to the fact that entities are by nature neither a Self (*bdag min*) (p. 219,1 / 46)—under the supposition that Candrakīrti follows step by step the words of the *kārikā*, the proposed emendation *bdag med* for *bdag min* (n. 377) seems doubtful, and perhaps a translation such as “The words ‘I’ and ‘mine’ [in the usage] of ordinary people are without object. Why? Because [the entities] are no Self” should be preferred to “... Weil ‘es kein Selbst gibt’”—nor a Non-self (*bdag med min*) (p. 229,13 / 62).

The following section, which discusses the combination of Self and Non-self, not only shifts the emphasis from *dharma* to *pudgalanairātmya*, but also offers a new interpretation of the negation *min*: Something which is a Self as well as a Non-self (*bdag dang bdag med*) (p.229,28 / 62) does not exist, neither does something which is neither a Self nor a Non-self (*bdag dang bdag med min*) (p. 229,40 / 62). In the latter case *min*—which has to be emended in the text (n. 601)—is utilised to formulate the fourth *koṭi*, not mentioned in the *kārikā*. Although merely “does not exist at all” (*'ga' yang med*) is given as the predicate, non-existence as the nature of *pudgala* (and *dharma*) seems to be intended (?).

2) Pp. 229,41-230,12 / 63: This section starts with the remark that the statement “*'ga' yang med*” in the verse applies to “designations” (*[b]rjod [pa]*) as well as to “[neither] a Self [nor] a Non-self” (*bdag dang bdag med [min]*), and it provides a full set of the alternatives given in the verse: “that which is not a Self etc.” (*bdag min zhes pa la sogs pa*, p. 230,6f. / 63) (the

expression *la sogs pa* obviously implies “that which is not a Non-self” [*bdag med min*] [note 603], and the indication of *bdag min* as “unclear or corrupt” in the edition and the addition of the negation “ist [nicht] weder das Selbst” to the translation thus would seem to be unnecessary) and “that which is neither a Self nor a Non-self” (*bdag dang bdag med min*) (p. 230,11 / 63) “do not exist at all” (*'ga' med*).

3) The third interpretation (p. 230,13-39 / 63f.), corresponding to Erb's second [the reference to “ŚSV 20,3,8” (n. 608) should be to 20,2,8], again offers the full set of alternatives. According to the *pratīkas* it could be interpreting this verse in the way it is actually preserved in ŚS and Nāgārjuna's autocommentary, thus providing a combination of the first two: *bdag med bdag med min* ... “The Self does not exist. [Entities are by nature neither a Self] nor a Non-self ...” (cf. Erb's PhD thesis pp. 36-37). In that case the proposed correction of *bdag med min* to *bdag med med* (p. 230,28 / 63, n. 619) would not be justified. Even Candrakīrti's comment: “The Non-self is merely non-existent” (*bdag med pa ni med pa nyid do*) could be understood as a reason for *bdag med min* as well as a paraphrase of *bdag med med*. The *pratīka* for the third—which might seem to be a complete pāda in itself—however, seems to make clear that Candrakīrti in this case places the emphasis on the non-existence of these alternatives rather than on the fact that they are not the nature of the *dharmas*: “Something which is a Self as well as a Non-self does not exist at all” (*bdag dang bdag med 'ga' yang med*) (p. 230,36 / 64).

The major amendments within the translation of kārikā 9: “[Weil] sowohl das Ewige als auch das Vergängliche, das, was nicht das Selbst ist, als auch das Selbst, das Reine als auch das Unreine, das Leid als auch das Glück [als Aspekte in einer Erkenntnis ihren jeweiligen Objekten gegenüber] nicht [verkehrt] sind, deshalb existieren die verkehrten Auffassungen nicht” certainly do not do justice to Nāgārjuna's verse (*mi rtag rtag min bdag med dang // bdag min sdug dang mi sdug min // sdug bsngal bde ba ma yin zhing // de phyir phyin ci log rnams med //*). The version given in Erb's PhD thesis is without doubt the more plausible one: “[Weil] das Nicht-Ewige die Negierung des Ewigen, das Nicht-Selbst die Negierung des Selbstes, das Unreine die Negierung des Reinen, das Leid die Negierung des Glückes ist, daher existieren die verkehrten Auffassungen nicht.” However, the translation given here does reflect the argumentation of ŚSV. As already stated above, Candrakīrti proves the impossibility of

the four “wrong views” (*mithyādarśana*) by the *sākāra* theory of cognition. As Erb has remarked in his PhD thesis (p. 249), there is no basis for this to be found in Nāgārjuna’s works, so he has raised the question of whether Candrakīrti’s interpretation should not be considered anachronistic. The argumentation of ŚSV on kārikā 9 is doubtlessly unique—to say the least—and the text of the whole passage is not very clear either, so that Erb states in a kind of résumé: “In Anbetracht der allgemeinen Unzuverlässigkeit unserer tib. Übersetzung erweckt die vorliegende Textstelle ein großes Mißbehagen. Ich muß gestehen, daß ich mir nicht überall bis ins letzte Detail darüber im klaren bin, wie der Text grammatisch zu verstehen ist, so daß meine Übersetzung nur tentativen Charakter hat.” On account of all this and as the PhD thesis is not generally nor easily available, it might have been beneficial not only to refer (n. 864) to the detailed comparison of the various commentaries on this verse given there, but to include these pages (pp. 244-249) in some form or other in the present work under review.

The work is made easily accessible by the three kinds of indices of technical terms (“Sachindizes” pp. 271-281), names (“Namensindizes” pp. 282-285) and textual passages quoted in ŚSV or referred to by the author (“Stellenindizes” pp. 286-302) which conclude the book.

In conclusion the reviewer wishes to congratulate the author on this excellent and pioneering work and express the hope that in the not too distant future either Erb himself will continue the work begun for the remaining part of ŚSV, or that some other colleague will take over this task, as long as he or she meets the high standards set in this work.

Helmut Tauscher

FRANCO, Eli. *Dharmakīrti on Compassion and Rebirth*. Wien 1997 (Wiener Studien zur Tibetologie und Buddhismuskunde, Heft 38). Pp. 394.

This monograph falls into two main parts. The first (pp. 15-155) consists of five chapters that form an introduction to the translation of the verses of Dharmakīrti’s *Pramāṇavārttika* II 34-72, together with the commentary of Prajñākaragupta (pp. 159-321). The overall purpose of Eli Franco’s lucid



and thoughtful book is to “advance our knowledge of the religious background of Buddhist logic and epistemology.”

Chapter I is a study of the compound *jagaddhitaiṣin* (“seeking the benefit of all living beings”) found in Dignāga’s *Pramāṇasamuccaya*. Dharmakīrti’s *Pramāṇasiddhi* 34-131ab can be considered a commentary on this term. Being *pramāṇabhūta* the Buddha not only incorporates knowledge of truth, but he is also a teacher who communicates that truth. This poses a problem: Why believe in the authority of the Buddha (or any other Bhagavat for that matter), rather than e.g. in the authority of the Veda? Why this *āgama*, rather than that *āgama*? Why not believe in the ferocious Jahve, or in the suffering Christ, or in the Prophet of Allah for that matter? Surely, one must have a reason, and a good one too, for one’s choice of religious faith, or how? Dharmakīrti tries to solve this problem of faith versus reason by pointing out that the Buddha has certain properties that would never make him want to lie to us. The teacher is also our true protector. Hence we can trust him on his words as a teacher of the four Aryan truths etc. The distinction that must be made between what we would perhaps call faith and reason is memorably expressed by Dharmakīrti:

*āgamasya tathābhāvanibandhanam apaśyatām /  
muktīm āgamamātreṇa vadam na paritoṣakṛt //*

“The [believer] who proclaims liberation on the basis of tradition alone, does not satisfy [the critical demands of] those who do not see the reason for tradition being the way it is.”

Chapter II focuses on the concept of *pramāṇa*. Franco argues that Dharmakīrti does not intend to define the concept of *pramāṇa*, but merely wants to establish that the Buddha is a *pramāṇa*. It is taken for granted that the Buddha has an infinite compassion that has been accumulated through many life-times. The two main preconditions are: 1) the existence of an infinite number of past lives, and 2) the possibility of an infinite increase of mental properties like compassion.

Chapter III therefore takes up Dharmakīrti’s doctrine of rebirth. Directly related to this is the subject of rebirth, the nature of the intermediary state, and the role of karma. Dharmakīrti’s own position seems to affiliate him with the Sautrāntika as well as the Yogācāra school.

Chapter IV is on rebirth. Its possibility is denied by the Lokāyata only. From the few fragments that remain, Franco attempts to reconstruct the materialist position that is the target of Dharmakīrti's critique. Moreover, he points out that Dharmakīrti's own proof of rebirth is based on proving the autonomy of mind free from other factors such as body, breath and sense faculties.

While the first four chapters have been written with a more general readership in mind, the final chapter becomes more technical. Franco makes an attempt to identify the anonymous opponents against whom Dharmakīrti is arguing. When it comes to the translation itself, Dharmakīrti's verses are, as Franco reminds us, "extremely difficult, rich and suggestive". This is true, of course; often we are not sure where a sentence begins or ends. We are not sure who is speaking, and even if we feel sure, we may not be sure whether we are dealing with a statement or a question—which may even be rhetorical. Dharmakīrti certainly had a sharp scientific mind, nevertheless his opinions and intentions often remain ambiguous, or unclear—often deliberately so, we may suspect.

With this in mind it goes without saying that even if the verses here have been translated before, new attempts are still welcome. Philological issues and different interpretations of the verses by the different commentators (not very frequent) are discussed in the footnotes to the translation of the verses. A complete translation of Prajñākaragupta's important commentary is given. This has not been done before, and Franco has obviously done a good piece of work in this regard. The translation corresponds to about thirty densely printed pages of the *Pramāṇavārttikālaṅkāra*, the most detailed of the four existing commentaries available. The excellent Tibetan translation rendered indispensable assistance in making sense of the Sanskrit original which is often in a poor state.

A detailed discussion of Franco's translation is out of the question in a brief review. On the whole, like his introductory chapters, and like his notes, it is very clear and very intelligible, especially, as said, considering the difficult style of Dharmakīrti. The book also contains four appendices, etc., and a useful index of Sanskrit words (pp. 361-384).

Dharmakīrti is not one of those authors that most of us just read and enjoy before breakfast. One has to think, to study carefully, and to ponder slowly. There is something frustrating in having to have him served piecemeal. Even if one believes oneself to have understood parts of him,

one dare not feel sure before one has a firm grasp of his background and his scientific work as a whole. If one is too much of a specialist in this field, there is the danger that one ends up making a fool of himself by losing the overall view. In general, the study of Dharmakīrti is still in its infancy, and there is a long way to go.

Much fine work has been achieved in recent years, and Franco's monograph ranks as one of the finest.

Christian Lindtner

RUTT, Richard. *The Book of Changes (Zhouyi): A Bronze Age Document*. Translated with introduction and notes. Richmond: Curzon, 1996 (Durham East-Asia Series; No. 1). 497 S., Ill. ISBN 0-70007-0467-1.

Noch eine Übersetzung des *Yijing*? Brauchen wir nach den jüngsten Arbeiten Edward Shaughnessys, der Übersetzung Dominique Hertzers des *Mawangdui-Yijings*, der Übersetzung Richard John Lynns des *Yijings* in der Lesung Wang Bis sowie weiterer jüngst erschienenen Werke zu diesem wohl ältesten Buch Chinas noch eine weitere Übersetzung? Eine vergleichende Rezension dieser jüngeren Arbeiten kann ich nicht leisten, aber die hier anzudeutende Übersetzung des *Yijing* unterscheidet sich von anderen Werken desselben Inhalts mindestens durch die sehr umfangreiche Einführung. In ihr eröffnet der Autor einen Zugang zum *Yijing*, der für SinologInnen und interessierte Laien gemacht scheint, und der bei weitem über eine Standardeinführung hinausgeht.

Das Werk gliedert sich in 3 Teile: die Einführung, die Übersetzung des Klassikers und schliesslich die Übersetzung der sog. "Zehn Flügel". Hinzu kommen die Anmerkungen zur Übersetzung und einige wenige Anmerkungen zur Übersetzung der "Zehn Flügel", sowie Schriftzeichenglossare und der Index. Eine Bibliographie gibt es im klassischen Sinne nicht, dafür gibt es bei den Anmerkungen eine spärliche Seite von "Books and articles often cited". Doch hierzu später mehr.

Die Einführung gliedert sich laut Inhaltsverzeichnis in die folgenden 6 Kapitel: 1. The Background: Bronze Age China – 2. The History of a Book – 3. The Fascination of Zhouyi – 4. European Translations – 5. The Contents of Zhouyi: Title; Hexagrams; Hexagram Order; Tags; Hexagram

Statements; Line Statements – 6. Divination: Methods; Probabilities; Prognostication: *Zuozhuan* material. Die Wörter des Inhaltsverzeichnisses wurden hier zwar wortgetreu abgeschrieben (inklusive der Tatsache, dass “Zhouyi” stabil, “Zuozhuan” hingegen kursiv gedruckt erscheint), allerdings finden sich im Text noch weitere Unterkapitel, welche im Inhaltsverzeichnis nicht aufgeführt sind.

Die einführenden Kapitel füllen stolze 203 Seiten: eigentlich eine Publikation in sich. Das erste Kapitel bietet einen Überblick über das bronzezeitliche, d.h. shang- und westzhouzeitliche China: Klima, Geographie, Politik, Geschlechterbeziehungen, Landwirtschaft, Krieg und Kriegstechnik, Jagd, Bauwesen, Nahrung, Kleidung und Textilien, Farben und Färben, Wissenschaft und Technik, Mathematik, Kalender, Religion, Musik und Literatur. All diese Bereiche werden kompetent und auf dem neuesten Stand der Forschung stehend zusammengefasst, wenn auch der Umfang von 20 Seiten keinen Platz für Vertiefung lässt. Als knappe Einführung in das China dieser Zeit ist der Text aber durchaus wertvoll. Und wenn man die Anmerkungen 425 Seiten später gefunden hat, bieten diese auch durchaus kommentierte weiterführende Lektüre an. (S. 458ff.)

Kapitel 2, “The History of a Book,” bietet eine Überlieferungsgeschichte des *Yijing*. Der Autor unterscheidet zwischen dem *Zhouyi* und dem *Yijing*: “The two titles are sometimes used as though they were interchangeable, but, properly speaking, *Yijing* refers to the composite work, and *Zhouyi* to the ancient core document.” (S. 26) Dieser Teil der Einführung wäre prädestiniert für die Perpetuierung der das *Yijing* umgebenden Mythen. Rutt hat dieser Versuchung widerstanden. Tatsächlich erfahren wir in diesem Kapitel, dass die Geschichte, wonach Konfuzius das *Yijing* geliebt haben soll, ein möglicher Lesefehler sein könnte, da in der Lu-Überlieferung des *Lun Yu* nicht yì 易, sondern yì 亦 stünde (S. 33). Auch zweifelt er die Wahrheit der im *Shiji* wiedergegebenen Geschichte an, wonach der Meister sein Exemplar des *Yijing* dreimal neu binden lassen musste. Er hält diese “charming story” für eine Mythenbildung (S. 34). Sowohl die Tradierungsgeschichte als auch die in den siebziger Jahren gefundenen hanzeitlichen Manuskripte werden kurz aber deutlich abgehandelt. Auch die chinesische und westliche Forschung des 20. Jahrhunderts wird besprochen und auch hier bleibt der Autor knapp, zeigt aber einen deutlichen roten Faden auf, den Interessierte aufnehmen und als Grundlage eines vertieften Studiums verwenden können.

Das dritte Kapitel, "The Fascination of Zhouyi," stellt eines der methodischen Kernstücke des Buches dar. Wie der Untertitel des Werkes – A Bronze Age Document – suggeriert, versucht der Autor das *Zhouyi* aus der Entstehungszeit heraus zu interpretieren und dieser Ansatz wird im dritten Kapitel deutlich. Rutt führt zunächst seine Trennung des *Zhouyi* als Kerntextes und der Zehn Flügel aus, da die philosophisch-spekulative Faszination des Buches ja mehr auf die Zehn Flügel denn auf das Orakelbuch selbst zurückgeht. Danach durchstreift er die Jahrhunderte der Beschäftigung mit dem *Yijing* und zählt dabei – in derselben konzisen Art wie in den vorhergegangenen Kapiteln – die Ideen auf, welche ans *Yijing* herangetragen wurden, von den mathematischen Studien Shao Yongs im elften Jahrhundert bis zu Martin Schönbergers Idee, die Logik des Klassikers mit unserem Wissen über den genetischen Code in Einklang zu bringen. Auf diesen Seiten brilliert Rutt methodologisch, weil er jeden Ansatz der Beschäftigung mit dem Klassiker zu kontextualisieren vermag und dadurch zum Schluss kommt:

"If *Yijing* has, in spite of itself, accrued a quasi-spiritual aura and been used for spiritual purposes, that is because its original meaning was forgotten. The resulting obscurity made it easy for the text to be used by many religions. Just as we have seen Confucians adopting it as a manual of science and ethics, we shall see that for eighteenth-century Jesuits it was a Christian protoevangelium; that Buddhists and Daoists have delighted in it; and that for the twentieth-century New Age movement it has occult powers. *Yijing* is a deconstructionist's dream: its fascination lies in its availability as a vehicle for it's readers' preoccupation." (S. 51).

Nichts als konsequent ist daher die Tatsache, dass der Autor hier auf seinen eigenen Zugang zum *Yijing* zu sprechen kommt, welches er im Korea der 50er Jahre kennenlernte und es folgt als humoristisches Aperçu eine schwärmerische Schilderung, welche das ländliche Korea als dem zhouzeitlichen China ähnlich erscheinend darstellt (S. 58-59).

Das folgende, mit "Translations into European Languages" überschriebene vierte Kapitel (im Gegensatz zu "European Translations" im Inhaltsverzeichnis) bietet eine Aufarbeitung der am *Yijing* geleisteten Übersetzungsarbeit. Hier bietet der Autor nicht nur eine gut dokumentierte, detailreiche Schilderung der Übersetzer und ihrer Werke, sondern dieses

Kapitel ist ausserdem sehr unterhaltsam zu lesen. Angefangen mit den Jesuiten, geht er weiter über die englischen Missionare, speziell Legge, dann die Übersetzungen Philastres, de Lacouperies, Wilhelms und schliesslich die seit 1945 entstandenen bis zur Übersetzung Lynns aus dem Jahr 1994. Da sich die erste Übersetzung auf den Text des 15. Hexagramms beschränkt, zitiert Rutt aus allen besprochenen Arbeiten jeweils das 15. Hexagramm. Während ich über die Vollständigkeit der zitierten Arbeiten nichts auszusagen vermag, so komme ich nicht umhin, die detaillierte, zuweilen liebevolle Art anzumerken, mit der Rutt über seine Vorgänger und deren Leben schreibt, ohne dem blossen Wiedergeben von Anekdoten zu verfallen. Nebenbei sind manche der Details hilfreich, etwa die Tatsache, dass sich die handschriftlichen Notizen Wang Taos, der Legge bei der Entstehung seiner Übersetzung half, heute in der New York Public Library befinden (S. 69); andere runden das Bild ab, etwa die Bemerkung, Lao Naixuan, Wilhelms Assistent bei der Übersetzung, habe Scharfgarbenstengel besessen, die von einer Pflanze beim Grab des Konfuzius in Qufu stammten (S. 76).

Nach all diesen genannten Vorarbeiten, nachdem der historische Rahmen ebenso wie die europäische Rezeption des Werkes dargelegt wurden, kommt Rutt im fünften Kapitel, "The Contents of Zhouyi," zur Struktur des Buches. Hier geht er vom Grossen ins Kleine, will sagen er nimmt sich nacheinander zunächst den Titel des Werkes vor, dann die einzelnen Hexagramme, deren Abfolge und Bezeichnungen, dann die Orakelsprüche mit Bezug auf das ganze Hexagramm und schliesslich jene mit Bezug auf einzelne Linien eines Hexagramms. Zum Schluss kommt er auf Reime innerhalb der einzelnen Linienorakel zu sprechen. Bei all diesen Teilen geht Rutt sehr ins Detail und geht ausführlich auf die einzelnen Aspekte der Struktur des Buches ein. So ist etwa ein Abschnitt der Nennung einer oder mehrerer der "four qualities" *yuán, hēng, lì* und *zhēn* 元亨利貞 in jedem der 64 Hexagrammsprüche gewidmet (S. 124ff.). Den meisten Raum in diesem Abschnitt nimmt allerdings die Diskussion der Abfolge der 64 Hexagramme ein. Rutt beschreibt die unterschiedlichen Rationalisierungsversuche der überlieferten Abfolge und er thematisiert die unterschiedliche Abfolge der 64 Hexagramme im *textus receptus* im Vergleich zum Fund von Mawangdui. Die Bedeutung dieses eher etwas technischen Kapitels kann nach Ansicht des Rezensenten ebenso wie das folgende gar nicht überschätzt werden. Es ist ähnlich hilfreich wie Helmut

Wilhelms acht Vorlesungen zum *Yijing*, die unter dem Titel *Die Wandlung* erschienen sind, bloss mit dem Vorteil, moderne archäologische Funde ebenso wie neuere Forschung miteinzubeziehen.

Das sechste und letzte Kapitel der Einführung – “Divination” – widmet sich zunächst der Technik der Divination als kulturelles Phänomen weltweit, kommt dann aber auf den chinesischen Fall zu sprechen und gibt hier eine Einführung in die Divinationstechniken Chinas, also neben der *Zhouyi*-Divination das an Skapulae und Plastronen durchgeführte “Knochenorakel”. Er überfliegt dieses Thema, weist aber auf alle wichtigen Elemente und auch auf die entsprechende weiterführende Literatur hin. Auch hier bleibt Rutt bemüht, nicht einfach Bekanntes weiterzuverbreiten, sondern er hinterfragt dieses Wissen und kommt etwa zum Schluss, dass Knochen- und Schafgarbenorakel etwa gleich alt sein könnten. Die nächsten zwanzig Seiten sind allen möglichen Berechnungen zur Natur der Hexagramme und zur Orakelnahme gewidmet. Rutt rechnet die Chancen aus, einen spezifischen Typ von Hexagramm zu erhalten (in Bezug auf die Anzahl der wandelbaren oder nicht wandelbaren Linien). Er gibt auch Auskunft über die unterschiedlichen Wahrscheinlichkeiten des Orakelnehmens mit Schafgarbenstengel oder mit Münzen (wie seit etwa der Tang üblich) und berichtet darüber, wie ein einmal ermitteltes Hexagramm in eine Orakel umzuwandeln, d.h. zu lesen ist. Daneben gibt er auch hier wieder eine Vielzahl kleiner Informationen, etwa Spekulationen zur Länge der zur Vorqinzeit verwendeten Schafgarbenstengeln (S. 151) oder der Hinweis darauf, dass das Münzenorakel eine Entwicklung von Zhuge Liang einerseits und Wang Xu, dem “Meister des Teufelstals” Gui Gu Zi, andererseits gewesen sein soll. Die zweite Hälfte des Kapitels gibt alle Stellen des *Zuozhuan* und des *Guoyu* wieder, in denen ein Hexagramm vorkommt. Alle Stellen werden übersetzt und kurz eingeführt.

Abschliessend kann zum ersten Teil des Buches gesagt werden, dass es eine ausgezeichnete Einführung ins *Zhouyi* darstellt, die auf der Höhe der Forschung steht, gleichzeitig gut zu lesen ist und vom interessierten Laien über Studierende, die eine Einführung ins Buch suchen bis zur fortgeschrittenen Fachperson alle Schichten von Lesern interessieren und informieren kann. Einzig *Yijing*-Forscher müssen wohl als Zielgruppe ausgenommen werden. Als Schwäche der Einführung gibt es bloss zu sagen, dass keine Schriftzeichen im Text zu finden sind und dass daher immer wieder der entsprechende Appendix konsultiert werden muss. Als

Flüchtigkeitsfehler ist wohl einzustufen, dass die Numerierung der Fussnoten in den Kapiteln 1, 2, 5 und 6 wieder neu beginnen, Kapitel 2, 3 und 4 dagegen durchgehend numeriert sind.

Der zweite Teil des Buches, die eigentliche Übersetzung, beginnt mit einer Einführung in die Übersetzungsproblematik des Antikchinesischen, wobei im Zusammenhang mit dem *Yijing* die Probleme zum Teil besonderer Natur sind. Die Einführung ist vor allem für Leser hilfreich, welche kein Antikchinesisch zu lesen vermögen und die deshalb mit der Problematik von lautlichen Entlehnungen oder der spröden Grammatik nicht vertraut sind. Rutt versucht die implizite Natur mancher Sätze zu verdeutlichen, indem er sie mit englischen Sprichwörtern vergleicht. So verdeutlicht er die implizite Konditionalität des Antikchinesischen am Sprichwort "Ice in November to bear a duck, the rest of the winter'll be slush and muck". Aber auch die anderen Problemkreise dieser spezifischen Übersetzung werden deutlich gemacht, und wenn der Autor auch den Anspruch erhebt "to seek the earliest sense of the text" so macht er mit seiner Einführung deutlich, dass dieser eine Fata Morgana bleiben muss.

Nach 19 Seiten Einführung folgt dann die Übersetzung des Klassikertextes – ohne Kommentar und ohne Anmerkung. Und selbst nach der ausgezeichneten und umsichtigen Einführung in den Text bleibt der so ausgelöste Schock enorm. Es wird sofort deutlich, dass der Text aus sich selbst heraus kaum verständlich ist. Die archaische Natur des *Zhouyi* wird mit brutaler Deutlichkeit transportiert, und zwar m.E. ohne exotisierend zu wirken. Ich nehme an, es entspricht der Absicht des Autors, den Leser zunächst behutsam an den Text heranzuführen, verschiedene "Rampen" zum Text hin zu errichten, nur um dann in der Übersetzung den Schock der Unverständlichkeit in seiner ganzen Kraft wirken zu lassen. Dieser wird freilich gemildert, indem der Autor der Übersetzung einen gut siebzig Seiten starken Anmerkungsapparat folgen lässt, in welchem er Informationen zu einzelnen Hexagrammen oder manchmal auch zu logischen Gruppen von zwei Hexagrammen anfügt. Der Anmerkungsapparat erscheint in der gewohnten Form einer soliden philologischen Übersetzung, welcher die Informationen chinesischer Gelehrter ebenso einfließen lässt wie Differenzen zu anderen Übersetzungen oder Querverbindungen unter einzelnen Hexagrammen. Rutt stützt sich nicht auf einen einzelnen Exegeten des *Yijing* (wie etwa Lynn dies tut), sondern er bedient sich aus den verschiedenen Quellen. Dies ist tatsächlich der einzige methodische Vorwurf,



den er sich gefallen lassen müsste, denn er rechtfertigt diese Methode nirgends.

Nach der Übersetzung des Klassikertextes folgt die Übersetzung der "Zehn Flügel" des *Yijing*. Dies überrascht eigentlich, denn Rutt erklärt ja, dass er vornehmlich am bronzezeitlichen Klassikertext interessiert sei und unterscheidet daher zwischen *Yijing* und *Zhouyi*. Wieso er trotzdem die "Zehn Flügel" übersetzt, wird nicht ganz klar und somit wird der Autor in dieser Hinsicht weder seinem Anspruch noch dem Titel des Buches – "Zhouyi" – gerecht. Es scheint, als ob der Autor den Titel "Zhouyi" vornehmlich deswegen gewählt hat, weil sein koreanischer Lehrer die Bezeichnung *Chuyôk* verwendet hat, die koreanische Lesung der Schriftzeichen für *Zhouyi*.

Die einzelnen Flügel werden als Gesamtheit eingeführt und später auch noch einzeln. In der Übersetzung wurde wie auch schon beim Klassikertext grosser Wert auf die Wiedergabe der Reime gelegt und die Übersetzung erschien an den vom Rezensenten überprüften Stellen akkurat. Der Stil der Übersetzung Rutts bleibt auch hier eher spröde, indem er versucht, die wortarme Ausdrucksweise des Antikchinesischen nachzuempfinden. Schreibt Lynn in seiner Übersetzung des "Flügels" "shuo gua", vierter Abschnitt etwa: "It is by thunder that things are caused to move, by wind that they are dispersed, by the rain that they are moistened, ... usw." (S. 120), so heisst dieselbe Stelle bei Rutt: "Thunder for moving; wind for dispersing; rain for moistening; ... usw." (S. 446). Der Übersetzung der "Zehn Flügel" ist kein eigener Anmerkungsapparat angehängt, was etwas schade ist, aber die eingeschobenen Erklärungen in der Übersetzung reichen wohl aus.

Als letztes folgt eine Bibliographie. Laut Autor gilt: "Bibliographical details will be found in the notes or elsewhere as indicated". Tatsächlich werden in den Anmerkungen aber nur Autor, Titel und Publikationsjahr genannt. Eine Ausnahme bilden die mikrofichteten Doktorarbeiten der USA und Englands. Für diese gibt der Autor sogar die Postanschrift der entsprechenden Institutionen an, bei welchen man Reproduktionen dieser Arbeiten behändigen kann. Nach Ansicht des Rezensenten ist die Bibliographie die grösste Schwäche dieses Werkes, denn es ist doch bemühend, die bibliographischen Angaben mancher Werke aus den Anmerkungen herauszusuchen zu müssen.

Alles in allem stellt das Buch eine wichtige und gewichtige Arbeit zum *Yijing* dar, die interessierten Laien wie Fachleuten von Nutzen sein dürfte, letztere benötigen allerdings wohl auch eine chinesische Ausgabe, aber mit dieser zusammen bildet Rutts Werk ein erstklassiges Arbeitsgerät.

Marc Winter

SHIBA, Ryōtarō. *Der letzte Shōgun*. Aus dem Japanischen übersetzt von Heike Patzschke. Mit einem Nachwort von Eduard Klopfenstein. Berlin: Edition q, 1998. 252 S.

Dieser historische Roman des bekannten japanischen Romanciers Shiba Ryōtarō (eigentlich Fukuda Sadaichi) behandelt das bewegte Leben des letzten Shōguns Tokugawa Yoshinobu (1837 - 1913). Das Haus Tokugawa als wahrer Machthaber führte 265 Jahre lang über 15 Generationen hinweg als Shōgun (Heerführer) die Regierungsgeschäfte Japans. Die Tokugawa-Zeit ist gekennzeichnet durch die Politik des Geschlossenen Landes. Das Auftauchen amerikanischer Kriegsschiffe im Juli 1853 vor Edo, dem heutigen Tōkyō, war für Japan ein bestürzendes, wenn auch nicht völlig unerwartetes Ereignis und setzte den Schlusspunkt unter die jahrhundertelange Isolation. Die Kontroverse um die Öffnung des Landes brachte das Ende des handlungsunfähig gewordenen Shōgunats und die Wiederherstellung der Herrschaft des Kaiserhofs, der lange Zeit ohne politischen und wirtschaftlichen Einfluss in Kyōto ein Schattendasein geführt hatte. In dieser turbulenten Zeit dauerte die Regierungsära Tokugawa Yoshinobus nicht viel länger als ein Jahr. Ihm selbst fiel die historische Aufgabe zu, die politische Macht dem Kaiser zurückzugeben.

Shiba beschreibt Yoshinobu in einer Aneinanderreihung von Anekdoten als elitären, gebildeten, talentierten Adligen, als Alleskönner. Geboren als Sohn des Lehnsfürsten von Mito, einem Nebenhaus der Tokugawa-Familie, und adoptiert zum Erben des dem Shōgun noch näher stehenden Hauses Hitotsubashi, war Yoshinobu sich seiner historischen Rolle bewusst. Auf Grund seiner vielseitigen Interessen war er aufgeschlossen für alles Neue, und, vertraut mit westlichem Gedankengut, war sein politisches Handeln reformerisch und innovativ. In der Darstellung Shibas ist es zu einem grossen Teil der faszinierenden Persönlichkeit Yoshinobus

zu verdanken, dass Japan ohne aufreibenden Bürgerkrieg zu einer neuen Regierungsform fand und den Sprung in die Neuzeit schaffte.

Shibas Werk bewegt sich ausschliesslich im Rahmen des oberen Schwert- und Hofadels. Dieses Milieu und die auch in der Übersetzung nachvollzogene gehobene Sprache macht die Lektüre zwar anspruchsvoll, verleiht ihr aber einen besonderen Reiz, den sich der historisch interessierte westliche Leser nicht entgehen lassen sollte. Im Gegensatz zum deutschen Sprachraum erfreuen sich in Japan historische Stoffe in Literatur, Film und Fernsehen grosser Beliebtheit. Das Staatliche Japanische Fernsehen NHK sendet jedes Jahr eine sich über zwölf Monate hinwegziehende Serie zu einem historischen Thema. Die Folge von 1998 trägt den Titel "Tokugawa Yoshinobu", nicht zuletzt in Gedenken an den 1996 verstorbenen Schriftsteller Shiba Ryōtarō. Das interessante Nachwort Eduard Klopfensteins behandelt die Person Shibas, seine Schreibhaltung und Bedeutung in der japanischen Literaturgeschichte und Gesellschaft. Es bietet zudem einen erleichterten Zugang zum vorliegenden, aus einem fremden Kulturkreis stammenden Werk. Um den Genuss der Lektüre zu steigern, empfiehlt es sich, das Nachwort zuerst zu lesen.

Ursula Koike-Good

STAUTZEBACH, Ralf. *Pāriśikṣā and Sarvasaṃmataśikṣā. Rechtlautlehren der Taittirīya-Śākhā*. Stuttgart: Franz Steiner. 1994. (Beiträge zur Südasienforschung, Südasien-Institut, Universität Heidelberg, Bd. 163.) VI + 419 pp.

In the Foreword to *Veda-Lakṣaṇa: Vedic Ancillary Literature, A Descriptive Bibliography* compiled by K. Parameswara Aithal (Franz Steiner, Stuttgart, 1991), A. Wezler recalled that the Vedic ancillary texts known by the name Veda-Lakṣaṇa "have been virtually forgotten since about 40 years". Later on in the same Foreword he expressed the hope that Aithal's book "will fulfil its true purpose as a mighty incentive to resume the editorial and similar scholarly activities in this highly interesting field of traditional Indian learning". Aithal himself provided, towards the end of his Introduction (p. 20), a list of Śikṣās which he intended to edit. This list

includes the items *Pāriśikṣā Savyākhyā* and *Sarva-saṃmata-śikṣā Savyākhyā*.

The book under review illustrates that Wezler's hope has, to at least some extent, been fulfilled and that some of the work that Aithal planned to do has been taken up by someone else, Ralf Stautzebach (RS). It will not cause surprise that RS has prepared this book at the University of Heidelberg, where it has been accepted as dissertation in 1993; the University of Heidelberg is the institution with which also the author of *Veda-Lakṣaṇa* is associated.

As indicated in the title, the book under review deals with two different Śikṣās of the Taittirīya-Śākhā. It further contains a short general introduction and an appendix about present-day Taittirīya-recitation in Tamil-Nadu. The present review will concentrate on the discussion, edition and explanation of the Pāriśikṣā.

It goes without saying that the book under review leans heavily on Aithal's *Veda-Lakṣaṇa*, sometimes to the extent of being rather unintelligible without it. Consider, for example, the ms-basis on which the edition of the Pāriśikṣā and of its commentary Yājuṣabhūṣaṇa has been prepared. In the relevant section "Zur Texterstellung" we read (p. 13): "Der im folgenden wiedergegebene Text der [Pāriśikṣā] mit dem Kommentar [Yājuṣabhūṣaṇa] gründet sich bis auf [Pāriśikṣā] 265-84 auf einer Devanāgarikopie des Grantha-Ms. MD 924 in [Sanskrit Texts on Phonetics (Lokesh Chandra 1981)] 317-94. Es ist trotz mehrfachen Bemühungen von Herrn Dr. Aithal nicht gelungen, anderer Mss.-Kopien zu dieser śikṣā habhaft zu werden." This manuscript, then, contains both text and commentary. Three other mss. are mentioned, which are stated to agree largely with the one used by RS. None of them contains verses 265-284. These verses figure nonetheless in the edition. Where do they come from? The following remark is meant to provide the answer (p. 13): "In dieser Hinsicht gibt der Schluss des Hamburger Ms. eine vollständige Ergänzung, wenn auch der letzte Vers nicht abschliesst." None of this is very clear, until one looks up Pāriśikṣā in Aithal's *Veda-Lakṣaṇa* (p. 429-432), where not only various mss of Pāriśikṣā and Yājuṣabhūṣaṇa (or both) are men-

tioned and briefly described, but also the concluding verses in the Hamburg ms quoted.<sup>1</sup>

Also elsewhere the clarity of presentation leaves to be desired. There can of course be no doubt that the Śikṣās constitute a highly specialized area of research, access to which is not easy for an outsider. But this can be no reason to make the book which tries to provide such access itself inaccessible. Unfortunately there is no other way to describe the book under review. Texts unknown to all but a few readers, even there where they are introduced for the first time, are referred to with the help (?) of obscure abbreviations. The “Einleitung” contains, for example, the following information: “Bei der Bearbeitung der *pārś* und *śś* konnte ich an folgende Publikationen anknüpfen: *tpr* mit den Kommentaren *tbhr*, *vaid* und *māh* ...[;] *vyās* ...[;] *kś* ...[;] *kaunś* ...[;] *vāsś* ...[;] *bhvś* ... Weiterhin ... *śsu* ...[;] *śamś* ...[;] *knś* ...[;] [d]ie *ārś* ...[;] [d]ie *siddhś* ...” The list of abbreviations is found at the end of the book (pp. 415-16) and makes itself abundant use of abbreviations. The notes, they too full of abbreviations, are also at the end of the book (pp. 275-409). The result is that, in order to read even the least problematic passage of the book under review, one needs to permanently keep at least two fingers on other pages. This might easily have been avoided.

The lack of effort to make the text accessible to a non-initiated public is a general feature of the book. This is to be regretted, for the very neglect into which this type of text had fallen calls for a work that introduces readers not accustomed to this kind of literature. More could have been done to make the work under review fulfill that role.

Questions relating to the Pāriśikṣā are discussed in a short introduction to the text. Here I will take up one of those questions, the one whether the author of the Pāriśikṣā also wrote its commentary Yājuṣabhūṣaṇa or not. RS dedicates less than a page to it and does not come to a clear conclusion. I will show that much more could be said about it, and that a very probable answer can be reached.

1 The Hamburg ms is “Hamburg [Staats- und Universitäts-Bibliothek] (cod.Palmbibl. III 8/133)” and is described separately on p. 549-550 of Aithal’s Veda-Lakṣaṇa (item 1195: Veda-Lakṣaṇa (HB)). Strangely, the Pāriśikṣā is not found among the 39 texts which this codex is here stated to contain.

The question is taken up in a short section, § 2.8 on p. 26-27 (“Sind Verfasser von [Pāriśikṣā] und [Yājuṣabhūṣaṇa] identisch?”). The question is only dealt with cursorily. Consider the following passage: “Die Identität geht nicht, wie Varma meint, aus der Einleitung des Kommentars hervor. Mit [Cakra] wird lediglich der Autor eines Lehrwerkes zum *varṇakrama* benannt, was sich auch auf einen Kommentar beziehen kann.” In other words, this introductory verse might identify the author of the Yājuṣabhūṣaṇa as being Cakra. This is practically all RS says about the issue.

Note here that the preceding introductory verse adds that Cakra’s father’s name was Rāma. With regard to the Hamburg ms, considered above, Aithal’s *Veda-Lakṣaṇa* states (p. 549): “The Ms. must have been written by or belonged to Cakra, son of Rāma Ayyaṅgār (of Ūruttiṭi?), whose writings are found in the codex.” It seems likely that the two Cakras are identical. The Hamburg ms, as we have seen, contains the Pāriśikṣā,<sup>2</sup> but not the Yājuṣabhūṣaṇa. This same ms does however contain commentaries on other Śikṣās (e.g., the Sarvasaṃmataśikṣā-vyākhyā). If Cakra the son of Rāma had composed both Pāriśikṣā and its commentary Yājuṣabhūṣaṇa, it would be hard to explain why he left out the commentary in this case. The situation becomes somewhat more understandable, without as yet becoming fully clear, if we assume that he is the author of the commentary only. In that case the Hamburg ms may be a collection of works he copied, perhaps against payment, and to which he could not, or did not wish to, add his own composition. This agrees with the circumstance that a colophon after Pāriśikṣā 168 explicitly identifies the son of Rāma as the author of the Yājuṣabhūṣaṇa, a commentary on the Pāriśikṣā (...rāmasūnuviracite pāriśikṣāvyākhyānabhūte ... yājuṣabhūṣaṇākhye ...). Further research—beginning with a detailed inspection of the Hamburg ms—may throw further light on this issue, but RS has not even mentioned it.

Internal criteria will have to be considered next. The use of the first or third person in the commentary to refer to the basic text does not help—here as so often—to determine identity or difference of authorship. Both occur, as in *udāhariṣyāmaḥ* introducing [221], against *nirūpayati* to introduce [124] and following ślokas, besides numerous occurrences of *āha*.

2 See however note 1, above.

Occasionally RS points to a difference between Pāriśikṣā and Yājuṣabhūṣaṇa, without discussing its relevance for the question of authorship. Pāriśikṣā 65 defines the place of articulation (*sthāna*) of consonants as the place where contact takes place. The commentary adds that this definition does not literally apply to fricatives etc., because no contact takes place in their case. RS comments (p. 61): “Die Begründung trifft nicht auf [die Pāriśikṣā] zu, da [Pāriśikṣā] 76 zu den Frikativen lediglich eine Öffnung in der Mitte des Artikulators beschreibt.” Does this have implications regarding the authorship question? RS does not raise the question, but one is tempted to interpret this difference as due to different authorship.

In this connection it is to be noted that Pāriśikṣā 3 announces an enumeration of sounds (*varṇasamāmnāya*), but that no such list is given in that text. The Yājuṣabhūṣaṇa, on the other hand, does list these sounds, 59 in number, in four verses. This might at first sight be considered an indication that the commentary is an integral part of the Pāriśikṣā. However, it is equally possible to look upon these four verses as belonging to the Pāriśikṣā rather than to the commentary. It is not clear by what criterion RS has relegated them to the commentary.

Pāṇinian terminology constitutes the background of the terminology of the Pāriśikṣā. Indeed, the Yājuṣabhūṣaṇa speaks of “the agreement with the established conventions of grammar etc.” (*vyākaraṇādīśāstrasiddhasamketānusāra*) as an argument justifying certain expressions (p. 41). Many technical terms introduced in the Pāriśikṣā coincide with those known from grammar. Occasionally a grammatical convention is used without it being introduced in the text. Consider the use of *t* after a short vowel—in *at*, *it* and *ut*—to designate just the short vowel (Pāriśikṣā 18). This convention should have been, but is not, explained in the initial section on technical terms (called *paribhāṣāprakaraṇa* in the commentary). The expressions *at*, *it* and *ut* are explained in the commentary, as *akāra*, *ikāra* and *ukāra* respectively. Had the authors of the Śikṣā and of the commentary been one and the same person, one might have expected a definition of this convention.

The same is true for the use of the Pāṇinian *pratyāhāras*. *Ac*, used for the first time in Pāriśikṣā 25, covers all vowels, but nothing in the Pāriśikṣā tells us why. The commentary explains the expression (*akārādya-ukāraparyanta svāra*; p. 43), and is clearly aware that it needs explanation.

Under Pāriśikṣā 27 it similarly explains *ac* (*svara*) and *hal* (*vyañjana*).<sup>3</sup> Had its author been the author of the Śikṣā, he might then have added the required explanation in the section on technical terms.

A strange reading is provided in Pāriśikṣā 43-44 which, even more strangely, seems to be confirmed by the commentary. We read there: *nādasya samvṛte kaṅthe śvāsas tu vivṛte sati/ hakāraḥ kriyate madhye .../*. RS translates/paraphrases “Bei zusammengezogener Stellung im Hals wird Ton, bei geöffneter Hauch und in der Mittelstellung *hakāra* erzeugt”. This no doubt gives the intended meaning, but it only translates the Sanskrit if we assume as first word nominative *nādaḥ* rather than genitive *nādasya*. The parallel passage in the Taittirīya-Prātiśākhya has indeed *samvṛte kaṅthe nādaḥ kriyate*. Yet the Yājuṣabhūṣaṇa introduces this verse with the words: ... *nādāday[ah]* ... *ucyante “nādasya” ityādinā*, thus confirming the reading *nādasya*. It does not however try to explain this reading, and comments as if the expected nominative were there. Only one conclusion seems possible here: the author of the Yājuṣabhūṣaṇa found the incorrect reading *nādasya* in his ms. (The correct reading may have been *nādas tu*, *nādaś ca*, or something of the sort.) This in its turn is only possible if the author of the Yājuṣabhūṣaṇa was not identical with the author of the Pāriśikṣā. Once again the situation might be further clarified by a detailed inspection of other mss.

[A similar situation occurs in Pāriśikṣā 51, but this time without confirmation by the commentary. The reading *ekāntarasya* does not seem to make sense, and the corresponding sūtra of the Taittirīya-Prātiśākhya (2.25) has *ekāntaras tu*. The Yājuṣabhūṣaṇa appears to cite the text as *ekāntara iti*. It would have been appropriate to explain why *ekāntarasya* has been maintained, but RS has not done so.]

It is also interesting to see that the term *hanu* “jaw” is feminine in the Pāriśikṣā, but masculine in the Yājuṣabhūṣaṇa (except where the latter cites the former). Cp. *hanūpasamhṛtatare*<sup>4</sup> in Pāriśikṣā 53, *atyupasamhṛte hanū* in 54, *nātivyaste hanū* in 57; against *hanū ... atyupasamhṛtau ... vivṛtau* etc. in Yājuṣabhūṣaṇa 48 (p. 52 l. 11 f.).

3 Surprisingly, the commentary on Pāriśikṣā 135 explains the plural *acaḥ* as *acādayaḥ svarāḥ*.

4 This should of course be *hanū upasamhṛtatare*, dual *ū* being *pragṛhya* (Pāṇini 1.1.11). Is this a mistake?



In this context we also have to consider the relationship between Pāriśikṣā 48 and the way it is explained in the Yājuṣabhūṣaṇa. The Śikṣā reads *nātivyastam avarṇe hanvoṣṭham nātyupasamhṛtam*, which RS translates: “Bei den *a*-Vokalen sind die Kiefer und Lippen nicht zu weit geöffnet und nicht zu sehr angenähert”. This line is practically identical to Taittirīya-Prātiśākhya 2.12 (*avarṇe nātyupasamhṛtam oṣṭhahanu nātivyastam*) but for the fact that the Pāriśikṣā, unlike the Taittirīya-Prātiśākhya, is metrical. Both the Yājuṣabhūṣaṇa and the commentaries on the Taittirīya-Prātiśākhya interpret this statement in such a manner that the two adjectives concern different sounds: short *a* on the one hand, long *ā* and *pluta ā* on the other. The Yājuṣabhūṣaṇa cites even another part of the Pāriśikṣā to support its interpretations. RS does not comment in any detail on the significance of this apparent difference between text and commentary, and limits himself to saying that the citation is not very convincing. William D. Whitney (1868:55) is more outspoken and concludes that (at least in the case of the Taittirīya-Prātiśākhya) the commentator appears to go against the text he comments. If we draw the same conclusion in the case of the Pāriśikṣā, one is led to think that its author was different from the author of the Yājuṣabhūṣaṇa. What is more, one may then have to consider the possibility that the author of the Pāriśikṣā was not influenced by any of the three surviving commentaries on the Taittirīya-Prātiśākhya, with all the chronological consequences this may entail. The case is not however completely waterproof. One might still maintain that a supposedly single author of both Pāriśikṣā and Yājuṣabhūṣaṇa wished to imitate the Taittirīya-Prātiśākhya and one of its commentaries (the Vaidikābharṇa). But this alternative would seem to be less convincing than the thesis of double authorship.

Pāriśikṣā 167 contains an obscure reading. RS presents it in the form apparently accepted by the commentator: ... *nityaḥ ātocyate 'sau kvacid eṇa oṇaḥ*. The problem lies in the last two words, which in the ms have the form *eṣa oṇaḥ*. Neither reading is clear, but the commentator explains: *eṇa oṇa ekāreṇa okāreṇa*. This leads RS to the paraphrase “der *nityakampa* [wird] mit *ā*, bisweilen mit *e* und *o* [gebildet]”. There can however be no doubt that this interpretation does not fit the words of the Śikṣā, and indeed that the words of the Śikṣā must here be corrupt. The commentator forces an impossible interpretation on a nonsensical reading, which implies that he is different from the Śikṣākāra.

Elsewhere the commentator explains a grammatically incorrect line as being *ārṣa* “usage of the seers”. Pāriśikṣā 183 concludes with the words: *evaṃ ca saptasvarabhakty udāhṛtāḥ* “So sind Beispiele für die 7 *svarabhaktis* gezeigt worden”. The commentator observes: *atra svarabhaktaya iti vaktavye svarabhaktīty āṛṣetyādi vijñeyam*.<sup>5</sup> It seems unlikely that the commentator describes his own language as *ārṣa*.

Pāriśikṣā 244-245 express the following: “Ein tonlos unaspirierter Verschlusslaut am *pada*-Ende wird vor *ṣ* oder *s* aspiriert”. However, “[d]er K[ommentar] führt weiterhin Beispiele zur Aspiration innerhalb eines *pada* auf: *saṃvathsaram, takḥṣam*. Dem entspricht die Regelfassung in [Sarvasaṃmata-Śikṣā] 19-20.1”.<sup>6</sup> The text commented upon is however very explicit about the requirement that this operation can only take place at the boundary between two words: the expression *padānta* figures twice over, and the following *s* and *ṣ* are characterized as *apadāntavartin*. It seems certain that commentator and Śikṣākāra did not agree in this matter, and were therefore different people.

This short survey shows, I believe, that *all* passages allow of the possibility that Pāriśikṣā and Yājuṣabhūṣaṇa had different authors, and that some more or less force us to draw this conclusion. I have no doubt that RS, if he had taken the trouble to take this issue somewhat more seriously, would have arrived at the same conclusion. As it is, he seems to be inclined to consider the two identical.

The hypothesis that the Pāriśikṣā could be older than the commentaries on the Taittirīya-Prātiśākhya, discussed above, is not without consequences. RS draws in the introduction to the Pāriśikṣā attention to its similarity with that Prātiśākhya. He then states (p. 24-25): “In einigen Fällen flossen hierbei Interpretationen ein, die [Tribhāṣyaratna] und [Vaidikābharāṇa] (i.e., the two commentaries on the Taittirīya-Prātiśākhya of that name, JB) gleichermassen entsprechen ... . Unter den Auslegungen zum [Taittirīya-Prātiśākhya] geben insbesondere jene einen Impuls zur Bewertung der

5 A similar remark might have been appropriate under Pāriśikṣā 179, which contains apparently an accusative plural *svarabhaktayas* (*udāhariṣye svarabhaktayas tāḥ*). Instead the commentator repeats the phrase without grammatical remarks.

6 RS adds a reference to “*vāśś* 10-1”. Since this abbreviation does not occur in the list of abbreviations at the end of his book, this reference remains obscure.

[Śikṣā], die nur auf [Vaidikābharāṇa] zurückzuführen sind ...” After some examples and remarks RS concludes: “ich [halte] es für wahrscheinlich, dass zu den Vorlagen der [Pāriśikṣā] ebenfalls [Vaidikābharāṇa] zählt”.

Why not assume the opposite, that the Vaidikābharāṇa was influenced by the Pāriśikṣā? The question is discussed, in the usual cursory manner, in the section dealing with the relationship between Pāriśikṣā and Vyāsaśikṣā. We read here (p. 25): “Dass letztere keineswegs der [Pāriśikṣā] folgt, zeigt [Pāriśikṣā] 239-40. Dieser Vers vereinigt bei der Definition eines Augmentes die Darstellung des [Taittirīya-Prātiśākhya], der [Vyāsaśikṣā] und des [Vaidikābharāṇa]. Die [Pāriśikṣā] kann hier nicht zugleich von [Vyāsaśikṣā] und [Vaidikābharāṇa] übernommen worden sein, da beide grundsätzlich verschiedene Ansätze vorbringen.” This statement is not further explained, neither here nor under Pāriśikṣā 239-40. And indeed, it is not easy to find what part of the Vaidikābharāṇa supposedly exerted an influence here. The most likely candidate, as far as I can see, is the phrase: *sa khalv abhinidhāna ity ucyate/ abhinidhīyate prakṣipyata ity abhinidhāṇaḥ* (Shama Sastri & Rangacarya, 1906: 379). Something similar occurs in Pāriśikṣā 240: *sa cābhinidhīyate ’trābhinidhāna ucyate*. But obviously no Sanskrit author needs another text in order to link *abhinidhāna* with *abhinidhīyate*. It is true that the Yājuṣabhūṣaṇa cites the Vaidikābharāṇa, but this proves nothing with regard to the relationship between Pāriśikṣā and Vaidikābharāṇa. Or does RS take it for granted that Pāriśikṣā and Yājuṣabhūṣaṇa have the same author? As so often, RS remains vague.

The Yājuṣabhūṣaṇa regularly gives etymologies (*nirvacana*) of key terms. RS seems to attach more value to these etymologies than they may deserve. This is what one is tempted to conclude from a note added to Pāriśikṣā 12-14. These lines assign the name *upasarga* to *pari*, *ā*, *ni*, *adhi*, *abhi*, *vi*, *prati*, *pra*, *ava* and *upa*. The commentary contains the following two lines, which occur in (have been taken from?) the Vaidikābharāṇa and the Tribhāṣyaratna respectively: *nirvacanaṃ tu gatitayā karmapravacanīyatayā vā padāntarair upasrjyanta ity upasargāḥ/ yajurvedaviṣaye upasargā etāvanta eveti mantavyam/*. RS explains (p. 39): “Weiterhin gibt der [Kommentar] die Ableitung: ‘Die Präpositionen (*upasarga*) heissen so, weil sie mit anderen *pada*-s zusammengebracht werden (*upasrjyante*) mit der Eigenschaft als *gati* oder als *karmapravacanīya*’. [The Yājuṣabhūṣaṇa] verlässt nun den Bereich grammatischer Argumentation und fährt fort: ‘Im Bereich

der [Yajurveda] sind nur diese (gemeint sind offensichtlich die im Vers genannten) als Präpositionen anzunehmen. ...” In a note (no. 26 on p. 288) RS observes that the commentary here “[Vaidikābharāṇa] und [Tribhāṣyaratna] sinnwidrig zusammengestellt hat.” He then explains: “Nach Vorgabe des Merkspruches haben Präpositionen des Typs *gati* als ... *upasarga* zu gelten. Es müsste dann aber nach [Pāriśikṣā] 234 *anu chandāṃsi* zu *anu cchandāṃsi* erweitert werden, was der [Kommentar] ausschliessen will.”

This does not seem to make sense. The Merkspruch is, apparently, the etymology. But an etymology cannot be looked upon as a definition, nor as having more than approximate validity in the interpretation of a word, in this case *upasarga*. It is not therefore justified to conclude that passages from the Vaidikābharāṇa and from the Tribhāṣyaratna have here “sinnwidrig” been combined. Note also that the Yājuṣabhūṣaṇa does not hesitate to use the expression *upasarga* in connection with prepositions that are not included in the above list, such as *sam* (p. 31). This appears to mean that the term *upasarga* is only used in connection with the above enumerated list where the Yajurveda is concerned. Everywhere else Pāṇinian terminology is used.

The same attitude with regard to etymologies shows itself under Pāriśikṣā 15-16. The commentary contains the following etymological explanation (p. 40): *anusvaryate paścārdhe svaravad uccāryata ity anusvārah* “Weil er in der letzten Hälfte (*anu*) wie ein Vokal (*-svaryate*) ausgesprochen wird, heisst er *anusvāra*.” A note (no. 5 on p. 288) comments: “Dieser Satz kann als Ergänzung der *anusvāra*-Definition 228-9.1 angesehen werden.” This remark does no harm, if its sole aim is to derive information from the etymology. But the etymology was certainly not intended to be a definition, or a supplement to a definition.

Pāriśikṣā 133 explains the expression *dhaivata* with the help of the verbal form *abhisandhīyate*. RS comments (p. 89): “Der Name [*dhaivata*] wird offenbar als derivative *vṛddhi* aus einer angesetzten Wz. *dhī* (aus *dhā*) entwickelt.” However, etymology is differentiated in India from grammar, and does not require strict derivations.<sup>7</sup>

7 Cp. Bronkhorst, 1984.

The Sanskrit text of the Śikṣā and its commentary is followed by an incomplete, but as a rule reliable paraphrase. Occasionally a literal translation is provided. This, too, is normally reliable, but there are exceptions. Consider the following. The Yājuṣabhūṣaṇa (under Pāriśikṣā 39-40) contains the following passage (p. 47 l. 4-7): *dvidvidhaḥ śabdo nityaḥ kāryaś ceti/ tatra nityaḥ sarvadeśavyāpy avyakta ekaḥ śabdo brahmety abhidhīyate/ tasmāt kāryaḥ śabda utpadyate/ sa vyaktaḥ kvācitko 'nantabhedaś ca/ tasya varṇātmakasyotpattir iha vyākhyeyatayādhikriyate/*. RS translates this as follows: “Der Laut ist zweifach: unvergänglich und hervorgebracht. Der unvergängliche Laut durchdringt alle Orte und ist *ungeschieden* und einzig. Er wird *brahma* genannt. Aus diesem entsteht der hervorgebrachte Laut. Er ist *isoliert*, tritt bisweilen in Erscheinung und hat unendlich viele Arten. Er *enthält* die Sprachlaute. Seine Entstehung, *die einer weiteren Erklärung bedarf*, wird zum *adhikāra erhoben*.” The German words in italics present cases where the translation leaves to be desired. *Avyakta* and *vyakta* do not, in this context, mean “ungeschieden” and “isoliert”, but “non-manifest(ed)” and “manifest(ed)” respectively. And the manifested sound does not contain (*enthält*) the phonemes, but is made up of them (*varṇātmaka*).<sup>8</sup> The expression (*utpattir*) *vyākhyeyatayādhikriyate*, finally, does not mean “Seine Entstehung, die einer weiteren Erklärung bedarf, wird zum *adhikāra erhoben*”, but “Its production is made the subject-matter as something that is in need of explanation / as the thing to be explained”.

This last expression contains the instrumental of an abstract noun (*vyākhyeyatayā*) in connection with the object of a verb. It seems that RS has difficulties with such constructions in general. Under Pāriśikṣā 41-42 he paraphrases *pratiniyatayā śrūyate* as “Vernommenwerden durch Zurückkommen”. The correct translation is “it is heard as fixed for each single case”; cp. Filliozat, 1988: p. 82 § 27d.

The fact that as a rule no literal translation is provided may account for the fact that at times Sanskrit readings are accepted that are untranslatable. Examples are *nādasya* and *ekāntarasya* in Pāriśikṣā 43 and 51 respectively, considered above. Also the line *idaiddvitīyedrasavahnisaṃjñāḥ* in Pāriśikṣā 83 seems to me hard to construe; the obvious emendation *idaiddvitīyedrasā vahnisaṃjñāḥ* would go against the metre. *Gakārasya* in

8 Under Pāriśikṣā 41-42 RS paraphrases again *varṇātmaka* as “Sprachlaut enthaltend”.

Pāriśikṣā 229 must be something like *gakāraḥ sa*, as is confirmed by the commentary. A particularly striking example is *svaro na sandhānapade visargaḥ* in Pāriśikṣā 198, which must be *svāro na sandhau na pade visargaḥ*. In all these and similar cases one wonders how RS conceives of the task of editing a text. The notes at the end of the book show that he does not always simply reproduce the manuscript, but on many occasions he apparently does, even when the result is plainly incorrect, or contrasts with the reading accepted by the commentator (recall that RS considers the commentator as being possibly identical with the Śikṣākāra!). On p. 128 RS characterizes a passage from the commentary as being “leicht korrupt” without specifying what is wrong with it, nor proposing any emendation.

Pāriśikṣā 241 reads, in RS’s edition: *nānte pare sati tarhy anantāt kagau, dvāv api cāgamau staḥ*. This reading cannot be correct, for various reasons. To begin with, we learn from the commentary that this rule concerns the insertion of an augment *k* between *ñ* and *t*. The rule in its present form says nothing of the kind, but a simple emendation from *nānte* to *nāt te* (confirmed by the commentary: *ñakārād iti kim* and *te takāre ... pare sati*) solves this problem. However, problems remain. The rule remains metrically chaotic, and still does not express all the commentary ascribes to it. RS could, and should, have recorded this, but he doesn’t. Even less does he point out that the rule does fit the *upajāti* metre (characteristic of many of the surrounding verses) if only some additional syllables be provided. The metrical scheme in its present, unsatisfactory, state is:

--U-UU-U--U--UU-U--.

By adding the three syllables in brackets, this becomes:

--U-(-)UU-U--/(~-)U--UU-U--,

which is a perfect *upajāti*. On the basis of the elements presented in the commentary, but that are missing in the incomplete verse, one can make the following conjecture as to its full form:

*nāt te pare (dhe) sati tarhy anantāt/  
(kramāt) kagau dvāv api cāgamau staḥ//*

There is of course no guarantee that this is the correct reading (which can be checked, and possibly refuted, with the help of the other mss of the text known to exist), but unlike the text presented by RS, it may well be.

A reasonable conjecture might have been made in the case of Pāriśikṣā 249, too. Consider to begin with the first line of the commentary on [248-249]: *īdādaya ikārapūrva aikārapūrvo yo yakāro dvirūpau dvitvaṃ na bhajen nāpadyate ...*. A note attached to the word *dvirūpau* says: “ms: *dvirūpau dvi*”. This allows us to conclude that RS planned to correct this reading—no doubt into *dvirūpaṃ dvit aṃ*, which alone makes sense— but somehow forgot to do so. This sentence, thus emended, paraphrases the expressions *dvirūpaṃ* and *na bhajet*,<sup>9</sup> which one would therefore expect to find in the passage commented upon. They are not there, but the edited version contains a lacuna, which we must consider in some detail. The second half of [249] reads, in the edition: *sparśottarasthe ...*. A note gives the ms reading, which is: *visargottarasthobhadvirūpya//*. This cannot, of course, be the correct reading, but it does contain similarities to the missing expressions *na bhajet* and *dvirūpaṃ*. RS changed the beginning on the basis of its citation in the commentary (*ūṣmasparśottarasth[e]*, where *ūṣma* occurs at the end of the first half of [249]). If we add *na bhajet dvirūpaṃ*, we arrive at: *sparśottarasthe na bhajet dvirūpaṃ*, which is metrically impeccable, and which makes perfect sense in its context.

An interesting case is to be found under Pāriśikṣā 144. The Śikṣā reads: *ivarnakotor yavakārabhāve yaḥ svaryate kṣaipra udāttayoḥ syāt* “When there is *y* or *v* in the place of *udātta i* or *u*, the [resulting] *svarita* is [called] *kṣaipra*”. The commentary raises the question why *ivarnakotoḥ* “in the place of *i* or *v*” had to be expressed, in the following passage: *ivarnakotor iti kim/ ‘eta etān’* (TS 6.6.8.3), *‘asāv ādityaḥ’* (TS 2.1.2.4), *‘saṃyattāḥ’* (TS 1.5.1.1), *‘saṃ vadante’* (TS 4.2.6.5). RS paraphrases: “Gegenbeispiele: (a) andere Laute als *i* oder *u* tragen den *udātta*: *‘etá etán’*, *‘asāv ādityáḥ’* etc. ...” He has clearly misunderstood the passage, for the context requires that the examples illustrate cases where there is *y* or *v* that do **not** replace *i* or *u*. Three of the four examples fit without difficulty: *‘asāv ādityaḥ’*, *‘saṃyattāḥ’* and *‘saṃ vadante’* all contain *y* or *v* that do not replace *i* or *u*. What about the first example? It clearly has to

9 Besides *īdādaya[h]*, cited from Pāriśikṣā 248. I have no idea how to understand this form.

read 'etáy etān', with y. This may look strange at first sight, but is regular Pāṇinian sandhi for *ete etān*, elision of y being optional by P. 8.3.19 *lopaḥ śākalyasya*.<sup>10</sup> The Taittirīya Prātiśākhya prescribes elision of y and v by sūtra 10.19, but adds (10.20) that Ukhya disagrees with it. This example shows that the authors of the Pāriśikṣā and of its commentary did not necessarily always know, or accept, the reading of the Taittirīya texts known to us.<sup>11</sup>

To conclude. With some more attention to details the book under review might have been considerably improved. It is unlikely that someone else will anytime soon edit and interpret the Pāriśikṣā and Sarvasaṃmataśikṣā, so the book will, in spite of its shortcomings, become the basis of future studies concerning these Śikṣās and related issues. In the situation one can only advise its readers to use it with caution.

*Some suggested improvements in the edition:*

(Note that no systematic search for errors has been made, and that the following enumeration merely lists some of the errors that a superficial reading brought to light.)

p. 31 l. 1	prāripsitasya	→	prāripsitasya (?)
p. 41 l. 2	ākḥā	→	ākhyā
p. 43 l. 21	procyamānā	→	procyamāne
p. 46 l. 11	ṣaḍviṃśati	→	ṣaḍviṃśatir
p. 47 l. 7	vyākheyatayā°	→	vyākhyeyatayā°
p. 49 l. 5	nādasya	→	nādas tu (?)
p. 50 l. 26	'nupradhānaṃ	→	'nupradānaṃ
p. 54 l. 4	ekāntarasya	→	ekāntaras tu (?)
p. 65 l. 25	kaṇṭhaṃ sthānaṃ	→	kaṇṭhaḥ sthānaṃ
p. 65 l. 27	kaṇṭhasthānaṃ	→	kaṇṭhaḥ sthānaṃ

10 The Kāśikā under this rule gives, among other examples, the contrasting pair *asā ādityaḥ / asāv ādityaḥ*, precisely the quotation from the Taittirīya Saṃhitā also given in the Yājuṣabhūṣaṇa. (This quotation has not been identified in Wilhelm Rau's *Die vedischen Zitate in der Kāśikā Vṛtti* (1993).)

11 Note that the counterexample *ta enaṃ bhiṣajyati* (TS 2.3.11.4) under [196-197] and in [207] shows that here a hiatus (and not y) separates the two vowels °a e°.



(in these last two cases the correct reading might conceivably be *kaṅṭha sthānaṃ*, in accordance with Taittirīya Prātiśākhya 9.1)

p. 67 l. 12	vargavatsthānayogo	→	vargavat sthānayogo
p. 67 l. 12	mukhaśabdenātra	→	mukhaśabdenātra
p. 69 l. 27	uktaparakāraṇe	→	uktaparakaraṇe
p. 86 l. 1	madhyakasya	→	madhyamasya (?)
p. 87 l. 23	śabdasyodātta°	→	śabdasyodātta°
p. 89 l. 19-20	°prādhānyotkarṣāl	→	°prādhānyotkarṣāl
p. 94 l. 11	eta etān	→	etay etān
p. 99 l. 26	bhigate	→	'bhigate
p. 100 l. 20	sa idhānaḥ	→	sa idhānaḥ
p. 109 l. 12	sya dhūrṣam ity°	→	sya dhūrṣad ity° (?)
p. 117 l. 2	svaro na sandhānapade vi°	→	svāro na sandhau na pade vi°
p. 117 l. 24	svaraḥ	→	svāraḥ
p. 120 l. 3	ce	→	ca
p. 123 l. 11	prakārena	→	prakāreṇa
p. 128 l. 4	gakārasya	→	gakāraḥ sa (?)
p. 134 l. 32-33	nānte pare sati tarhy anantāt kagau, dvāv api cāgamau staḥ		
	→ nāt te pare (dhe) sati tarhy anantāt/ (kramāt) kagau dvāv api cāgamau staḥ//		
p. 136 l. 7	kim artham	→	kimartham
p. 136 l. 8	tatraśikṣ°	→	tatra śikṣ°
p. 137 l. 23	prathamaparśaḥ	→	prathamaparśaḥ
p. 139 l. 4	parśottarasthe ...	→	parśottarasthe (na bhajed dvirūpam)
p. 139 l. 5	dvirūpau	→	dvirūpaṃ

*Other corrections:*

p. 47 l. 23	śabdasyodbhāva	→	°dbhava
p. 47 l. 34	1.12.12	→	2.4.2
p. 109 l. 22	hastiṇī	→	hastinī
p. 132 l. 29	lakṣyānuṣara	→	lakṣyānuṣāra
p. 290 l. 35 (n. 7)	nicht nicht	→	nicht

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AAWL	Abhandlungen der Akademie der Wissenschaften und der Literatur, Mainz, Geistes- und Sozialwissenschaftliche Klasse
Jg.	Jahrgang
P.	Pāṇinian sūtra
TS	Taittirīya Saṃhitā

Johannes Bronkhorst

VERDENRELIIGIONERNES HOVEDVAERKER: HĪNAYĀNA. DEN TIDLIGE INDISKE BUDDHISME, udgivet af Christian Lindtner. København: Spektrum Forlag, 1998. 228 S.

MAHĀYĀNA. DEN SENERE INDISKE BUDDHISME, udgivet af Christian Lindtner. København: Spektrum Forlag, 1998. 255 S.

In der verdienstvollen Reihe, in der die hier angezeigten Bände publiziert wurden, sind aus dem indoiranischen Bereich bereits Werke aus dem Avesta, dem Veda, den jüngerer Upaniṣaden sowie die Bhagavadgītā und das Bhāgavata-Purāṇa dargeboten worden. Anders als man vermuten sollte, hat diese Studienbücherei keinen populärwissenschaftlichen Charakter; vielmehr werden bestimmte Grundkenntnisse durchaus vorausgesetzt. Der Bearbeiter des Hīnayāna und Mahāyāna, Dr. Christian Lindtner, der meh-

rere Jahre an der Redaktion des CPD beteiligt war und neben dem Sanskrit und Pāli auch das Chinesische und Tibetische beherrscht, bot für die Lösung seiner Aufgabe eine ausgezeichnete Qualifikation.<sup>1</sup> Die hier besprochenen beiden Bände sind das Resultat einer fast drei Dezennien umfassenden Forschungsarbeit.

Manchem Fachkollegen wird die Sprachbarriere eine zeitraubende Last sein, und so hält der Rez. es für angebracht, durch eine Skizzierung des Inhalts dem Benutzer einen Eindruck davon zu vermitteln, was er von beiden Bänden erwarten darf. In den die Hīnayāna-Anthologie einleitenden Bemerkungen wird Buddha mit Recht dem 6. Jh. v. Chr. zugewiesen (S. 8). Lindtner hebt die Übereinstimmung von ältestem Buddhismus und Jinismus hervor, wie sie etwa in der Ablehnung eines Schöpfergottes und des brahmanischen Opferrituals bestand. Er sieht im kanonischen Buddhismus eine Form der Bhagavat-Religion ("Bhagavatismus") und definiert die Eigenschaften eines Bhagavat (S. 9). Über *jñāna*-, *karma*- und *bhakti-yoga* verknüpft L. die vier edlen Wahrheiten mit der Bhagavadgītā<sup>2</sup> und verweist auf das *brahmanirvāṇa* in BhG I I, 72; V, 25 ( S. 196 ) .

Mit besonderer Anerkennung muß hervorgehoben werden, daß L. in seinen einleitenden Erläuterungen zu den Texten und speziell bei der Auswahl der Texte selbst ausgetretene Pfade verlassen und neue Wege beschritten hat. So vermittelt er die Grundbegriffe des älteren Buddhismus –

- 1 Es ist nicht zuletzt ein Zweck dieser Rezension, auf die bisher zu wenig beachteten buddhologischen Forschungsleistungen L.s aufmerksam zu machen. Einige Hinweise müssen hier freilich genügen. Nachdem L. mit dänischen Übersetzungen des *Dhammapada* und aus Werken des Nāgārjuna begonnen hatte, besorgte er Ausgaben des *Pañcaskandhaprakaraṇa* (1979) und des *Satyadvayāvatāra* (1981). Seine 1982 erschienene Dissertation *Nagarjuniana: Studies in the Writings and Philosophy of Nāgārjuna* wird als Standardwerk eingeschätzt und wurde mehrfach nachgedruckt. Aus L.s Feder stammen zahlreiche Ausgaben, Übersetzungen und Studien, so *Buddhismen, Tanker og Livsformer*, das von 1982 bis 1997 neun Auflagen erlebte. Ferner verdanken wir L. die erste sanskritische und tibetische Ausgabe und Übersetzung der *Alokaṃālā* des Kambala (1985) sowie mehrere Beiträge zu der von K. Potter herausgegebenen *Encyclopedia of Indian Philosophies*.
- 2 Dazu vgl. jetzt Kashi Nath Upadhyaya: *Early Buddhism and the Bhagavadgītā* (Delhi 1998).

so die vier edlen Wahrheiten, die Kausalkette, *bodhi* und *samādhi* – nach dem Catuṣpariṣatsūtra.<sup>3</sup>

In der Einleitung zur Übersetzung des Aggaññasutta geht L. auf eine außerordentlich wichtige Problematik der Religionswissenschaft im Zusammenhang mit einer Arbeit von N. Klatt<sup>4</sup> ein. Mit Hinblick auf die seit dem Alexanderfeldzug ausgebauten Handelsverbindungen zwischen Indien und dem Nahen Osten sowie auf die von Aśoka initiierten Missionen wirft L. die Frage nach dem Einfluß des Buddhismus auf das frühe Christentum auf (S. 60) und kommt zu der Überzeugung, daß grundlegende Vorstellungen des Neuen Testaments unter dem Gesichtspunkt eines "judaisierten Buddhismus" betrachtet werden können (S. 64). Buddha, Mahāvīra und auch Kṛṣṇa als Zentralfiguren des "Bhagavatismus" sind L. zufolge komplexe Erscheinungen: einerseits Menschen, andererseits vergöttlichte Wesen. Den Ursprung dieser Doppelperscheinung sieht L. in BU II, 3, 1: *dve vāva brahmaṇo rūpe mūrtam caivāmurtam ca martyam cāmṛtam ca ...* Rez. sieht in dieser Stelle für die ansonsten durchaus plausible "Euhemerisierung" eine zwar schwache, aber immerhin diskutabile Basis; doch ist es ihm im Gegensatz zu L. versagt, in RV X, 129, 6 eine Vorstufe des Tathāgata zu erblicken (S. 67).

L. stellt nun die These auf, daß auch Jesus Christus sowohl als reale, sterbliche Person, als auch als mythische Gestalt gesehen werden müsse, gewissermaßen als Jesus *und* Christus (S. 61). Dabei bezieht er sich auf den Brief des Paulus an die Epheser, in dem es (I, 10) heißt: "... auf daß alle Dinge zusammengefaßt würden in Christo, beides, das im Himmel und auf Erden ist, durch ihn."

Es ist zu begrüßen, daß L. die Frage, ob und inwieweit das NT von buddhistischen Quellen abhängt, mit solcher Deutlichkeit aufwirft. Neu ist sie freilich nicht. Schon 1882 hatte R. Seydel die Abhängigkeit der Evangelien von den buddhistischen Legenden zu erweisen versucht.<sup>5</sup> Und schon

3 Übersetzung des Catuṣpariṣatsūtra nach der Ausgabe von E. Waldschmidt (Berlin 1952-1962). Dies nur als Beispiel; im Rahmen dieser Rez. kann nicht auf alle von L. benutzten Quellen eingegangen werden.

4 N. Klatt: *Literarkritische Beiträge zum Problem christlich-buddhistischer Parallelen* (Köln 1982).

5 R. Seydel: *Das Evangelium von Jesu in seinen Verhältnissen zu Buddha-Sage und Buddha-Lehre* (Leipzig 1882).

damals ist darüber eine heftige Diskussion entbrannt. Über diese äußert sich L. nicht. Bevor er aber seine Thesen zu erhärten versucht, sollte er sich mit den gegen Seydels Auffassungen gerichteten Argumenten auseinandersetzen, wie sie von keinem Geringeren als Ernst Windisch vorgebracht worden sind. In "Māra und Buddha" gipfeln Windischs Untersuchungen in der Feststellung, daß dem Buddhismus äußerlich ähnliche Legenden des Christentums nicht aus dem buddhistischen Sagenkreis übernommen wurden, sondern daß sie parallel und unabhängig davon entstanden sind.<sup>6</sup> Auch in seiner Studie "Buddha's Geburt und die Lehre von der Seelenwanderung"<sup>7</sup> betonte Windisch die grundlegenden Unterschiede zwischen beiden Weltanschauungen sowie den Parallelismus ihrer Entstehung und kam zu dem Schluß, daß die Geburtslegenden um Buddha und Jesus unabhängig voneinander entstanden seien. Später wandte sich auch Johannes Hertel gegen die These, die Bibel sei nur eine Wiedergabe altindischer Schriften. Hier steht dem wissenschaftlichen Meinungsstreit also noch ein weites Feld offen.

Die Übersetzung des Aggaññasutta (= Dīghanikāya III, 4) mit seiner Behandlung des *paṭiccasamuppāda* ist L., der mit Recht auf die sprachlichen und inhaltlichen Archaismen dieses Werkes<sup>8</sup> verweist, sehr gut gelungen. *vaṇṇa* deutet er richtig mit "staender"; *vessa* sind allerdings nicht nur "handelsmanden". Daß in Pāli Texten Begriffe und Namen meist in Sanskrit wiedergegeben werden (so Kalmāṣadamyā statt Kammāsadamma) irritiert etwas, zumal keine einheitliche Linie verfolgt wird. So steht im Suttanipāta III, 1 Giribbaja neben Śākya. Doch ist dies natürlich nur von untergeordneter Bedeutung.

Einer gekürzten Übersetzung des Mahānidānasuttanta (= Dīghanikāya II, 2) folgen dem Mönchsleben gewidmete Auszüge aus dem Suttanipāta, u.a. das Pabbajjā und das Padhāna-Sutta. Die vor diesen Auszügen gegebene kurze Übersicht über das Tipiṭaka hätte wohl besser an den Anfang des Buches gehört.

6 E. Windisch: *Māra und Buddha* (Leipzig 1895), S. 218-219.

7 E. Windisch: "Buddha's Geburt und die Lehre von der Seelenwanderung," in: *Abhandlungen der philologisch-historischen Klasse der Kgl. Sächsischen Gesellschaft der Wissenschaften*, Band 26 (Leipzig 1908), Nr. 2, S. 3 - 236.

8 Vgl. dazu jetzt auch K. Meisig: *Das Sūtra von den vier Ständen: Das Aggaññasutta im Licht seiner chinesischen Parallelen* (Wiesbaden 1988).

Für die weiteren Beiträge dieses Bandes ist man schon deshalb sehr dankbar, weil sie sonst in Anthologien kaum zu finden sind. Dies gilt etwa für zwei repräsentative Kapitel aus dem Udānavarga, das den Laienpflichten gewidmete Sigālovādasutta und das Śālistambasūtra mit seiner Betrachtung des *dhātusamavāya*. L. erweist sich nicht zuletzt hier als hervorragender Kenner dieser Literatur. Mit Gewinn liest man auch seine Übersicht über die Abhidhamma-Literatur in der Einleitung zu dem erkenntnistheoretisch bedeutsamen Pañcaskandhaprakaraṇa. Am Schluß des Buches findet man Āryadevas Catuḥśataka mit den "vier falschen Auffassungen" sowie die 85 Verse des von Mātṛceṭa verfaßten Mahārājakaniṣkalekha<sup>9</sup>; hier deutet L. den didaktischen Brief (*lekha*) richtig als neue literarische Form. "Noter" mit zahlreichen Hinweisen auf teils neueste, teils wenig bekannte Werke sowie ein kurzgefaßtes Literaturverzeichnis runden den Band ab. Leider fehlt ein Register.

In der Einleitung zum zweiten hier zu besprechenden Band erörtert L. die Quellen unserer Kenntnis des Mahāyāna, gibt – unter besonderer Berücksichtigung des Nāgārjuna – eine Übersicht über die Mahāyāna-Literatur und schildert die Entwicklung vom *arhat* zum *bodhisattva*. Die Darstellung der unterschiedlichen Positionen von Hīnayāna und Mahāyāna hinsichtlich der Ontologie und der Ethik liest man mit besonderem Interesse. Einige Bemerkungen über die dänische Wissenschaftspolitik und über geistige Strömungen der Gegenwart gehen über die Buddhologie hinaus und können daher nur am Rande dieser Rezension stehen. L.s Kritik am Verhalten der Kopenhagener Universität gegenüber der orientalistischen Philologie mag in manchem berechtigt sein; wenn L. aber behauptet, sie sei aufgelöst worden "på vanlig marxistisk manér" (S. 13), so widerspricht das "vanlig" Erfahrungen, die nicht nur der Rez. gemacht hat. Auch den Fideismus, der in L.s Wunsch einer Überwindung des "ulyksalige modsætning mellem tro (religion) og viden" (S. 14) zum Ausdruck kommt, kann der Rez. nicht teilen.

Wichtiger ist aber wohl der Umstand, daß L. *expressis verbis* den rechten Mittelweg zwischen philologisch-exakter und gut lesbarer Übersetzung angestrebt hat und daß ihm dieser wesentliche Aspekt seiner Arbeit vorzüglich gelungen ist. Soweit es der Rez. beurteilen kann, lesen sich

9 Vgl. hierzu die Ausgabe der tibetischen Fassung mit deutscher Übersetzung von M. Hahn, in: *Asiatische Studien* 46, 1 (1992), S. 147-179.

sämtliche hier vorgelegten Übersetzungen flüssig und geben den Geist der Originaltexte getreu wieder. Auch dem Anspruch, anhand der getroffenen Auswahl alle wesentlichen Seiten des Mahāyāna darzustellen, wird L. voll- auf gerecht. Wir müssen uns hier freilich auf eine flüchtige Skizzierung des Inhalts dieses Bandes beschränken.

Den Schwerpunkt bildet hier die Übersetzung der 928 Verse des Madhyamakahr̥daya. Dieses auch als Tarkajvālā bezeichnete, bisher aber wenig beachtete Werk des Bhāvaviveka (Bhavya) steht in der Traditionslinie von Nāgārjuna und Āryadeva. In der Einleitung äußert sich L. ausführlich über Bhāvavivekas Werke, über die er schon früher gearbeitet hatte.<sup>10</sup> Religions- und philosophiegeschichtlich von besonderem Interesse sind Bhāvavivekas Kritik an Hīnayāna und Yogācāra (Kap. IV und V) und seine Auseinandersetzung mit der Mīmāṃsā (Kap. IX). Zu bedauern bleibt daher, daß die Kapitel VI und VII mit den Polemiken gegen Sāṃkhya und Vaiśeṣika ausgelassen werden mußten. Bei aller Würdigung der philosophiegeschichtlichen Rolle Bhāvavivekas fällt es doch schwer, ihn mit L. als Kämpfer für die Veredlung der Menschheit "gennem videnskab og oplysning" (S. 117) einzuschätzen.

Als Beispiel mahāyānistischer Morallehre bringt L. das Upāliparipṛcchāsūtra, wobei er *bodhisattva*, *pāramitā*, *śrāvaka*, *pratyekabuddha* und andere Begriffe definiert. Detailliert ist auch die Einleitung zur (um die Prosa-Eröffnung gekürzten) Übersetzung des neunten Kapitels des Samādhirājasūtra. Dem Prajñapāramitāstotra folgt die Übersetzung des Prajñāśataka. Dieses wird als buddhifizierte hinduistische Sprichwortsammlung gedeutet und dem *arthaśāstra*-Bereich zugeordnet.

Aussagekräftig für die Ethik des Mahāyāna ist die Prañidhānasaptati, die Sammlung von 70 Versen über das höchste Streben. Wiederum philosophiegeschichtlich bemerkenswert, nämlich als Destillat des subjektiven Idealismus, ist die aus 30 Thesen bestehende Triṃśikā des Vasubandhu über die "Welt als Vorstellung", von L. richtig mit dem Satz "Det hele kun er tanke" (S. 93) zusammengefaßt und mit einer Einführung in den Yogācāra und dessen Vergleich mit dem Madhyamaka versehen. Hiermit in Zusammenhang steht die Ālambanaparīkṣā des Dignāga, der hier nicht

10 Unter anderem "Bhavya, the Logician", in: *The Adyar Library Bulletin* 50 (1986), S. 58-84.

als Logiker, sondern als Verfechter der These, daß "alt er blot bevidsthed", vorgestellt wird.

Es spricht für L.s umfassende Kenntnis der Materie, daß er mit den kleinen Schriften des durch seine Missionstätigkeit in Tibet hervorgetretenen Atiśa (11. Jh.) auch eine späte Rekapitulation des Mahāyāna aufgenommen hat. Vertreten ist sie in der hier vorgelegten Sammlung durch einen Auszug über die absolute und die relative Wahrheit sowie durch einen um 1040 geschriebenen Brief an den König Nayapāla.

Am Schluß des Bandes findet man eine knappe, aber aussagekräftige Bibliographie, die auch Werke neuesten Datums enthält. Die Bewältigung des schwierigen Satzes ist gut gelungen, so daß sich störende Druckfehler nur an wenigen Stellen<sup>11</sup> finden.

Faßt man das Gesagte zusammen, so hat sich L. durch seine mühevollen und zugleich qualifizierte Arbeit großes Verdienst erworben. Gewiß werden nicht alle von L. vorgebrachten theoretischen Auffassungen von Bestand sein. Aber die Lektüre der beiden Bände lehrt, scheinbar Altbekanntes in neuem Licht zu sehen. Dies allein bedeutet schon eine dankenswerte Bereicherung der Buddhologie. Infolge ihrer thematischen Breite verdienen aber die hier besprochenen Bücher Verbreitung nicht nur unter Indologen, sondern auch unter Religionswissenschaftlern, Theologen und Philosophen. Doch bleibt dies, solange die eingangs erwähnte Sprachbarriere besteht, wohl ein *pium desiderium*. Man kann daher nur der Hoffnung Ausdruck verleihen, daß die hier von L. vorgelegten Sammlungen – und vielleicht auch die anderen Verdensreligionernes Hovedvaerker – bald Übersetzungen in eine der Weltsprachen erfahren mögen.

Klaus Mylius

11 Hingewiesen sei auf die fehlerhaften diakritischen Zeichen S. 8 und 10, auf die falsche Silbentrennung S. 110, Z. 4, und auf die Überschrift S. 244, die Satyadvayāvātāra lauten muß.



WEBER-BROSAMER, Bernhard and BACK, Dieter M., *Die Philosophie der Leere. Nāgārjunas Mūlamadhyamaka-Kārikās. Übersetzung des buddhistischen Basistextes*. Wiesbaden: Harrassowitz Verlag, 1997 (=Beiträge zur Indologie 28). Pp. xi & 130.

Decisive for a good understanding of a text such as Nāgārjuna's *Mūlamadhyamaka-Kārikā* (MMK) is not only a reliable translation (experience shows that this can be amazingly difficult) of each verse, but also a clear grasp of the 27 chapters of the MMK as a whole compared with the remaining authentic works of Nāgārjuna. Moreover, once one has come that far, one must try to place the author and his work in the broader historical context of ancient Buddhist and Indian philosophy. Without identifying the author's background and sources, numerous details – and the picture as a whole – remain unclear, or even deceptive.

As far as the first point is concerned—the translation itself—this new book is, with some exceptions, quite reliable. It is also the first complete modern translation of Nāgārjuna's magnum opus into German. (The first was published, with the two earliest commentaries, by Max Walleser, back in 1911 & 1912). As such it obviously fills a lacuna, especially for German students of philosophy.

The translation is based on the Sanskrit text published by La Vallée Poussin (1903-1913) and, based on this, that of Vaidya (1960), as well as the one of de Jong (1977). It is a pity that the translators have not exhaustively consulted the materials available in Chinese and Tibetan. Had they done so they would have come closer to the original Sanskrit text as written by Nāgārjuna. In quite a few cases the earliest commentaries reflect variant readings preferable to those given by the fairly late commentator Candrakīrti. Also, with regard to the title of the chapters, Candrakīrti in eight cases differs from the consensus of the previous commentators (see my *Nagarjuniana*, p. 25, n. 79 for the details). One can, in brief, speak of Candrakīrti's *recension* of the MMK. Again, the translators have overlooked the long list of textual emendations etc. suggested and published in my review of Saigusa Mitsuyoshi, *Chūron geju sōran*, in *Cahiers d'Extrême-Asie* 4 (1988), pp. 244-247. It would be tedious here to repeat what I have already written elsewhere, and there is no reason to go into minor details.

I shall confine myself to a few observations:

2.3: The idea is that there can only be going of that which is being gone, *provided* that that which is going to be gone can exist as such *before* it starts to be gone. The two following verses argue why this is so by way of *prasaṅga*.

2.15: The argument seems to be more clear if we translate *tiṣṭhati* with *stop*, rather than with *stand*. A goer cannot stop, for then he would be standing, and, therefore, he would not be moving, and, therefore, without moving he would not be a goer. Alternatively, if he is not a goer, he cannot stop, i.e. he cannot stop moving, as a goer.

2.22: As suggested by the *hi*, the final sentence gives the reason for the conclusion given in the preceding sentence (introduced by *yasmād...*): There must be some individual agent *before* he manifests himself, here in the activity of going.

7.16: For a more pertinent reference than the one given in note 37 (p. 26), see my *Nagarjuniana*, p. 109, n. 19.

16.10: The words *samāropa* and *apakarṣaṇa* can hardly be translated as *attain* and *abolish*. The author seems to be thinking in terms of addition and subtraction.

18.6: All three verbs have the same agents, viz. the Buddhas. The following verse gives the reason why it would be wrong to think that the Buddhas have thereby contradicted themselves: There is really nothing to talk about. In that case they cannot contradict their own words.

18.12: The verse has probably been misunderstood by all commentators. I suggest that *jñānam* is taken with *anutpāde*, *kṣaye*, and, finally, with *saṃsargāt*. Nāgārjuna refers to three kinds of knowledge (cf. *op. rec.*, p. 78, n. 98).

23.7: The reading *doṣasya* should probably be retained, with de Jong, as a *lectio difficilior*, and as showing the influence of BHS. The meaning is not affected. See, e.g. *Mahāparinirvāṇasūtra*, p. 7 (ed. Waldschmidt).

24.7: For the meaning of this verse, see my remarks in *Asiatische Studien* 46/1 (1992), p. 249. The commentators did not recognize Nāgārjuna's canonical source.

24.9. Here we should read *gambhīre*, to be construed with *buddhaśāsane*, not with *tattvam*.

Some more general remarks:

In the Introduction (p. ix) the editor describes Nāgārjuna's philosophy as "agnosticism". This can be misleading. Nāgārjuna looks upon all things in the perspective of two truths. He, accordingly, makes a distinction between practical and theoretical reason (*prajñā*). There is no room for agnosticism from either point of view. He accepts a *tattvajñāna* in the ultimate sense, and a *laukikaprajñā* in a relative and practical sense. He would never reject the possibility of achieving *jñāna*, or gnosis. Hence, "agnosticism" may be a misleading label for *śūnyatāvāda*, or Madhyamaka, the science of the Middle.

The translators claim (p. 18) that the doctrine of the (six) elements (*dhātu*) is archaic (which is true), and that it has no particular place in Buddhism.—It is true that direct discussions of *ṣaḍdhātvāda* are very rare in Buddhist texts. But there is a canonical reference, often quoted, to the effect that man consists of six elements. And, when one considers the nature of the Buddhist notions about *skandha* and *pratīyasamutpāda*, it will be seen that they are largely derived from the doctrine of six elements. As is especially clear from the extremely important *Śālistambasūtra* (see my review in *Buddhist Studies Review* 15,1 (1998) pp. 107-116), Buddhist speculations about causality presuppose a natural philosophy of six elements. For further details, see my paper "Buddhism as *ṣaḍdhātvāda*", in *The Adyar Library Bulletin* 61 (1997).

Did the two final chapters originally belong to the MMK?, the translators ask (p. 100). Some scholars have doubted this. I agree with the translators that they certainly did. One chapter has to do with the *pratīyasamutpāda* formula, found in virtually all Buddhist texts, the other (27) has to do with the dogmas (*drṣṭi*), as found in *Brahmajālasūtra* (often quoted in numerous *Mahāyāna śāstras* later on). It is extremely important for Nāgārjuna, whose MMK is otherwise written in the spirit of *prajñāpāramitā*, to show suspicious readers that he is by no means a heretic. Elsewhere in the MMK, he repeatedly makes it clear that he sees it as his duty to give a correct interpretation of the *pratīyasamutpāda*, and that the purpose of the *dharamadeśanā* is to get rid of all dogmatic attitudes (*drṣṭi*). This is the purpose of his concluding his MMK with these two chapters.

The MMK can be classified as an exercise for learned Buddhist monks in the use of reason. Hence the additional title *Prajñā*. Elsewhere,

Nāgārjuna explains that *prajñā* itself is not sufficient for the attainment of happiness and liberation, the double fruit of Dharma. Reason, practical as well as theoretical, must be preceded by faith, or *śraddhā*, the *Ratnāvalī* says (1.5). Nāgārjuna, in other words, expects the reader of his MMK to be familiar with numerous other Buddhist texts (in Sanskrit) before he takes up the study of *Prajñā*. If one is *tattvagaveṣin* one must first study *Abhidharma*, etc. (*Yuktiṣaṣṭikā* 30). His ancient readers were insiders, but his modern readers are outsiders. It is therefore a must for us moderns to study the MMK not only in the light of the author's other works, but also in the light of texts known to the ancient author. We must, so to speak, in our imagination bring ourselves back into the position that we may assume his intended readership to have occupied. It may be tedious, circumstantial and time consuming, but there is no alternative. It is the only way to bring even a monument of perennial philosophy alive to us. For this reason, lest the context is lost, a modern translation of the MMK must be presented to the reader with an introduction to the background and the other authentic works of the author.

Christian Lindtner

WILLIAMS, Paul. *Altruism and Reality. Studies in the Philosophy of the Bodhicaryāvatāra*. Richmond (Surrey): Curzon Press, 1998. Pp. xii & 272.

The *Bodhicaryāvatāra*, or rather the *Bodhisattvacaryāvatāra*, is an introduction to the spiritual career of a bodhisattva written by the Madhyamaka poet Śānti-, or rather Śāntadeva. The text is available in the original Sanskrit and in later Chinese, Tibetan, and Mongolian translations. (For the basic text, cf. my "Textcritical Notes on Sanskrit Texts", in Li Zheng & Jiang Zhongxin (eds.), *Papers in Honour of Prof. Dr. Ji Xianlin on the Occasion of His 80th Birthday*, Beijing 1991, pp. 651-660; and for a review of the most recent of the ancient translations, viz. Igor de Rachewiltz, *The Mongolian Tanjur Version of the Bodhicaryāvatāra*, Wiesbaden 1996, see *Buddhist Studies Review*, 15/1 (1998).

The book is available in numerous modern translations, the most recent being that of Kate Crosby and Andrew Skilton, published as *The Bodhicaryāvatāra*, in *The World's Classics*, by Oxford University Press

1995. A good introduction to the author and his works (for Śāntadeva is also the author, or compiler, of the *Śikṣāsamuccaya*), was provided by Amalia Pezzali, *Śāntideva, mystique bouddhiste des VIIe et VIIIe siècles*, Firenze 1968, Vallecchi Editore.

Now, then, that the basic materials for a serious study of one of the most important Indian texts on Madhyamaka are readily available to students, one of the next tasks ahead of us is to take up the study of the numerous ancient Indian and Tibetan commentaries to Śāntadeva's celebrated philosophical poem. (For a preliminary survey of the extant Indian commentaries, see Amalia Pezzali, op. cit., pp. 59- 61, and my remarks in *To buddhistiske læredigte*, København 1981, pp. 16-18.) The most important of the extant commentaries is that of Prajñākaramati, still available in Sanskrit, and edited by Louis de La Vallée Poussin, Calcutta 1901-1914, reprinted by P.L.Vaidya, Darbhanga 1960.

In this volume Paul Williams has brought together some previously published papers on some Indian and Tibetan interpretations of selected verses from chapters eight and nine of the *Bodhi[sattva]caryāvatāra*. His concern is, as he phrases it, to indicate "shifting patterns of interpretation, and integration of interpretations into a wider systematic doctrinal and practical framework found among Indian and particularly Tibetan commentators" (p. ix). His main interest thus lies in the doctrinal interpretation of the commentaries. The first verse studied by Paul Williams is BCA 9.13:

*nirvṛtaḥ paramārthena saṃvṛtyā yadi saṃsaret /*  
*(buddho' pi saṃsared evaṃ tataḥ kiṃ bodhicaryayā //)*

He translates (p. 5): "If from an ultimate point of view there is cessation, from a conventional point of view there would be saṃsāra", etc., and, correctly, revises this translation in a note on p. 178. However, much of his argument still remains obscure, since Williams, as well as the Tibetan versions, do not make a clear distinction between *nirvṛtaḥ* (adjective), and *nirvṛtiḥ* (substantive). Both are translated by *mya ñan las 'das pa* (see Takashi Hirano, *An Index to the Bodhicaryāvatārapañjikā*, Tokyo 1966, p. 120). This little example very neatly shows how dangerous it can be to study even later Tibetan texts without a clear idea of the original Sanskrit behind it.

The next verse studied (p. 12) is BCA 9.104. Here, some confusion arises from the reading *sattvaḥ*, in the singular, perhaps suggested by Tibetan *sems can* (without *rnams* indicating the plural). On the other hand, the translation “sentient beings” correctly reflects the plural. All the Sanskrit manuscripts read *sattvāḥ*.

The third verse studied (p. 15) is BCA 9.111. Based on the Tibetan commentaries, Paul Williams, introduces “the investigating mind” in his translation, even though neither the Sanskrit nor the Tibetan verse has any word for “mind”. Here it would have been useful to point out some of the numerous passages in Indian texts where *dhī*, *mati*, or *prajñā* is explicitly given as the agent of *vicāra*. That *mati* is understood is clear from e.g. BCA 9.35, the celebrated verse quoted on p. 21. See also *Yuktiṣaṣṭikā* 1, for *buddhi* (= *mati*, etc.) said to be *astināstivyatikrāntā* and *nirāśrayā* (my *Nagarjuniana*, p. 102). This is the yogic ideal of Madhyamaka: by means of *prajñā*, analysis of the *lakṣaṇas* of dharmas the yogin eventually obtains an *advayajñāna* once his *mati* transcends the duality of being and nonbeing.—On p. 24 the Sanskrit original of Tibetan *so so rañ rig pa'i ye śes* is given as *pratisvasaṃvittijñāna*. It should, however, be *pratyātmagatijñāna*, a common term especially in the *Laṅkāvatārasūtra*, see D.T. Suzuki, *An Index to the Laṅkāvatāra Sūtra*, Kyoto 1934, p. 135. See also the same author's *Studies in The Laṅkāvatāra Sūtra*, London 1930, pp. 421- 423.

The second essay (pp. 29-51), on altruism and rebirth, consists of philosophical comments on BCA 8.97-98. In spite of the correction on p. 187, Williams' translations of the two verses are not very good. Śāntadeva is asking himself whether the reason that he does not protect himself against future suffering is that that suffering will not hurt him. He answers by asking himself yet another question: Why, then, does he protect himself from the suffering of a future body, if it will not harm him? In other words: the present is, as a whole, responsible for the future; it is not just one person who is responsible for himself or for another.—Some confusion is created by the fact that the Tibetan version fails to translate Sanskrit *kāya*. We must ask why. The answer may be that the translators, by suppressing the “body” of the Sanskrit, left the “future” (*ma 'oñs pa yi*) open: The Tibetan could refer to physical as well as mental pain. The problem is avoided if we translate *kāya*, by e.g. “the person” (physical as well as

psychical). (The Mongolian version, to be sure, shows no trace of any *kāya*.)

The book likewise offers reflections on BCA 9.28 (“An Argument for Cittamātra”), and on 9.140 (“Identifying the Object of negation”). The final chapter (pp. 104-176) is entitled “The Absence of Self and the Removal of Pain”. It is an examination of BCA 8.101-103. If there is no self or no soul, but only a continuum (*saṃtāna*), or a collective (*samudāya*), how, then, can anyone be liberated from suffering?

As will be seen Paul Williams has chosen to discuss some theoretical issues that often come up in Mahāyāna Buddhist texts, and that should also be of interest to contemporary philosophers. His book can be read with great profit even by students with a very limited knowledge of Sanskrit and Tibetan. A text such as the BCA can be studied in more than one way. Paul Williams (p. 52): “The view that the most appropriate way to approach a Buddhist text is where available through a commentary is one with which I am basically in sympathy.” He is also aware, of course, that different commentaries, also may offer widely differing interpretations (though this is actually quite rare).

I am, for this and other reasons, rather in sympathy with the view that a sharp distinction must be made between the basic text and its commentaries. Each should be treated in its own right. The basic text should be understood on its own background, and with the help of other works of the same author, or other works known to the author. Likewise, each commentary should be studied in its own right. Only then should we study the commentary, not just to see what it has to say about the basic text, but also *why*. When it comes to Tibetan commentaries in particular, we should be very much on guard for “new” interpretations, that in the end simply may be based on misunderstanding of the Indian original. To study Tibetan commentaries (and translations in general), in other words, is an extremely risky business if undertaken (as often) without a good command of the Sanskrit. (For some observations on this, see my paper “Editors and Readers”, in Lama Daboom Tulku (ed.), *Buddhist Translations. Problems and Perspectives*, New Delhi 1995, pp. 193-204.)

A general shortcoming of this otherwise fine book, has, as I have tried to demonstrate with a few examples, to do with the fact that the author has not taken the time it takes to become thoroughly familiar with the Sanskrit texts on their own Indian background. As I have often said,

and as I will never become tired of repeating, Buddhist studies must be seen as a branch of general Indology. Without the good knowledge of Sanskrit and other Indic languages that is now becoming rarer and rarer, advanced Buddhist studies are facing serious problems indeed.

There are still many Indian commentaries that have not been edited according to modern standards. Modern editions of these commentaries must be considered *desiderata*, especially when we have to do with such a beautiful and interesting text as the BCA. The new book of Paul Williams is warmly recommended to all Madhyamaka enthusiasts.

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