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THE TEACHINGS OF PAÑCAŚIKHA IN THE *MOKṢADHARMA*

Shujun Motegi, Nagano

*pañcaviṃśatitattvajñō yatra tatrāśrame vaset /
jaṭī muṇḍī śikhī vāpi mucyate nātra saṃśayah //*

One who knows the 25 principles will be emancipated, whichever stage of life he may dwell in, whether he may have twisted hair, or a shaved head or knotted hair. There is no doubt about this.

This verse is ascribed to Pañcaśikha (abbr. P) in the *Mātharavṛtti* and other texts,¹ and is often quoted anonymously to show the basic standpoint of Sāṃkhya.² FRAUWALLNER assumed as his working hypothesis perhaps to some extent on the basis of the attribution of this verse to P, that one of P's contributions to Sāṃkhya thought is the establishment of 25 principles that become the standard of the classical Sāṃkhya.³ Yet this verse is not found in the teachings of P in the earliest and most important text known to contain his ideas, namely the *Mokṣadharmā* section of *Śāntiparvan* of the *Mahābhārata* (abbr. MBh).⁴ The materials which refer to P are:

1. MBh XII.211, 212, 306, 307, 308,
2. *Sāṃkhya Kārikā* (abbr. SK) and its commentaries,
3. *Sāṃkhya Sūtra* and its commentaries,
4. *Tattvavaiśaradī*,⁵
5. *Sarvadarśanasamgraha* and *Ṣaḍdarśanasamuccaya*,
6. Buddhist literature.

- 1 See *Mātharavṛtti* on SK 22, *Tattvasamāśasūtravṛtti*, *Sāṃkhyatattvayāthārthyadīpanam*, *Sāṃkhyatattvavivecanam*.
- 2 Cf. *Gauḍapādabhāṣya* on SK 23; *Sarvadarśanasamuccaya* (Bibliotheca Indica No. 167, p. 96); *Tattvasamgrahapañjikā* on v. 7 (Gaekwad's Oriental Series No. 30, p. 17).
- 3 FRAUWALLNER, E., *Geschichte der indischen Philosophie*, vol. I, 1951, p. 300.
- 4 The *Mahābhārata*, for the first time critically edited by BELVALKAR, S. D. K., 1954, Poona.
- 5 For the fragmental references to P in the *Sāṃkhya Sūtra* and its commentaries and *Tattvavaiśaradī*, see GARBE, R., *Pañcaśikha Fragmente, Festgruss an Rudolf von Roth*, Stuttgart, 1893.

Among these six groups, the first group, from the MBh, is the most important because it provides us with an earlier, longer and more definite documentation of P, whereas the other materials contain only short, fragmentary references to him. We therefore have to examine the relevant chapters of MBh in order to acquire more definite knowledge about P. Scholars have already discussed P, but it does not seem to me that they have managed to produce a clearly defined image of him.⁶ Clarifying his image may help us reach a more definite understanding of the earlier stage of the Sāṃkhya.

I. Before examining the MBh we should glance at P in the later literature of the group 2-6. An observation of these materials yields the following points:

1. None of the commentaries on the SK make P stand out among the other teachers of Sāṃkhya.
2. The commentaries on the *Sāṃkhya Sūtra* treat P as an authority and regard him as more important than the commentaries on the SK do.
3. Vācaspatiśra repeatedly refers to P in his *Tattvavaiśaradī*, a sub-commentary of the *Yogasūtra*, and ascribes certain statements to him, though his name is not mentioned either in the *Yogasūtra* or in the *Yogabhāṣya*.
4. In the *Sarvadarśanasamgraha* and *Ṣaddarśanasamuccaya*, P appears in the description of Yoga or Seśvarasāṃkhya.

Keeping these points in mind, I shall now examine the relevant chapters of the MBh. First I shall summarize the chapters and then examine them more closely.

6 P has been discussed among scholars. Cf. HOPKINS, E. W., *The Great Epic of India*, 1901, pp. 142-157. CHAKRAVARTI, P., *Origin and Development of the Sāṃkhya System of Thought*, 1951, Calcutta (Reprint 1975, Delhi), pp. 43-44, 102, 113-130. BEDEKAR, V. M., "Studies in Sāṃkhya: Pañcaśikha and Caraka", *Annals of the Bhandarkar Oriental Research Institute* 38, 1957, pp. 140-147. BEDEKAR, V. M., "Studies in Sāṃkhya: The Teachings of Pañcaśikha in the Mahābhārata", *Annals of the Bhandarkar Oriental Research Institute* 38, 1957, pp. 233-244.

HOPKINS assumed that P is a Pañcarātra teacher according to a reading of the Bombay version of the *Mahābhārata* that is omitted in the Poona edition.

II. At the beginning of Chap. 211 of the *Mokṣadharmā*, P is described as an incarnation of Kapila in an episode explaining why he belongs to the clan of Kapila. P wanders around the world and happens to come to the palace of Mithilā's king, where he defeats in argument thousands of sages who stay there. Mithilā's king, Janaka, thereupon decides to follow P. For the sake of the king, P preaches the highest emancipation which is prescribed by Sāṃkhya (211.19). He preaches "disgust" (*nirveda*) as the basic motivation for emancipation. He denies actions and characterizes them as perishing, etc. (211.21), and then presents arguments which refute both materialists (*nāstika*) and Buddhists. The materialists' point is that the soul (*ātman*) is nothing but the physical body because it is only perceptible things that exist. They deny the validity of *anumāna* and *āgama*.⁷ P refutes this by maintaining that the soul is different from the body and that things having form are different from things formless.

Then P proceeds to deny the Buddhist theory of rebirth (211.30-31). Buddhists hold that human beings are subjected to multiple rebirths as a result of their ignorance and actions. The cause of rebirth, according to them, is greed and delusion. This is substantiated by the parable of field, seed and moisture, which is often seen in Buddhist literature.⁸

It is difficult to reach a clear understanding of the next argument of the Buddhists. They seem to hold that, when the mind (*citta*) ceases to exist at death, a new body arises from the previous body.⁹

7 The terms taken as *anumāna* and *āgama* are *kṛtānta* and *aitihya* respectively. This interpretation is suggested by Nīlakaṇṭha.

8 The relevant verse runs:

*avidyām kṣetram āhur hi karma bījaṃ tathā kṛtam /
trṣṇāsamjananam sneha eṣa teṣāṃ punarbhavaḥ //* (211.32)

Ignorance, it is said, is the field, action done is a seed, and the occurrence of thirst is moisture. This is rebirth according to them.

See *Daśabhūmikasūtra* (Buddhist Sanskrit Texts No. 7, Darbhanga, 1967), p. 31.20-21; SCHOENING, J. D., *The Śālistamba Sūtra and its Indian Commentaries*, vols. II, p. 424, Wiener Studien zur Tibetologie und Buddhismuskunde, Heft 35.2, Wien 1995; *Abhidharmakośaṭīkā Upāyikā*, Peking Tu 179b5-180a6; *Anguttara Nikāya*, PTS edition vol. 1, p. 223; 雜阿含經 Taisho, vol. 2, pp. 8c-9a. (I would like to thank Prof. F. ENOMOTO and Prof. Y. MUROI for providing these references to Buddhist texts.)

9 The verse in question is as follows:

*tasmin vyūdhē ca dagdhe ca citte maraṇadharmiṇi /
anyo 'nyāj jāyate dehas tam āhuḥ sattvasamkṣayam //* (211.33)

P refutes this point by reasoning that the two cannot be connected, as the mind of the new body has nothing to do with the mind of the previous body (211.34). He further argues that, if the Buddhist argument were true, no one would find pleasure in donation, knowledge, asceticism or power, because the result of an action done by one person would be obtained by another (211.35). He adds a third reason by stating that, if the Buddhist argument were true, another body would arise even if one destroyed a body by clubbing it to death (211.37).

After refuting this Buddhist theory, P expresses his own standpoint on the theme of emancipation. It is difficult to extract his own views reliably, however, as the text would appear to be corrupt. Nonetheless, his main points are as follows:

1. Man should abandon desire, which leads him to death (211.45).
2. As man is perishable, he should be indifferent to kinsmen and friends (211.46).
3. Man cannot find satisfaction when he realizes that earth, space, water, fire and wind protect the body and that there is no shelter in the perishable body (211.47).

Being astonished by the teaching of P, Janaka raises other questions, found in the beginning of Chap. 212. Janaka asks P whether there exists a consciousness after death (212.2).¹⁰ If not, there must be no difference between ignorance and knowledge, or between sanity and insanity. P then begins his teaching to Janaka, who has become as if sick because of being at a loss due to the questions mentioned above. There is, P says, neither annihilation nor existence of the soul after death. To prove this point, he analyses a human being into its constituent elements. A human being consists of body, sense-organs and mind (*śarīrendriyacetasām*) and depends on these three when performing actions (212.6). The following verses (212.7-15) are too confused to allow for extraction of a clear idea. His aim nevertheless seems to be to explain the three constituents of a human being one by one and to show that, though these constituents are not *ātman*, one is inclined to think of these three as *ātman* and that this wrong notion is a cause of pain.

For this purpose P first explains the bodily constituents. The body is made of five material elements (*dhātavaḥ*) which act according to their own

10 Cf. *Bṛhadāraṇyaka Up.* 2.4.12 *na pretya samjñāsty are bravīmi / iti hovāca yājñavalkyaḥ* /; HOPKINS, E. W., *Great Epic of India*, p. 149, fn. 1.

nature (*svabhāva*) (212.7-8). Five sense-organs are enumerated and it is explained that their actions follow the mind (*cittapūrvamgamā*).

After this P, referring to feelings (*vedanā*) (212.11), enumerates the objects of sense-organs (212.12) and concludes that a man who takes the whole of these elements as *ātman* has a notion of 'I' or 'my', which leads to pain (212.14-15). P then returns to the argument of sense-organs (212.20) after preaching abandonment (*tyāga*) as the way to emancipation (212.16-19).

In verse 20, P designates the previously enumerated five sense-organs as organs of knowledge (*jñānendriya*) and, in correspondence with this designation, enumerates the five organs of action (*karmendriya*), which, like organs of knowledge, have mind (*manas*)¹¹ as the sixth (212.21). Then P returns to the sense-organs and presents the three elements necessary for perception, which are as follows:

*karnau śabdaś ca cittam ca trayah śravaṇasamgrāhe /
tathā sparśe tathā rūpe tathaiva rasagandhayoh //*

Ears, sound and mind are the three (elements) in hearing.

In the same way, (this three-fold division is to be understood) in the case of touch, colour, taste and odour.

Here we have three elements involved in each perception. The total number of elements comes to fifteen and they are called the fifteen *guṇas* (212.24ab) due to which three conditions (*trividho bhāvaḥ*) arise. These three conditions, called *sāttvika*, *tāmasa* and *rājasa*, are explained in the following verses (212.25-31).

After a long explanation of the three conditions, P again turns back to the process of the perception of hearing. In the following verses he may be intending to discuss the difference between perception in dreams and in wakefulness to prove that the unconscious condition of deep sleep is not a kind of emancipation (212.32-39).¹²

Finally, P describes the state of emancipation through a parable of rivers and the ocean, in which the process of emancipation is likened to

11 *manaḥsaṣṭhāni*, a variant reads *balaṣaṣṭhāni*.

12 This portion is difficult to interpret consistently. GANGULI and other modern scholars follow Nilakaṇṭha's interpretation who understood *tāmasa* as a dark condition during sleep and the term *tāmasa sukha* as an unconsciousness during deep sleep.

rivers, which, when they reach the ocean, lose their form and name and no longer know who they themselves are (212.42). He asks Janaka why, as this is the case, consciousness arises again after death. A soul (*jīva*) has no consciousness after death, because it is mixed (? *saṃmiśrite jīve*) and held in the midst (? *grhyamāne madhyataḥ* [var. *sarvataḥ*]) (212.43). Then P goes on to describe the emancipated state of souls by other parables (212.44-52).

This rough sketch shows that these two chapters lack consistent content. Topics often change suddenly. The terms used are not consistent. Yet it is clear that the main theme is emancipation and the way to it. In Chap. 211 P shows the way to emancipation by clarifying the concept of soul or self through a refutation of materialists and Buddhists. In Chap. 212 he shows the nature and function of the mind in the body and the condition of emancipation in comparison with the unconscious condition of deep sleep. I shall now focus my examination on P's teachings found in these two chapters.¹³

13 The reason is that P's teachings found in Chaps. 306, 307 and 308 are quite different from those mentioned above, and that they are likely to have been composed later. A summary of P's involvement in these three chapters is as follows:

- In Chap. 306 the name of P appears only once in the enumeration of *bhikṣu*.
- In Chap. 307, which consists of only 14 verses, P is asked by Janaka how it is possible to avoid old age and death. P explains that both are unavoidable, stressing the dominant power of time (*kāla*). But this chapter is an adaptation of the dialogue of Aśman and Janaka in MBh XII.28. This chapter therefore does not transmit the view of P. We know from this adaptation that the combination of P and Janaka was well known at the time.
- Chap. 308 begins with a question of Yudhiṣṭhira concerning whether there has ever existed a man who attained emancipation without giving up the position of king. In order to answer the question, Bhīṣma cites a long dialogue between Janaka and Sulabhā in which the teachings of P are referred to. Here P teaches the three kinds of emancipation, which are realized respectively by the knowledge of Sāṃkhya, by Yoga and by the observance of the king's regulation (308.25). The means to emancipation is said to be *vairāgya* based on *jñāna*.

Sulabhā also criticizes Janaka for not knowing all the teachings of P. According to her, the teachings of P consist of four parts which are *sopāyah sopaniṣadaḥ sopāsaṅgaḥ saniścayaḥ* (308.163) (The teachings of P include means, methods, practices and conclusion.) (*The Mahabharata*, Translated by Kisari Mohan GANGULI, vol. X, p. 70) Details of the four parts are not mentioned.

The views of Janaka and Sulabhā as a whole are quite different from those of P in the preceding chapters.

III. First I shall examine several terms found in these chapters in order to get a better understanding of P's teachings and to trace the course of progress from P to the SK. While some of the terms employed by his teachings are also used in the SK, others are not. Among the important terms used by P, terms which are not used in the SK, are *nirveda*, *dhātu*, *svabhāva*, *jīva*, *citta* and *kṣetrajña*, whereas the corresponding terms used in the SK are *guṇa*, *manas*, *buddhi*, *buddhīndriya*, *karmendriya*. Among these terms I shall begin by paying attention to the terms *nirveda* and the related term *tyāga* as the motivation or means for emancipation.

In Chap. 211 P states his own way to emancipation in the argument with materialists and Buddhists. In verses 19 and 20, P declares the highest emancipation taught in Sāṃkhya.¹⁴ Emancipation is reached by disgust (*nirveda*) for worldly affairs. He classifies *nirveda* into three subdivisions, *jātinirveda*, *karmanirveda* and *sarvanirveda*. As he does not explain each of the three kinds of *nirveda* in the following verses, however, the concrete sense of each subdivision is not clear.

While *tyāga* is a very popular term throughout the whole text of the *Mokṣadharmā*, the occurrence of *nirveda* is very limited. We find other occurrences of the term only in Chaps. 171, 263 and 265.

The term *nirveda* is used most vividly in Chap.171, where we find the story of Manki. Manki has happened to lose his last belongings, two calves. He ponders the concept of wealth and makes up his mind to abandon all worldly things in order to be free. He finds salvation from this miserable state of poverty in disgust for worldly objects. Through this disgust he finds calm and arrives at the great state of happiness which is *brahma*.¹⁵ In other chapters of the *Mokṣadharmā*, *nirveda* is used in the same sense, that is, as the basic motivation to emancipation.¹⁶

14 Though what is meant by Sāṃkhya is perhaps not the name of a school which has a system like the SK, but a group of thinkers who have some views or practices in common and came to be called Sāṃkhya.

15 To praise the disgust, the story of ṛṣi Bodhya is added at the end of this chapter. He is called ṛṣi who arrived at calm through *nirveda*.

16 In Chap. 263 we have a story of a *brāhmaṇa* who attains a divine power by which he can see the truth of the world. First the *brāhmaṇa* is given beautiful clothes by the gods as a reward for a life of virtue (*dhārmika*). Not being attracted by the clothes, he attains *nirveda* and goes further into the forest to practice *tapas*. As the result of *tapas* he finally attains divine power.

The earliest occurrence of the concept of *nirveda* in Brahmanism is probably in the statement of Yājñavalkya. When he announces his intention to renounce the world to his wife Maitrī (*Bṛhadāraṇyaka Up.* 3.5.1), he uses the term *nirvidya* to express his feelings toward the world. In the literature near to the date of the *Mokṣadharmā*, however, we come across *nirveda* itself only once in the *Bhagavadgītā* and again once in one of the middle Upaniṣads, viz., the *Muṇḍaka Upaniṣad*.¹⁷

On the other hand, when we cast a glance at the Buddhist literature, the Pāli counterpart of *nirveda*, *nibbidā*, occurs frequently and has the sense of “the preliminary and conditional states for the attainment of Nibbāna.”¹⁸ *Nibbidā* is a fundamental term which is in frequent use in early Buddhism. This term is also seen in Jaina literature.¹⁹ Observing these occurrences of the term *nirveda*, one may conclude that it was used widely in Buddhist, Jain and Brahmanical circles. Though the term is found much less frequently in Brahmanism than in Buddhism, it is certain that *nirveda* was

In the same manner, the term *nirveda* is used in Chap. 265 to mean the stage which is attained by those who keep *dharma* with them. Yudhiṣṭhira asks Bhīṣma what *pāpa*, *dharma*, *nirveda* and *mokṣa* are. *Nirveda* is attained by one who is not satisfied with the results of *dharma*. He attains it through the eye of knowledge. He abandons *kāma*, but keeps *dharma* with him. By *nirveda* he destroys the bad deeds, as a result of which he attains *mokṣa*.

In addition, in Chap. 189.16-17 (182 in the Poona edition), *nirveda* is used with *nirvāna* in the context of yogic practice (HOPKINS, E. W., “Yoga-technique”, *Journal of the American Oriental Society*, vol. xxii, p. 347. *manaḥ prāṇe nigrhñīyāt prāṇaṃ brahmaṇi dhārayet, nirvedād eva nirvānaṃ na ca kiṃcid vicintayet*).

Again, HOPKINS points out that the Yogin should be free of *kleśa* and *nirveda*, *anirvedo gatakleśaḥ* [MBh XII.188.14], and then he quotes XII.188.15. (HOPKINS, *ibid.*, p. 357.)

17 Both read respectively:

*yadā te mohakalilaṃ buddhir vyatitariṣyati /
tadā gantāsi nirvedam śrotavyasya śrutasya ca // (Gītā 2.52)
parīkṣya lokān karmacitān brāhmaṇo nirvedam āyān nāsty akṛtaḥ kṛtena /
tad vijñānārthaṃ sa gurum evābhigacchet samitpāṇiḥ śrotriyam brahmaṇiṣṭham //*
(*Muṇḍaka Up.* I.2.12)

Having scrutinized the worlds that are built up by a work, a Brahman should arrive at indifference. The (world) that was not made is not (won) by what is done.

HUME, R. E., *The Thirteen Principal Upanishads*, Oxford 1921, p. 369.

18 Pāli Text Society (abbr. PTS), *Pāli-English Dictionary*, p. 365.

19 See, for example, *Iṣibhāṣiyaim* 38.10, (*Iṣibhāṣiyaim*, ed. by SCHUBRING W., *Alt und Neu Indischen Studien* 14, 1969), *Ācāraṅga*, p. 17.26 (*Ācāraṅga-Sūtra*, *Erster Śrutaskandha, Text, Analyse und Grossar*, ed. by SCHUBRING, Leipzig 1910.).

used to stand for an important motive for emancipation among a certain group of ascetics in the days of the middle Upaniṣads and *Mokṣadharmā*.

In Chap. 212, P mentions *tyāga* as the means of emancipation, classifying it into four subdivisions: *dravyatyāga*, *bhogatyāga*, *sukhatyāga*, *sarvatyāga*.²⁰ Again as in the case of *nirveda* the subdivisions of *tyāga* are not explained.²¹

We have come across two terms, *nirveda* and *tyāga*, used to express the motivation or means for emancipation in the teachings of P in these different chapters.²² It seems impossible to find an appreciable relationship between these terms for the way to emancipation. As the introduction and the whole description of *tyāga* have no contextual relation to the surrounding material, FRAUWALLNER considers this portion to be an apparent later insertion (“ein offenkundiger Einschub”),²³ an assessment with which I tend to agree.²⁴ But, in any case, we should remember that neither is considered to be the motivation or means for emancipation in classical Sāṃkhya.

20 *dravyatyāge tu karmāṇi bhogatyāge vratāny api /
sukhatyāge tapoyogaḥ sarvatyāge samāpanā //* (212.18)

By abandoning possession, ritual acts are obtained, by abandoning eating, vows are obtained. By abandoning pleasure, connection with *tapas* is realized, and by abandoning all, completion is reached.

21 The subdivisions of *tyāga* are not found in the *Mokṣadharmā*, except *sarvatyāga* (see MBh XII.231.3,5; 265.20; 308.38).

22 In the very beginning of Chap. 211, the term *saṃnyāsa* is once used in the introductory summary of the thoughts of P. (211.7)

23 FRAUWALLNER, E., “Untersuchungen zum Mokṣadharmā. Die sāṃkhyistischen Texte”, *Wiener Zeitschrift für die Kunde des Morgenlandes* 32, 1925, p. 191.17.

24 If the term *tyāga* is an interpolation, there must be a reason. The following is one of the possible explanations, though it is only a guess: In the course of time the 4th *āśrama* was established in the development of the *āśrama* system of Hindu life. For the established 4th *āśrama*, the purpose of which is emancipation, *tyāga* is a more acceptable practice for people who have passed through the preceding *āśramas*. Such people do not have to have such a strong feeling of renunciation like *nirveda*, as the 4th *āśrama* comes in a due course for them. Perhaps this is one of the reasons why *tyāga* is a common religious practice in the *Mokṣadharmā*. The interpolation of *tyāga* in Chap. 212 would thus seem to occur for the purpose of making P appear more orthodox.

IV. Next I shall examine P's analysis of human beings. In verse 212.6, P says that a human being is an aggregate (*samāhāra*) of body, sense-organs and mind (*śarīra*, *indriya*, *cetas*). Then, in the following verses, he proceeds to explain each of these in detail.

First, in verse 7,²⁵ the physical body is said to be made up of five constituent elements. These are as follows:

dhātavaḥ pañcaśākho 'yaṃ khaṃ vāyur jyotir ambu bhūh /
te svabhāvena tiṣṭhanti viyuḥyante svabhāvataḥ // (212.7)

Here, in this verse, we see two terms, *dhātu* and *svabhāva*, that are unfamiliar to Sāṃkhya.

In these two chapters concerning P we do not come across any term other than *dhātu* which refers to the five material elements. The term *mahābhūta* is commonly used in the *Mokṣadharmā* and in the classical Sāṃkhya to stand for the five material elements.²⁶ Since P uses *dhātu*²⁷ instead of *mahābhūta*, a term that occurs commonly in the SK and the *Mokṣadharmā*, one may at the very least conclude that some of P's basic terminology is different from that of Sāṃkhya.²⁸

25 In verse 7 we see an enumeration of the five material elements. In the next verse, verse 8, we see another enumeration of the material elements composing a body. The two enumerations seem unrelated.

ākāśam vāyur uṣmā sneho yac cāpi pārthivam /
eṣa pañcasamāhāraḥ śarīram iti naikadhā /
jñānam uṣmā ca vāyuś ca trividhaḥ karmasamgrahaḥ // (212.8)

26 Cf. FRAUWALLNER, E., "Zur Elementenlehre des Sāṃkhya", *Wiener Zeitschrift für die Kunde des Morgenlandes* 34, 1927, pp. 1-5. (*Kleine Schriften*, pp. 140-144)

27 There is a possibility that the verses referring to *dhātu* (verses 7 and 9) are later interpolations, because they appear not to have a strong connection with the surrounding context.

28 The term *dhātu* appears again in verse 9, which reads as follows:

indriyānindriyārthāś ca svabhāvaś cetanā manaḥ /
prānāpānau vikāraś ca dhātavaś cātra niḥśṛtāḥ // (211.9)

Organs, objects of organs, *svabhāva*, *cetanā*, *manas*, breathing in and out, things changed and material elements are born here.

This verse is difficult to understand in this context. The theme in question is the body, its constituents and its action. Yet the verse enumerates elements which have not necessarily been connected with the body. The enumeration of verse 9 starts with *indriya*. And five *indriyas* are enumerated in the next verse as *cittapūrvamgamā*,

In the verse above, P uses the term *svabhāva* to explain the union and disunion of material elements. The same term occurs again in verse 212.41 to explain the existential mode of living beings:

*evam sati ka ucchedaḥ śāśvato vā katham bhavet /
svabhāvād vartamāneṣu sarvabhūteṣu hetutaḥ // (212.41)*

As all living beings exist by their own nature under some conditions, why, in this case, does annihilation or eternal existence (for *ātman*) occur?

P appears to consider worldly occurrences as due to *svabhāva*. In his argument against the Buddhists, he criticizes the Buddhist concepts of rebirth and transmigration and then proceeds to describe the world of transmigration as he understands it. P argues that the birth and death of a human being is a natural phenomenon, and that these are quite naturally repeated just as natural phenomena repeat. He further maintains that it is natural that the human body perishes as an old house decays.²⁹ P would seem to emphasize this *svabhāva* which works independently of human will.³⁰ This stress on *svabhāva* leads to the view that human effort in the world is in vain and to an acceptance of destiny. One of his most important points is that he accepts destiny as an essential condition of human

although *citta* is not enumerated in verse 7. As the terminology in these verses is not coherent, there would seem to be a kind of confusion or corruption.

Another occurrence of *dhātu* is seen in verse 211.40, where it means the constituents of the body.

29 It is described with the following comparisons:

*ṛtuḥ samvatsaras tithyaḥ śiṭoṣṇe ca priyāpriye /
yathātītāni paśyanti tādrśaḥ sattvasamkṣayaḥ // (211.38)*

As (people) look upon seasons, years, lunar days, coldness and heat, pleasant and unpleasant things, when they passed, so (people see) the death of living beings (*sattvasamkṣaya*).

*jarayā hi parītasya mṛtyunā vā vināśinā /
durbalaṃ durbalaṃ pūrvam grhasyeva vinaśyati // (211.39)*

A man, surrounded by old age and destructive death, perishes after being old and gradually weakened, like an old house (perishes).

30 According to the testimony of the *Gauḍapādabhāṣya*, some Sāṃkhya teachers admit *svabhāva* to explain diversity brought about without any agent (*athaitānīndriyāṇi... kim īśvareṇa uta svabhāvena kṛtāni... ity atrāha – iha sām̐khyānām svabhāvo nāma kaścit kāraṇam asti / [Gauḍapādabhāṣya on SK 27]*) cf. JONSTON, E. H., *Early Sāṃkhya*, p. 70.19.

existence.³¹ It is therefore likely that P maintains a theory of emancipation that is based on a belief in destiny, and thus proposes as one means to emancipation the abandoning of the worldly affairs governed by destiny by way of disgust for them.

V. Now I turn to P's explanation of the second element that comprises a human being, viz., *indriyas*.

First, in verse 10, five *indriyas* are enumerated along with *citta*, as follows:

śravaṇaṃ sparsānaṃ jihvā dr̥ṣṭir nāsā tathaiva ca /
indriyāṇi pañcaite cittapūrvamgamā guṇāḥ // (212.10)

The sense-organs are five in number and presuppose the work of *citta*. In this chapter these six organs all have definite functions.³² The sense-organs and *citta* work together in *perception* (212.23). It is *citta* that works in *dreams* (212.37).³³ In addition P uses other terms for the psychic organ such as *cetas*, *manas* and *buddhi*. All of these, including *citta*, are commonly used in the *Mokṣadharmā* to stand for the mind or psychic organ. In the teachings of P, *citta* and *manas* would seem to be synonymous.³⁴ *Cetas*, moreover, would seem to be synonymous with *buddhi* or *citta*. It is difficult to come to a clear understanding about the relation or difference between them. So we have only a kind of enumerative order of psychic organs without a division in their roles.³⁵ It is clear, however, that *manas*

31 The same attitude is also seen in Chap. 306 where he stresses the dominance of *kāla* which is said to have nearly the same function as destiny. (cf. BEDEKAR, V. M., "The doctrines of *svabhāva* and *kāla* in the *Mahābhārata* and other old Sanskrit works", *Journal of University of Poona* 13, 1961, pp. 7-28.)

32 In Chap. 211 *citta* appears in the Buddhist description of death (211.33).

33 The relevant verse runs:

yat tamopahataṃ cittam āśu saṃcāram adhruvam /
karoty uparamaṃ kāle tad āhus tāmasaṃ sukham // (212.37)

34 FRAUWALLNER, E., "Untersuchungen zum Mokṣadharmā. Die sāmkyistischen Texte", *Wiener Zeitschrift für die Kunde des Morgenlandes* 32, 1925, p. 191.28

35 In Chap. 267, another Sāmkyia teacher, Asita Devala, states his view on sense-organs and their functions in much more systematized manner than P. As to the relation of organs, Asita says:

cittam indriyasamghātāt paraṃ tasmāt paraṃ manaḥ /
manasas tu parā buddhiḥ kṣetrañño buddhitaḥ paraḥ // (MBh XII.267.16)

and *buddhi* have no particular function of their own, as they are only enumerated by name.³⁶ Taking this observation into consideration, it might be possible to conclude that in the teachings of P it is *citta* that is originally used for a psychic organ, while *manas* is introduced later, perhaps together with *buddhi*, for a systematization of organs from the Sāṃkhya point of view, and that the synonymous terms for a psychic organ therefore remain unrelated.

There is another problem concerning organs. In verses 20-22 we see another enumeration of *indriyas*. P calls the five sense-organs, which were enumerated in verse 10, *jñānendriya* in verse 20, and then begins an enumeration of *karmendriya* as follows:

pañca jñānendriyāṅy uktvā manaḥsaṣṭhāni cetasi /
manaḥsaṣṭhāni (var. balaṣaṣṭhāni) vakṣyāmi pañca karmendriyāni tu // (212.20)

It is strange that the term *jñānendriya* is used here, but is not used in verse 10 where the *jñānendriyas* are actually enumerated. This term is used here to justify using the term *karmendriya*, which is a concept unique to Sāṃkhya and is used in the chapters of the *Mokṣadharmā*, which can be called the Sāṃkhya chapters, containing more completed Sāṃkhya concepts such as 8 *prakṛtis* or 25 principles.³⁷ The use of the term *karmendriya* gives an impression of being 'out of place' here as it occurs without other Sāṃkhya concepts.

VI. In the context of organs, the term *guṇa*, one of the basic concepts to support *pariṇāmavāda* in classical Sāṃkhya, deserves to be examined next. In this chapter, however, the use of *guṇa* is inconsistent. First, the five

And as to their functional difference, he says:

pūrvam cetayate jantur indriyair viṣayān prthak /
vicārya manasā paścād atha buddhyā vyavasyati /
indriyair upalabdhārthān sarvān yas tv adhyavasyati // (MBh XII.267.17)

36 Verse 212.22 seemingly refers to a function of *buddhi* and *manas*. But it is difficult to grasp the meaning in this context. There must be a corruption or interpolation. The relevant verse runs:

vāk tu śabdaviśeṣārtham gatim pañcānvitām viduḥ /
evam ekādaśaitāni buddhyā tv avasṛjen manaḥ //

37 The chapters of the *Mokṣadharmā* where the term *karmendriya* is seen are 203, 267, 287, 291, 292 and 295.

sense-organs are called 'guṇa' (212.10cd).³⁸ The term is often used to stand for the constituent elements of something such as sense-organs (212.10), physical body (212.14), perception (212.24) and probably dream-states (212.39).³⁹ The common usage of the term in the *Mokṣadharmā* to stand for quality is seen in verse 212.12.⁴⁰

A second usage of the term *guṇa* is found in verses 212.25-31, which explain three kinds of feelings (*vedanā*). The term *vedanā* also appears in verse 11 where it is explained as standing for the three kinds of feelings, namely, pleasure, pain and neither pleasure nor pain, an explanation found in the Buddhist literature.⁴¹ The same term is explained again here in relation to the three *guṇas*, that is, *sattva*, *rajas* and *tamas*, and is reminiscent of the *tri-guṇa* theory in classical Sāṃkhya. It has already been pointed out that verses 25-31 are also found in chapters 187 and 239 of the

38 The passage runs: *indriyāṅīti pañcaite cittapūrvamgamā guṇāḥ* // (212.10cd)

39 The occurrences are :

imaṃ guṇasamāhāram ātmabhāvena paśyataḥ /

asamyagdarśanair duḥkham anantaṃ nopasāmyati // (212.14)

(The constituents of the body, both physical and mental, are called *guṇa* and considered not to be *ātman*.) Those who wrongly see this the collection of *guṇas* as *ātman* aren't calmed.

karnau śabdaś ca cittaṃ ca trayāḥ śravaṇasamgrāhe /

tathā sparśe tathā rūpe tathaiḥ rasagandhayoḥ // (212.23)

evaṃ pañcatrikā hy ete guṇās tadupalabdhye / (212.24ab)

Ear, sound and mind (*citta*) are the three elements necessary in hearing. This is true of touch, colour, taste and odour. Thus perception (that is of five kinds) has fifteen *guṇas*.

evam eṣa prasamkhyātaḥ svakarmapratyayī guṇāḥ /

kathamcid vartate samyak keśāmcid vā na vartate //

After the description of the pleasure in sleep (*tāmasa sukha*) in the preceding verse 37, P explains the nature of things seen in dreams. Nīlakaṇṭha explains the term *guṇa* by saying that it means the whole range of subjective and objective existences from consciousness to gross material objects. (*The Mahabharata*, translated by Kisari Mohan GANGULI, vol. IX, p. 121, fn.2) Here *guṇa* seems to stand for things in general that are seen in dreams. It can, therefore, be understood that *guṇa* is used for the elements composing a dream.

40 The verse reads:

śabdaḥ sparśaś ca rūpaṃ ca raso gandhaś ca mūrty aṭha /

ete hy ā maraṇāt pañca śad guṇā jñānasiddhaye // (212.12)

41 Cf. e.g. *Abhidharmakośabhāṣyam of Vasubandhu*, ed. by PRADHAN, P, Patna, 1975 (Second Edition), p. 10.14: *trividho 'nubhavo vedanāskandhaḥ / sukho duḥkho 'duḥkhasukhaś ca /*

Mokṣadharmā.⁴² The relevant verses are (different readings among the chapters are shown in footnotes.):

*praharṣaḥ prītir ānandaḥ sukhaṃ saṃsāntacittatā*⁴³ /
*akutaścīt kutaścīd vā cittataḥ*⁴⁴ *sāttviko guṇaḥ*⁴⁵ // (212.26-187.33, 239.23)
*atuṣṭiḥ paritāpaś ca śoko lobhaś*⁴⁶ *tathākṣamā* /
*liṅgāni rajasaś tāni dr̥śyante*⁴⁷ *hetvahetutaḥ*⁴⁸ // (212.27-187.34, 239.24)
*avivekaś*⁴⁹ *tathā mohah pramādaḥ svapnatandritā* /
*kathamcid api vartante*⁵⁰ *vividhāś*⁵¹ *tāmasā guṇāḥ*⁵² // (212.28-187.35, 239.25)
*tatra yat prītisaṃyuktaṃ kāye manasi vā bhavet*⁵³ /
*vartate sāttviko bhāva ity apekṣeta*⁵⁴ *tat tathā*⁵⁵ // (212.29-187.30, 239.20)
*yat tu saṃtāpasamyuktaṃ aprītikaram*⁵⁶ *ātmanaḥ* /
*pravṛttaṃ raja ity eva tatas tad abhicintayet*⁵⁷ // (212.30-187.31, 239.21)
*atha yan mohasaṃyuktaṃ kāye manasi vā*⁵⁸ *bhavet*⁵⁹ /
*apratarkyam avijñeyam tamaś tad upadhārayet*⁶⁰ // (212.31-187.32, 239.22)

We see that the above six verses have been transmitted in very different forms. The relationship of these verses from these three chapters to each

42 FRAUWALLNER, E., “Untersuchungen zum Mokṣadharmā. Die sāmkyhistischen Texte”, *Wiener Zeitschrift für die Kunde des Morgenlandes* 32, 1925, p. 181.

43 Chap. 239: *sāmyaṃ svasthātmacittatā*

44 Chap. 239: *akasmād yadi vā kamād vartate*

45 Chap. 187: *kathamcid abhivartanta ity ete sāttvikā guṇāḥ*

46 Chap. 239: *abhimāno mṛṣāvādo lobho mohas*

47 Chap. 239: *vartante*

48 Chap. 187: *hetvahetubhiḥ*

49 Chap. 187: *abhimānas*

50 Chaps. 187, 239: *abhivartante*

51 Chap. 239: *vijñeyās*

52 Chap. 239: *tathā mohah pramādaś ca tandrī nidrāprabodhitā* /

53 Chap. 239: *kiṃcid ātmani lakṣayet*

54 Chap. 187: *avekṣeta*

55 Chap. 187: *tadā*. Chap. 239.21ab: *yat tu saṃtāpasamyuktaṃ kāye manasi vā bhavet*

56 Chap. 187: *atha yad duḥkhasamyuktaṃ atuṣṭikaram*

57 Chap. 187: *tan nasamrabhya cintayet*. Chap. 239: *rajaḥ pravartakaṃ tat syāt satatam hāri dehinām* /

58 Chap. 187: *avyaktaṃ iva yad*

59 Chap. 239: *yat tu saṃmohasaṃyuktaṃ avyaktaviṣayaṃ bhavet* /

60 Chap. 239: *upadhāryatām*

other is impossible to determine. It is likely that the relevant verses were well known to those who had a knowledge of Sāṃkhya, and that they were exposed to rather arbitrary citation.

To understand the whole situation we have to go back to the relevant verses of Chap. 187, the theme of which is the existential modes of intelligence (*buddhi-bhāva*).⁶¹ The three kinds of *buddhi-bhāva* are explained as pleasure, pain and neither pleasure nor pain (187.21-22). Then three kinds of feelings (*vedanā*) are said to reside in all living beings, that is, *sāttvikī*, *rājasī* and *tāmasī* (187.28). Their relations are defined in the next verse: the nature of *sattva* is contact with pleasure, the nature of *rajas* is contact with pain, the nature of *tamas* is the inactivity of both pleasure and pain. Thereafter the relevant verses are quoted.

On the other hand, in Chap. 212, the explanation differs. The term *vedanā* is explained in the manner mentioned above, but, as the concept *buddhi-bhāva* is not found in Chap. 212, the three kinds of *vedanā* are connected to the three conditions (*trividho bhāvaḥ*) seen in human beings. This is the first occurrence of *bhāva* in this chapter. Then without mentioning the relation of both sets of the three kinds, the relevant six verses are quoted.⁶² Therefore, the term *bhāva* appears without any contextual relation, which leads one to conclude that these verses were inserted later as a necessary reinterpretation.⁶³ In verse 11, the explanation of *vedanā* is made from the Buddhist view, interpreting *vedanā* as pleasure, pain and neither pleasure nor pain. The verses are quoted to reinterpret this

61 It is pointed out by VAN BUITENEN that there are two different usages of *bhāva* in this chapter. One is the evolution of *buddhi*. The other is the three kinds of conditions of *buddhi*. As both senses are used indiscriminately, the reading becomes unclear. Cf. VAN BUITENEN, J. A. B., "Studies in Sāṃkhya (I): An old text reconstituted", *Journal of the American Oriental Society* 76, 1956, p. 153.

62 Here may be the reason why the order of verses is changed in Chap. 212. A transmitter of this chapter must feel the necessity to show the relation of the three kinds of *vedanā* to the three kinds of *buddhi-bhāva*. He puts the 4th verse of Chap. 187 at the first, because this verse has both *sukha* in *vedanā* and *sattva* in *buddhi-bhāva*.

63 MBh XII.212.24 runs as follows:

*evaṃ pañcatrikā hy ete guṇās tadupalabdhaye /
yena yas trividho bhāvaḥ paryāyāt samupasthitah //*

Cf. FRAUWALLNER, E., "Untersuchungen zum Mokṣadharmā. Die sāmṅhyistischen Texte", *Wiener Zeitschrift für die Kunde des Morgenlandes* 32, 1925, p. 191.27.

concept from the Sāṃkhya view. Hence, I would tentatively conclude that the verses quoted above were not originally included in the teachings of P.

It is unusual that such a varied use of the same term, *guṇa*, should occur in the same chapter of 52 verses. The present state of the text must represent the culmination of a complex historical process about which little can be decided at present. It is significant to point out, however, that, if the verses 25-31 are in fact an interpolation, there are no other uses of the term *guṇa* reminiscent of Sāṃkhya.

VII. P has a relatively simple concept of the self or soul. He attempts to prove the existence of the self in his refutation of the materialists in the following verse:

*pretya bhūtātyayaś caiva devatābhyupayācanam /
mr̥te karmanivṛttiś ca pramāṇam iti niścayaḥ // (211.29)*

The soul (*jīva*) is different from the body, (because), after death, (the material) elements (comprising the body) disappear, and (people) pray to gods, and (physical) actions cease. This is determined to be the (valid) reason (that the soul has an existence independent from that of the body).

It is certain that P admits the existence of an empirical self which resides in the body, makes it move and then leaves it when one dies. P uses the term '*jīva*' to refer to such an existence in verse 43, in which the state of emancipation is described.

*evam sati kutaḥ saṃjñā pretyabhāve punar bhavet /
pratisaṃmiśrite jīve grhyamāṇe ca madhyataḥ // (212.43)*

In this case, why should consciousness arise again after death? For the soul is mixed and held in the middle (of *mahat*?).

Though the meaning of the verse is not clear, it may be that P maintains that, when emancipated, an individual soul loses itself into a large existence. This large existence may be *brahman* which is referred to by the term *mahad* in verse 46.⁶⁴ P does not use the term *brahman* itself, but he seems to admit the same kind of existence in the description of

64 Cf. FRAUWALLNER, E., "Untersuchungen zum Mokṣadharmā. Die sāmkyistische Texte", *Wiener Zeitschrift für die Kunde des Morgenlandes* 32, 1925, p. 201.10-14 (*Kleine Schriften*, p. 77).

emancipation. His use of the parable of rivers and the ocean to describe emancipation presupposes an existence equivalent to an ocean into which individual selves, that is, rivers, lose themselves. Emancipated souls, moreover, are said to see *mahat*, a term that is used synonymously with *brahman* (212.46). Thus P must admit, albeit implicitly, the existence of *brahman*.⁶⁵ It must be admitted, however, that other parables that P uses to describe emancipation do not necessarily presuppose the existence of *brahman*.⁶⁶

Another term that P uses to refer to the self is *kṣetrajña*. In Chap. 211.12, it is Āsuri who recognized and distinguished it from *kṣetra* (211.12). Yet in Chap. 212.40, the term appears without any contextual connection, as follows:

*evam āhuḥ samāhāram kṣetram adhyātmacintakāḥ /
sthito manasi yo bhāvah sa vai kṣetrajña ucyate // (212.40)*

Thus the *adhyātmacintakas* have said that the (bodily) aggregate is the field. The *bhāva* which stays in *manas* is called a field-knower.

The term *samāhāra* is used in verse 14 to stand for a physical body.⁶⁷ The same term appears with the same meaning again in the far removed verse 40 and is explained in terms of *kṣetra* and *kṣetrajña*. Here it is said that certain thinkers (*adhyātmacintaka*) use the terms *kṣetra* and *kṣetrajña* to distinguish the physical body from the self.

65 In Chap. 267 of the *Mokṣadharmā*, Asita Devala propounds much refined teachings of Sāṃkhya. He explicitly mentions that an emancipated soul arrives at *brahmatva* (MBh XII.267.37) and that it sees the highest mode of existence in *brahmabhāva* (*ibid.*, 38).

66 The other parables are: silk-worm falling down when the thread ends (212.47), a lump of clay crushed by a stone (212.47), an antelope discarding an old horn (212.48), a snake sloughing its skin (212.48), and a bird leaving a tree which is going to fall down into water (212.49). In these parables, the emphasis is put on indifference rather than unification.

67 Verse 212.14 runs as follows:

*idam guṇasamāhāram ātmabhāvena paśyataḥ /
asamyagdarśanair duḥkham anantaṃ nopasāmyati // (212.14)*

In verse 40 *samāhāra* must be used in connection with the *guṇasamāhāra* in verse 14, as both stand for a physical body. The verses in between, however, describe *tyāga* and the three kinds of *guṇa*, neither of which have anything to do with the relevant question, that is, the relation between body and self.

The term *adhyātmacintaka* occurs several times in the *Mokṣadharmā*. It refers to thinkers who investigate the inner self,⁶⁸ including perhaps Sāṃkhya thinkers. The term characteristically occurs with *āhuh* or *prāhuh*, as below.

aṣṭau jñānendriyāny āhur etāny adhyātmacintakāḥ // (267.18)

atha sapta tu vyaktāni prāhur adhyātmacintakāḥ // (298.10)

Hence the phrase *adhyātmacintakāḥ... āhuh* is a sort of formulaic expression used when the theme in question is connected with a certain tendency of thought.⁶⁹ The aim of this verse is the reinterpretation of *samāhāra* in terms of Sāṃkhya.⁷⁰ We should, therefore, regard the term *kṣetrajña* as not originally used by P, but used here as an additional explanation.

VIII. In certain places P would seem to deny the authority of the *Veda*. Verses 211.41-44, where P refers to the *Veda*, are difficult to interpret consistently. Although the context of the verse 41 is not clear, P would seem to treat the *Veda* negatively by stating that the *Veda* and the customs (*vyavahāra*) exist for the purpose of the regulation of worldly affairs, which do not bring any kind of resolution.⁷¹ It would appear, moreover, that P denies the traditional values in the parable of the elephant and its tamer, as follows:

*evam arthair anarthaiś ca dukkhitāḥ sarvajantavaḥ /
āgamair apakṛṣyante hastipair hastino yathā //*

68 The occurrences of *adhyātmacintaka* in the *Mokṣadharmā* are: XII.267.18, 286.15, 298.10, 298.15 (*adhyātmagaticintaka*), 299.6, 302.3, 308.114, 338.6 (*adhyātmacintām āśritya*), 338.10 (*adhyātmagatiṃ... pracintayan*), 339.13.

69 According to MEENAKSHI, the epic usage of *āhuh* is: generalization and reference to the past. (Cf. MEENAKSHI, K., *Epic Syntax*, 1983, New Delhi, pp. 162-163)

70 The term *kṣetrajña* seems to have been used among early Sāṃkhya thinkers. This is understandable because its designation presupposes the dualism of material and spirit. The *Maitrāyaṇī Up.* gives its definition in Sāṃkhya terminology as follows: *samkalpādhyavasāyābhimānalīngah* / (*Maitrāyaṇī Up.* 2.5)

71 The relevant verse runs as follows:

*lokayātrāvidhānaṃ ca dānadharmaphalāgamah /
yadartham vedaśabdās ca vyavahārās ca laukikāḥ* // (211.41)

All living beings who suffer from profits and unprofits are drawn by *āgamas*, like elephants (are drawn by) an elephant tamer.

Though the meaning of *āgama* is not entirely certain, it is clear that some traditional values are here denied by P,⁷² a negative attitude to tradition that accords well with his teaching of *nirveda*. On the other hand, P would seem also to admit the validity of the Veda as a means for emancipation. In verse 212.45 he describes the emancipated:

*yadā hy asau sukhaduḥkhe jahāti muktas tadāgryāṃ gatim ety aliṅgaḥ /
śrutipramāṇāgamamaṅgalaiś ca śete jarāmṛtyubhayād atītaḥ // (212.45ef)*

He rests overcoming the fear of old age and death by the Scripture, right means of cognition, tradition and prayer (?).

IX. In the following, although many readings remain unclear, I shall summarize P's teachings as found in the chapters of the *Mokṣadharmā* examined above.

P wanders the world as an ascetic, engaging in debates and, at times, winning people over to his teaching of disgust. Thus he is given the designations *mahāmuni* (211.6) and *kavi* (212.5).⁷³ He emphasizes destiny (*svabhāva*), which works independently of human efforts and recommends disgust towards worldly affairs. He admits the existence of an empirical self called *jīva* that loses itself into a larger existence when emancipated. He describes the state of emancipation with analogies which stress the lack of distinction of individual souls. He compares the state of emancipation with, and distinguishes it from, the unconsciousness of deep sleep. He analyzes a human being into the three elements of body, five sense-organs and mind. He would seem to designate the mind or psychic organ primarily by the term *citta*⁷⁴ and the material elements that constitute the body, possibly, by

72 Modern translators of the MBh, such as GANGULI, DUTT and DEUSSEN take the meaning of this verse in the opposite direction. The Veda, according to them, brings all men back to the right way, like an elephant tamer leads elephants to the right way. It seems to me that this interpretation of the parable does not fit the context or the meaning of the verb *apakṛṣyante*. P recommends the renunciation of kinsmen and friends in verse 46, which is not necessary if the Veda leads all people rightly.

73 In Chaps. 306 and 307, P is called *bhikṣu* (306.58, 307.3).

74 Or possibly *manas* in the sense of 'the mind', not in the sense of the psychic organ of Sāṃkhya.

the term *dhātu*. His teachings, therefore, are expressed by terms which are not used in the SK and its content is far from classical Sāṃkhya. Some terms, moreover, display a proximity to Buddhism.⁷⁵

X. None of the teachings of P in the *Mokṣadharmā* summarized above are found in the fragments ascribed to P in other literature.⁷⁶ The *Yoga-bhāṣya* has some anonymous statements or quotations which Vācaspatimiśra ascribes to P. Vācaspati refers to P's teachings only once in his commentary on the SK, the *Tattvakaumudī*.⁷⁷ Vācaspati seems to treat P rather as a Yoga than a Sāṃkhya teacher. This treatment is accepted by the authors of the *Sarvadarśanasamgraha* and the *Ṣaḍdarśanasamuccaya*.

The *Sāṃkhyasūtra* and its commentaries give P the preeminent position of a highly respected Sāṃkhya teacher. Yet as their dates are much later (16th century or so) and the fragmental documents ascribed to P are quite different from his teachings in the *Mokṣadharmā* mentioned above, we should consider that a new image of P appeared along with the rebirth of Sāṃkhya.

XI. Even though P is considered to be a Sāṃkhya in the SK, his teachings in the *Mokṣadharmā* have little relation with the Sāṃkhya theory found elsewhere in the *Mokṣadharmā* or in the SK. The Sāṃkhya terms, such as *kṣetrajña*, *karmendriya* found in the *Mokṣadharmā* sections at issue here are likely an interpolation or later addition. How, then, could the person mentioned in the earliest reference to P in the *Mokṣadharmā* be the same person referred to in the SK 70 when the former's teaching seems to be far

75 The Buddhist terms not referred to in the present paper are *viññāna* and *kleśa*. Moreover, the phrase used in the second element of the compound, that is *-pūrvamgama*, is often found in Buddhist literature, but not in the *Mokṣadharmā*. Cf. e.g. *Samyutta Nikāya* (PTS edition) vol. 5, p. 1.13 *et passim*; *Daśabhūmikasūtra* (*ibid.*) p. 5.17,18 *et passim*. In stories of the Pāli canon, Pañcasikha appears as a son of Gandharva when Buddha exists as Mahā-Govinda. It is told that he is pleased with Mahā-Govinda or the Buddha's discourse that eight noble paths lead to *ekāntanibbidā*, *virāga*, *nirodha* etc. (*Dīgha Nikāya* [PTS edition] vol. II, *Mahā-Govinda Suttanta*, pp. 251-252; *Sakka-Pañha Suttanta*, pp. 263-269, 288).

76 Cf. GARBE, R., *Pañcasikha Fragmente*, (see fn. 5)

77 *Tattvakaumudī* on the SK 5. *yathāha sma bhagavān pañcasikhācāryaḥ "svalpa-saṅkaraḥ saparihāraḥ sapratyavamaṛṣaḥ" iti /* (A longer phrase including this portion is quoted in the *Yogabhāṣya* 2.13 and ascribed to P in the *Tattvavaiśārādī*.)

from the standpoint of Sāṃkhya? We need, therefore, to investigate the reasons behind P's being called a Sāṃkhya.

There can be found no relation to the terminology and basic theory of Sāṃkhya, such as dualism, evolution theory, emancipation by discriminative knowledge (*viveka jñāna*) etc., in P's thought. Compared with other Sāṃkhya teachers in the *Mokṣadharmā*, P's position is unique given his use of the terminology of *nirveda*, *dhātu*, *svabhāva*, *citta* and *jīva*. It is thus difficult to place him in the history of Sāṃkhya concepts or theory. Though the texts examined above are corrupt and confusing, it may be safe to state that P's terminology and standpoint are definitely different from those of Sāṃkhya, and that one of the reasons for corruption may well lie in later attempts to make P a Sāṃkhya thinker. On the basis of these two points I draw the following conclusions:

Given that it is certain that P was a type of ascetic well known in the world, and that he shared the basic concept *nirveda* with Buddhists and Jains, it is quite possible that he was, like the Buddhists and Jains, a heretic (*pāṣaṇḍa*).⁷⁸ It may well have been that when religious thinkers around the time of the middle Upaniṣads became aware that they had established a new theory that deviated from traditional Brahmanism, they felt it necessary to identify themselves as a new group of thinkers under a certain authority. They sought an authoritative person and arrived at P. The reasons for their having chosen P are perhaps as follows: First, they must have engaged the same religious practice as P, that is, they must have been wandering ascetics (*parivrājaka*),⁷⁹ within whose circles *adhyātmacintakas* may have been included. Second, their theory deviated from the Brahmanism, and in this sense, they were heretics.⁸⁰ The authority they sought in order to

78 In the critical apparatus of the Poona edition of the MBh on XII.211.4, Arjunamiśra's comment on *pāṣaṇḍa* is quoted. He says: *yadvā niḥśreyasaṃ prati vimukhatvena pāṣaṇḍavāsanāvantaḥ / tathā ca pañcaśikhacārvākabauddhān rājāsau pūrvapakṣakāriṇo manyate.*

79 Cf. *Jayamaṅgalā* on SK 71: *muner āsuraye pañcaśikhas tathā gargagautama-prabhṛtirnarṇarāmatamgramyā (?) (sic) īśvarakṛṣṇanāmānaṃ parivrājakam ity anayā śiṣyaparamparayā /*

80 Sāṃkhyas teach a rigid dualism of material and spirit which inevitably denies traditional values such as the belief in *brahman* or the authority of the Veda; however, for certain reasons they chose not to oppose the tradition and tried to co-exist with it, unlike the Buddhists and Jains. They had to accept the traditional values to a certain extent to survive in the Hindu society as an "orthodox *darśana*". It is most likely that

legitimatize their teaching would have had to satisfy some required conditions, namely, antiquity, fame among religious thinkers, popularity, etc. P the ascetic would have satisfied (with the exception of antiquity, for which Kapila was resorted to) many of these conditions, and was thus placed at the head of this group of thinkers, a group whose theories may represent the earliest stage of the Sāṃkhya school. It is in this way, then, that P, whose views differ from those of Sāṃkhya, who in fact never mentions particular Sāṃkhya theories, comes to be accepted as an authoritative teacher of Sāṃkhya.⁸¹ Due to similar circumstances, again based on his being an ascetic, P later comes to be treated as an ancient teacher of Yoga. In this case too, anonymously transmitted phrases of earlier times become ascribed to him.

with this change Sāṃkhya finds its place as a teaching for *brāhmaṇas* who reside in the fourth stage of life (*āśrama*).

This process seems to be reflected in the equivocal attitude of the SK to the Veda. In the SK 2 the Vedic methods (*ānuśravika hetu*) are denied as the means for emancipation. But in the SK 51 the study of the Veda (*adhyānana*) is counted as the means to completion (*siddhi*), Sāṃkhya's earlier concept of emancipation. Moreover in the SK 5 the definition of the third means for right cognition (*pramāṇa*) is given as *āptaśrutir āptavacanam tu*. By the expression *āptaśruti*, though the Veda is accepted as a means of right knowledge, it is treated not as the only authoritative literature, but as one of trustworthy literature.

81 EDGERTON points out that Sāṃkhya is a regular name for the way for salvation by knowledge (EDGERTON, F., *The Beginnings of Indian Philosophy*, London, 1965, p. 35). His definition of the term Sāṃkhya does not explain well the relation between P and the Sāṃkhya school, because P does not seem to put importance on "knowledge".

