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ON THE HISTORICAL DEVELOPMENT OF THE CONCEPT OF INFERENTIAL UPĀDHI

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Abstract

It does seem certain, as prior research has suggested, that *upādhī* was given the role of “under-cutter” in the Navya-nyāya theory of inference, and that the word “additional/associate condition,” which may lead us to misunderstanding, should be avoided in translations of the word, at least in the reading of Navya-nyāya texts. However, this is not the case for its early concept. In Vācaspati’s *Tātparyāṭīkā*, we can find this early concept of *upādhī*, which was developed through discussions between Naiyāyikas and Buddhist logicians on the ascertainment of causal relationship. At this historical stage, *upādhī* had a meaning of an “associate factor necessary for the occurrence of *x*’s existence from *y*” rather than an “undercutting condition for the occurrence of inferential knowledge of *x* from *y*.” Only in later texts, such as Udayana’s *Parīśuddhi* and Gaṅgeśa’s *Tattvacintāmaṇi*, do we find indications that the word went through a historical process to eventually abandon this former aspect.

The Nyāya school, which mainly concerned itself with epistemology and logic, is generally considered to have established its theory of inference through a particular usage of the word “*upādhī*”. While the importance of understanding its concept has long been recognized among scholars who aim to investigate the Nyāya theory of inference, there has often been the misunderstanding that *upādhī* has the function of making an unsound inference sound by its addition to, or by its association with, a pseudo inferential mark. However, prior research has pointed out that the word itself does not actually have any sense of the factors “associate” or “additional” in the context of inference. Phillips, in his recent research on *upādhiprakaraṇa* in the *TC* (PHILLIPS 2002), evaluated “zusätzliche Bestimmung” or “additional condition” (FRAUWALLNER 1970 and VATTANKY 1984) and “associate condition” (MATILAL 1998) as “non-sensitive” translations by arguing that *upādhī* should be understood as something which blocks the occurrence of inferential cognition, or as a device to find a pseudo inferential mark. He eventually suggests an “undercutting condition” for the English translation, which seems to be widely accepted. Kitagawa (1965, 1966), Gango-

padhyāy (1971) and Chakraborty (1978a, 1978b) dealt with this issue earlier than Phillips, although this translation had not yet been suggested by them. Recently, Sjödin (2006) dealt with the concept of the term in her investigation of the *NL* and its surrounding texts, against which Oetke (2009) critically re-examined the specific key passages of the same text with more elaboration.

On the basis of the above prior achievement, this paper aims to clarify the historical change in the concept of *upādhi*. While investigation has so far mainly been based on Navya-nyāya texts, such as the *TC*, this paper introduces texts of earlier Naiyāyikas, such as Vācaspati and Udayana, to make clear the early concept of this word in the context of inference and examine inclusively how it has historically changed, making use of works dealing with the notion of natural relationship (*svābhāvikasambandha*)¹, which have a close link with the present issue and are indispensable for its investigation.

1. Prior Achievement and Points of Issue

Prior achievement and points of issue regarding the historical development of *upādhi* might be summarized as follows:

Etymologically, the word is analyzed into the particle ‘*upa*’ (signifying ‘proximity’, *samīpa*) and ‘*ādhi*’ (signifying ‘to put’, from √*dhā* plus prefix ‘*ā*’), and meaning “to put near” or “that which is put near” as a whole. In the context of philosophy, however, this term is used in the sense of “imposing its property by being put near, or something which has its function” by derived meaning.² According to the analogy of the crystal and the hibiscus, which has often been used among Indian thinkers, just as a hibiscus reflects its red color on a crystal when the former is put near the latter, *upādhi* imposes its property on another thing by being placed nearby.³ However, in the context of Nyāya theory of inference, especially that of the later Nyāya, the word hardly reflects its

1 As examples, OBERHAMMER (1964), LASIC (2000) and FRANCO (2002) etc. can be listed.

2 *TCD*, p. 738, 11: “*upa samīpavarttini ādadhāti svīyaṃ dharmam ity upādhiḥ.*” etc.

3 *TC*, p. 266, 1–2: “*atha upādhiḥ sa ucyate yaddharmo 'nyatra pratibimbate, yathā japākusumam sphaṭikalauhitye upādhiḥ.*” Udayana connects this analogy with the argument of inferential *upādhi* in his *NKus*. *NKus*, p. 245, 24–26: “*tatra upādhiḥ tu sādhanāvyāpakatve sati sādhyavyāpakāḥ. tat dharmabhūto hi vyāptiḥ javākusumaraktatā iva sphaṭike, sādhanābhimate cakāstīti upādhiḥ [...]*” In this description, *upādhi* seems to be understood not as what is put near but as the function that it has. Etymological explanation of *upādhi* is mentioned in GANGOPADHYAY (1971: 147), CHAKRABORTY (1978a: 295), PHILLIPS (2002: 24–27).

etymological meaning. It should be understood as “a symptom through which we can know the unsoundness of the argument” (KITAGAWA, 1965), “an under-cutter which interrupts the occurrence of inferential cognition,” or “a defeater to point out pseudo inference mark” (PHILLIPS, 2002), not as “a thing to be added to” or “associated with” a pseudo inferential mark to convert it into a sound one.⁴ *Upādhi* in this sense is typically defined as “*sādhānāvyāpakatve sati sādhyavyāpakam*” by some Indian thinkers.⁵

At least two questions can arise regarding the above:

1. There seems to be a considerable difference between the etymological meaning of the word and its later technical usage as an “undercutting condition.” Most researchers broadly explain the earlier and more fundamental meaning of this term used in the context of inference, introducing the well-known example of a pseudo inference of “smoke from fire”. However, they do not seem to precisely investigate its earlier usage or seek the trace of its historical change in specific passages of texts. Thus, the historical background, in which the conversion from its original meaning to that of an *undercutting condition* occurred, has not been made clear.
2. Although “*sādhānāvyāpakatve sati sādhyavyāpakatvam*” is the most popular definition in later Nyāya tradition, there were several others, one of which is “*sādhyasamavyāpakatve sati sādhanāvyāpakatvam*”⁶. They are largely different in the sense that an *upādhi* defined in the latter manner constitutes a possible sound *hetu* with respect to the *sādhyā*, whereas *upādhi* that complies with the former definition does not possess this property. That is to say, an *upādhi* which satisfies the former definition only

4 KITAGAWA, 1965: 22; GANGOPADHYAY, 1971: 149; CHAKRABORTY, 1978a: 297; PHILLIPS, 2002: 27.

5 *ATV*, p. 863, 12, *NKus*, p. 245, 24, *TR*, p. 44, 2 etc. The definition “*sādhyavyāpakatve sati sādhanāvyāpakatve*”, which is considered to have the same content, appears in *TBh*, p. 45, 5–6 and *TS*, p. 46, 20, etc. The *TR*’s description is obviously a quotation from the *ATV* as its commentary points out (*TR*, p. 44, 1–2: “*anyatrāpy uktam – kaḥ punar upādhiḥ? sādhyā-prayojakaṃ [...]. kim asya lakṣaṇam? sādhanāvyāpakatve sati sādhyavyāpakatvam.*”) It should be noted that Varadarāja presents, as his own opinion, another type of definition, i.e. “*sādhānāvyāpakāḥ sādhyasamavyāptā upādhiḥ*” before this quotation.

6 *TR*, p. 42, 3. The *NL* gives a different type of definition which seems to be practically the same with this. *NL*, p. 502, 1: “*kiṃ punar upādhitvam. sādhyakṛtsnasahacārīṇaḥ sādhanāikadeśa- vṛttitvam.*” It may be noteworthy that, in the *MNU*, a text of Bhāṭṭa Mīmāṃsakas, the same type of definition is presented as their authoritative view. *MNU*, p. 28, 9: “*sādhyavyāpakatve sati sādhyasamavyāpta upādhi iti tasya lakṣaṇam.*”

precludes the soundness of some other *hetu*, but is not necessarily itself a sound reason with respect to *sādhya* and would not necessarily produce a sound reason by addition to an unsound *hetu*⁷. There has not been sufficient work considering this contradiction.

These two points will now be considered below.

2. *Upādhi* in the *NVTṬ*: Argument with Buddhist Logicians on the Determination of *Kāryakāraṇabhāva*

As is well-known, the word “*upādhi*” used in the context of inference first appears in a small fragment of Trilocana’s work⁸ and later in the *NVTṬ* of Vācaspati⁹. Here, let us take an argument in the *NVTṬ*, through which we will be able to investigate the early concept of *upādhi* in more detail.

The term used in the context of inference appears within a discussion with Buddhist logicians regarding the determination of causal relationship (*kārya-kāraṇabhāva*). For Buddhist logicians, who held causal relationship and identity (*tādātmya*) as the two grounds for inference, it became indispensable to make clear how these relationships are determined by the agent of inference. In the discussion regarding the former relationship, they argued that it is determined by special perception and non-perception¹⁰, and its knowledge can be described as “*tadanantaram eva bhavati*”. According to them, for example, the relationship between fire and smoke is determined as causal because smoke is seen only after fire.

To prove the above theory, Buddhist logicians took two steps of argument against Vācaspati. First, they denied the possibility that a visible factor such as a donkey, which may sometimes associate with fire, would be the cause of smoke on the basis that smoke can be seen not only after a donkey’s existence, but in its

7 See Section 3 of this paper.

8 The fragment is found in the *VC* and *VN*. (*VC*, p. 161, 17–26; *VN*, p. 106, 16–26).

9 *NVTṬ*, p. 129, 2– p. 136, 17.

10 *HB*, p. 11, 5–7: “*yathedaṃ asyopalambhe upalabdhilakṣaṇaprāptam prāg anupalabdham upalabhyate, satsv apy anyeṣu hetuṣv asyābhāve na bhavātīti yas tadbhāve bhāvas tadbhāve ’bhāvaś ca pratyakṣānupalambhasādhanaḥ kāryakāraṇabhāvaḥ [...]*” Buddhist argument regarding the determination of causal relationship has already been discussed in detail by KAJIYAMA (1963), LASIC (1997) etc.

absence as well. Whether a donkey associates with it or not, smoke of the same kind can be seen when fire, with wet fuel (*ārdrendhana*), exists, and it cannot when fire does not.¹¹ They next rejected the assumption that an invisible factor such as a ghost (*piśāca*), which can always associate with fire, would be the cause of smoke on the basis that smoke cannot be seen without fire. If, they said, the invisible factor is assumed to always associate with fire, then fire is thought to be the cause, just as fire is considered to be the cause even if fire is always associated with wet fuel when it produces smoke.¹²

In the above arguments presented by Buddhist logicians, a donkey, a ghost, and wet fuel are obviously used as factors which associate with fire. Among them, wet fuel is considered to be such a factor that makes the production of smoke from fire determinate. It is obvious that this argument of Buddhist logicians became the background of the concept of inferential *upādhi* for Vācaspati, although wet fuel is not called *upādhi* in this argument. In the well-known passages of the *NVTṭ*, Vācaspati says as follows:

*tasmād yo vā sa vāstu saṁbandhaḥ kevalaṁ yasyāsau svābhāviko niyataḥ, sa eva gamako gamyaś cetaraḥ saṁbandhūti yujyate. tathā hi dhūmādīnām vahnnyādisaṁbandhaḥ svābhāvikaḥ, na tu vahnnyādinām dhūmādibhiḥ. te hi vināpi dhūmādibhir upalabhyante. yadā tv ārdrendhanasaṁbandham anubhavanti, tadā dhūmādibhiḥ saha saṁbadhyante. tasmād vahnnyādinām ārdrendhanādyupādhikṛtaḥ saṁbandho na svābhāvikaḥ, tato na niyataḥ [...].*¹³

Therefore, it is reasonable to say that whatever the relationship may be, when one relatum is determined merely to be naturally related to the other¹⁴, the former becomes a *gamaka* and the latter *gamya*. To explain precisely, the relationship of smoke etc. with fire etc. is natural, but not the relationship of fire etc. with smoke etc. For (fire etc.) are seen without smoke etc., but, when fire etc. experience the connection (i.e. are connected) with wet fuel etc., they become related to smoke etc. Thus, the relationship of fire etc., which is created by *upādhi*

11 *NVTṭ*, p. 130, 8–10: “*atha tadanantaram eva bhāvaḥ. na ca rāsabhānantaram bhavann api tadanantaram eva bhavati, tasmin saty apy asaty agnau tadabhāvāt. asaty api tasmin saty ārdrendhanavati vahnau tadbhāvāt.*”

12 *NVTṭ*, p. 130, 19–131, 1: “*yo yo dhūmo dṛṣṭaḥ sa sarvas tāvad ārdrendhanasahitavahnnyanantaram eva na piśācānantaram [...]. yadi tu tan nimittaṁ kasmāt vināpi vahninī kvacid dhūmo nopalabhyate? athāsau sarvathā vahnisahitaḥ, tathā satyārdrendhanavat katham vahnir api na kāraṇam?*”


13 *NVTṭ*, p. 135, 8–12.

14 In his review of LASIC (2000), Franco suggested a reading where “*niyata*” in this passage should be interpreted in an epistemological sense and gave “restrictively determined” as its translation (FRANCO, 2002). I followed his suggestion here.


such as wet fuel etc., is not natural and, accordingly, fire etc. are not restrictively determined to be naturally related to smoke etc. [...].

As the expression “*vahnyādīnām ārdrendhanādyupādhikṛtaḥ sambandhaḥ*” simply shows, *upādhi* here should be understood as a “factor (or condition) by which a relationship between two *relata* is made to look natural” and “that which associates with a cause to produce an effect” as appeared in the argument of Buddhist logicians. It should not be understood as an undercutting condition. *Upādhi* in this sense, which can be found having almost a parallel structure with its etymological meaning (Figure 1 and 2), must be original in the context of the theory of inference.

<Figure 1>



<Figure 2>



However, we should not miss the fact that there is a significant shift of meaning of the term in this small passage itself. What Vācaspati intends in the above argument is that the Buddhist way of ascertainment of *vyāpti* is redundant.¹⁵ According to Buddhist logicians, since smoke is perceived to occur after fire with association of wet fuel, and smoke is not perceived to occur without fire in spite of the existence of wet fuel, it is determined that smoke is an effect, and fire is a cause, which means smoke is *vyāpya* and fire is *vyāpaka*; and, therefore, inference of smoke from fire is known to be possible. Whereas for Vācaspati, the fact that fire produces (or coexists with) smoke only with the association of wet fuel means that fire does not always produce smoke, which, for him, accordingly

15 The above quoted passage is presented after the refutation against differentiating relationships as inferential ground, i.e. two relationships by Buddhists, four by Vaiśeṣikas, and seven by Sāṃkhya. It is thus to be understood that Vācaspati aimed here to present his theory that merely determinating whether the relationship is natural or not is enough for the one *relatum* to be a sound reason. cf.) *NVT*, p. 131, 22– p. 132, 3: “*astu tarhi sambandhaḥ svābhāvikatayā anyānapekṣo 'vyabhicārī gamakāṅgam. sa ca yo vā sa vā bhavatu, kṛtaṃ kāryakāraṇabhāvādvadhāraṇāyasena.*”

meant that cognition of fire does not always produce cognition of smoke. In his theory, then, what assures that cognition of *x* always produces cognition of *y* is the requirement that cognition of *x* can produce cognition of *y* even if it is not associated with another factor.

It is quite important here that Vācaspati identified the ontological event of fire producing smoke with the epistemological event. For Vācaspati, who preferred attributing universal concomitance (*vyāpti*) to the object of external sense organs¹⁶, there is no distinction between an ontological causal relationship between *kāraṇa* and *kārya* and a logical relationship between *hetu* and *sādhya* in the sense that the latter is also considered to be not a conceptualized mental event and exist in the outer world, as in the case of the former. Thus, according to him, wet fuel is an associate condition by which fire becomes able to produce smoke as an effect, which directly means that it is an undercutting condition, by cognition of which fire is known as what does not always produce cognition of smoke. Given this, it turns out that “*upādhi* as an additional or associate condition” and “*upādhi* as an undercutting condition” are, as it were, opposite sides of the same coin.

3. Two Definitions of *Upādhi* in Udayana’s Work

Udayana, one of the biggest names of Indian philosophy, is considered also to be the first logician who gave a clear definition for inferential *upādhi*. In the *ATV*, he presented this well-known definition which was inherited by the later Nyāya tradition, i.e. *sādhanāvyāpakatve sati sādhyavyāpakatvam* (D1). This definition is preceded by another, *sādhyaprayojakam nimittāntaram* (D2), which is given as a reply to the question of what *upādhi* is. He says as follows:


*kaḥ punar upādhiḥ? sādhyaprayojakam nimittāntaram. kim asya lakṣaṇam. sādhanāvyāpakatve sati sādhyavyāpakatvam.*¹⁷

16 It is well-known that Vācaspati added a slight but significant modification to Trilocana’s theory of grasping *vyāpti*. According to the latter, *svābhāvikaśaṃbandha*, i.e. natural relationship, is to be grasped by perception via internal organs accompanied by repeated observation (*bhūyodarśanasahāyamānasapratyakṣa*). Vācaspati drew *vyāpti* more into the domain of perception by holding that it is grasped by perception via external organs with the aid of impression from repeated observation (*bhūyodarśanajanitasamśkārasahāyendriyapratyakṣa*). cf.) *VC*, p. 131, 23, *NVTṬ*, p. 136, 22.

17 *ATV*, p. 863, 11–13.


If we now symbolize the domain in which inferential marks exist as H, *upādhis* as U, and *sādhya*s as S, and the fact that *x* resides in each of H, U, S respectively as Hx , Ux , and Sx ¹⁸, we can draw Figures 3 and 4 as examples which satisfy D1. In these cases, *upādhi* can be an inferential “corrector”, which makes a pseudo inference sound by being added to an inferential mark ($\forall x(Hx \wedge Ux \rightarrow Sx)$, Ha , therefore Sa). However, since *upādhi* is required only to pervade *sādhya* but not to be pervaded by *sādhya*, according to this definition, it occurs, in some cases, that $Hx \wedge Ux$ does not logically lead to Sx (Figure 5). This fact is clear evidence that *upādhi* does not operate as a “corrector” by being added to a pseudo inferential mark as has been stated in prior research.

<Figure 3>

H: the domain in which *vahni* existsS: the domain in which *dhūma* existsU: the domain in which *ārdrendhana* exists

$$\forall x(Hx \wedge Ux \rightarrow Sx)$$


<Figure 4>

H: the domain in which *himsātva* existsS: the domain in which *adharmatva* existsU: the domain in which *niṣiddhatva* exists

$$\forall x(Hx \wedge Ux \rightarrow Sx)$$

- 18 It should be noted here that the symbols Hx , Ux , Sx cannot be verbalized as “*x* is H” and so on. As has been pointed out by some researchers, such as Wada, when an Indian syllogism is applied to the Venn diagram, H, etc. does not signify the group of *hetu*, etc. but the places in which *hetu*s, etc. exist. In other word, for example, a statement “*hetu* is pervaded by *sādhya*”, in the context of Indian logic, means that “*hetudharmin* is subsumed by *sādhya-dharmin*”, not that “*hetudharma* is subsumed by *sādhya-dharma*”. Thus Hx , etc. should be verbalized “*x* resides in H.” Cf. WADA, 2007: 193–195.

<Figure 5>



U: *sādhānāvṛtyapakatve sati sādhyavyāpakah*

$\exists x(Hx \wedge Ux \wedge \neg Sx)$

Taking the above into consideration, D2 turns out to create a contradiction with D1. For the word “*sādhya*prayojaka”, which can be interpreted to mean that *upādhi* is “a factor/condition which prompts the production of the *knowledge* of *sādhya*,” requires the domain U to be pervaded by that of S at least in the domain of H, just as in the cases of Figures 3 and 4. In a word, *upādhi* should satisfy “*sādhya*śamavyāpakatva” to be *sādhya*prayojaka.

In this connection, it should be recalled that Oberhammer once interpreted D2 as *upādhi*’s definition through its nature (Wesensdefinition) and D1 as the definition through its function (funktionelle Bestimmung).¹⁹ Fundamentally following his achievement, Sjödin presented another interpretation that D2 is the ontological definition, whereas D1 is epistemological.²⁰

Considering these instructive suggestions, we can now attempt to solve the contradiction between D1 and D2 through what has been concluded regarding the early concept of *upādhi*. In section 2 of this paper, it has been made clear that the original meaning of this term was an “associate factor/condition by

19 OBERHAMMER, 1964: 167.

20 It seems that she has obtained this idea through her investigation of a certain passage of the *NL*, which has closely similar structure with Udayana’s statement above. *NL*, p. 496, 1 – p. 502, 1: “*kā punar vyāptiḥ. sādhanasya sādhyasāhityaṃ kārṇyena, na punar anupādhītvam, anāikāntike sopādhītvodbhāvanāpatteḥ. nāpi sādhyābhāvavirodhaḥ. anvayini pratibandhā-siddhiprāpteḥ. kiṃ punar asyā lakṣaṇam. anupādhīkatvam. kiṃ punar upādhītvam. sādhyakṛtmasahacārīṇaḥ sādhanāikadeśavṛttitvam.*” This passage is problematic in the sense that “*anupādhī(ka)tvam*” is first denied as the reply to the question regarding what *vyāpti* is, and is next accepted as its definition. Sjödin, who finds this passage parallel with the above Udayana’s statement regarding *upādhi*, tried to interpret the former as an “ontological definition” and the latter as an “epistemological one” (SJÖDIN, 2006: 124–130). Oetke, however, re-examined this passage, critically considering Sjödin’s interpretation. Although this issue may have a strong link with the main issue of this paper, I would like to refrain from considering it further here.

which *sādhana* (e.g. fire) prompts the production of the *existence* of *sādhya* (e.g. smoke) as its effect”. Presumably, the word “*sādhya*prajayaka” should also be interpreted along this current. That is to say, the word “*prajayaka*” here does not signify a “prompter of occurrence of cognition” but a “prompter of occurrence of ontological effect”. In this interpretation, “another cause (*nimittāntara*)”, the other factor of D2, is found to be compatible with the whole definition. Thus, since *prajayaka* is thought to be used in the ontological sense of another cause, it does not seemingly need to always produce its effect to be called so, just as fire is eligible to be called cause even if it does not always produce smoke.²¹

4. Upādhi in Later Texts

Coexistence of the two different types of definition in the *ATV* seems to have caused a more or less confusing situation in later texts. Keśavamiśra, in his *TBh*, paraphrases “*upādhi*” as “*prajayaka*” while he agrees with the D1 type of definition. However, in the explanatory process for identification of these two terms, what he uses as an example of *upādhi* is “*niṣiddhatva*” in a pseudo inference of *adharmatva* from *hiṃsātva*, and “*śākādyannapariṇatibheda*” in a pseudo inference of *śyāmatva* from *maitrītanayatva*, in which *upādhi* appears as only *sādhya*samavyāpaka (Figure 4) but not as *sādhya*vyāpaka.²² Thus, it cannot be concluded that he meant by the word “*prajayaka*” what Udayana must have intended. In contrast, Maṇikanthamiśra clearly required *prajayaka* to be *sādhya*samavyāpaka in order for it to operate as it is expected.²³

21 This reading is, however, not necessarily supported by later commentators. Śaṅkaramiśra’s *Kalpalatā*, p. 864, 3: “*nimittāntaram iti. sādhya*prajayakāntaram ity arthaḥ. samavyāpyo-pādhai tātpariyam.” Bhagīratha’s *Prakāśikā*, p. 865, 6: “*kaḥ punar iti. upādheḥ svarūpam āha. sādhya*prajayaka iti. yaddharmāvacchine sādhyaśāmanādhikarāṇam ity arthaḥ.”

22 *TBh*, p. 45, 4–11: “*kratvantarvartinī hiṃsā adharma*sādhanaṃ hiṃsātīvāt kratubāhyahiṃ-sāvat. tatra hy adharmaṭve hiṃsātvam na prajayakaṃ kiṃ tu niṣiddhatvam eva. prajayakaṃ upādhir iti yāvat. tathāhi sādhyavyāpakatve sati sādhanāvyāpaka upādhir ity upādhilakṣa-ṇam.” Cf. *TBh*, p. 37, 5–14: “*yady api yatra yatra maitrītanayatvam tatra tatra śyāmatvam iti bhūyodarśanaṃ samānaṃ tathāpi maitrītanayatvaśyāmatvayor na svābhāvikaḥ samban-dhaḥ, kiṃ tv aupādika eva, śākādyannapariṇāmasyopādher vidyamanātvāt. tathā hi śyā-matve maitrītanayatvam na prajayakaṃ kiṃ ca śākādyannapariṇatibheda eva prajayakaḥ. prajayakaś copādhir ity ucyate.*”

23 *NR*, p. 80, 13 – p.81, 8: “*nanu prajayako dharma upādhir ity ucyate. prajayakatvam ca na nyūnādhikavṛtteḥ. kiṃ tu samanyatasyaiva [...]. samanyatasyaiva dharmasya prajaya-*

Descriptions regarding this issue among later Naiyāyikas thus vary and seem to need more investigation. What is explicit, however, is that Gaṅgeśa rejected “*sādhyaśamavyāpakatva*” as *upādhi*’s definition by advocating that it does not cover all cases of *upādhi*, which should operate as ‘defeaters of pseudo reason’. He says as follows in the section of *pūrvapakṣa*:

*atha sādhyaprayojako dharma upādhiḥ. prayojakatvaṃ ca na nyūnādhikadeśavṛtteḥ. tasmin saty abhavatas tena vināpi bhavataḥ tad aprayojakatvāt [...]. iti cet, na. dūṣaṇaupāyikaṃ hi prayojakatvaṃ iha vivakṣitam. tac ca sādhyavyāpakatve sati sādhanāvyāpakatvaṃ iti tad eva prayojakam, na tv adhikam vyarthatvāt.*²⁴

Gaṅgeśa himself does not say clearly, but this discussion between *pūrvapakṣin* and his objector presumably presupposes the above mentioned Udayana’s statement in the *ATV*. Or, it may even be assumed that this *pūrvapakṣin* is assigned as Udayana himself. At any rate, it is obvious here that Gaṅgeśa was recognizing that the word “*sādhyaśamavyāpakatva*” in D2 had a risk of establishing a contradiction with “*sādhyavyāpakatva*” in D1, since to be *sādhyaśamavyāpakatva* might require one to have *sādhyaśamavyāpakatva* (*na nyūnādhikadeśavṛtti*). Thus, he tries here to make *pūrvapakṣin* avoid its contradiction by having him regard “*prayojaka*” as a “device which prompts (objectors) to refute a pseudo reason (*dūṣaṇaupāyika*)”.²⁵ We are able to see, in this passage, the fact that *upādhi* was diluted from its original meaning and came to be confirmed as an “undercutting condition”, which had already been implied by Udayana’s definition, “*sādhyavyāpakatve sati sādhanāvyāpakatvaṃ*”.²⁶

katvaṃ ity atra prayojakatvaṃ kiṃ vyāpakatvaṃ? vyāpyatvaṃ? ubhayaṃ vā? ādye viśama-vyāptasyāpi vyāpakatvād anaikāntikatvaṃ. dvitīye ’pi tathāiva. na hi samavyāptam eva vyāpyam. tṛtīye samavyāptam eva samavyāptam ity uktam bhavati.” Cf. FRAUWALLNER, 1970: 31.

24 *TC*, p. 265, 1–5. A similar argument can be found in the *NR*. See above.

25 “*Sādhyaśamavyāpakatva*” is already denied as a factor of *upādhi*’s definition before this passage due to the same reason. *TC*, p. 234, 4–7: “*nāpi sādhyasamavyāptatve sati sādhanāvyāpakavam upādhitvam. dūṣakatābījasya vyabhicāronnayanasya satpratipakṣasya vā sām्यena viśamavyāptasyāpy upādhitvāt. tathā dūṣakatāyāṃ sādhyavyāpyatvasya aprayojakatvāc ca.*” Although this statement appears under the advocacy of *pūrvapakṣin*, Gaṅgeśa’s stand point does not differ from this. Frauwallner finds “*sādhyaśamavyāpakatve sati sādhanāvyāpakatva*” obsolete at the time of Gaṅgeśa (FRAUWALLNER, 1970: 30).

26 Gaṅgeśa himself seems to have accepted “*paravasitasādhyavyāpakatve sati sādhanāvyāpakatvaṃ*” as standard definition of *upādhi*. *TC*, p. 284, 1.

5. Conclusion

The meaning of the word “*upādhi*”, used in the context of inference, was presumably “a factor/condition by which a relationship between two *relata* is made to look natural” and “that which associates with a cause to produce an effect” at its starting point. Its usage can be seen, in the *NVTṬ*, in the discussion between Naiyāyikas and Buddhist logicians regarding the determination of causal relationship. However, due to the epistemological characteristic of Vācaspati’s theory, which attributes logical relationship to a fact occurring in the outer world, the term converted its original meaning into “a condition by cognition of which one *relatum* is known as what does not always produce cognition of the other *relatum*”.

One of Udayana’s definitions in his *ATV*, “*sādhya prayojakam nimittāntaram*,” seems to keep the ontological aspect of the word “*upādhi*” that it originally had. However, the word “*sādhya prayojaka*,” which can be read as “prompter of cognition of *sādhya*”, caused the possibility that the later Naiyāyikas would interpret it to mean “an additional or associate condition which makes a pseudo inference sound”, although Udayana, who clearly defined it as “*sādhanāvyāpakatve sati sādhyavyāpakatvam*”, himself recognized that its function does not reside in this point.

Gaṅgeśa interpreted “*sādhya prayojaka*” in the epistemological sense, much like the other later Naiyāyikas. However, he explicitly avoided the possibility that “*sādhya prayojaka*” would be “*sādhyasamavyāpaka*” by giving it the meaning “a device to refute a pseudo inference.” At this historical point, *upādhi* was diluted from its original meaning and confirmed as an “undercutting condition”.

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