

Zeitschrift: Freiburger Zeitschrift für Philosophie und Theologie = Revue philosophique et théologique de Fribourg = Rivista filosofica e teologica di Friburgo = Review of philosophy and theology of Fribourg

Band: 33 (1986)

Heft: 1-2

Artikel: Aquinas's construction of a moral account of the passions

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DOI: <https://doi.org/10.5169/seals-760679>

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Aquinas's Construction of a Moral Account of the Passions

When it has been studied in the last hundred years, the doctrine of the passions in Aquinas has usually been compared with its modern competitors rather than with the sources for its construction. One reason for this may be the influence of Mercier, whose *Psychologie* stressed from its first edition the paramount importance for neo-Scholastic psychology of systematizing the latest experimental results¹. Even avowedly historical commentaries have depended, however, upon the same contrast with recent clinical theories. Henri-Dominique Noble, in many of his exegetical pieces published between 1908 and 1926, recurs to modern psychological views on the passions². The same is true of

¹ See Désiré MERCIER, *Cours de Philosophie*, III: *Psychologie* (8th ed., Louvain and Paris, 1908), pp. VI–VII, for remarks from the preface to the first edition (1892). It is significant that Mercier retained the emphatic claims of that early preface in subsequent editions. *Psychologie* was thoroughly reworked and divided into two volumes for the sixth edition of 1904, at which time a separate section on the passions was added at the end of the treatment of volition and the will. The paragraphs there on the interpretation of the passions (§ 220) offer a «Thomist theory» as the only defensible alternative to the quandaries of «physiological» and «intellectualist» accounts. Mercier seems to mean by the «Thomist theory» an explanation based on the reciprocal causality of representational and physical elements.

² See particularly Henri-Dominique NOBLE, «La nature de l'émotion selon les modernes et selon saint Thomas», *Revue des sciences philosophiques et théologiques*, 2(1908), 225–245 and 466–483. Noble published something like a dozen essays during these years on many aspects of the Thomistic doctrine of the passions. His synthetic treatment appeared under the title *Les passions dans la vie morale* (Paris, 1931–32), the second and third volumes of his series «La vie morale d'après S. Thomas». Noble is also the author of the article on passions in the *Dictionnaire de Théologie Catholique*, 11(1932), cols. 2211–2241.

later work by Klingseis, Thibon, Plé, Nolan, Bednarski, and Cottier³.

If the contest with clinical psychology seems to be expected by a modern readership, a contrast with ancient and medieval sources shows better the construction of Aquinas's teaching about the morality of the human passions. The medieval sources are sometimes forgotten: two studies explicitly concerned with Thomas's authorities, those by Meier and Wittmann, choose to examine the ancient *loci* without sufficient care for their medieval transmission or their reception by Thomas⁴. It is only when Thomas's texts are read against the full range of their sources, both ancient and modern, that one can see how they are composed and what they achieve. Of course, the moral doctrine about the passions is too large to permit an analysis of its construction in a single essay. Some portion of it must be selected. Now the passions cannot be brought into a moral account at all unless they can be shown to be somehow subject to reason. His approach to that decisive question can usefully serve to introduce the constructive study of Thomas's whole doctrine, especially since it is often a central issue in the pertinent ancient and medieval authorities.

There is a second reason for the selection which can also justify this paper's method. The study of textual construction must be not only a

³ In chronological order, Rupert KLINGSEIS, «Moderne Theorie über das Unbewußte bei Thomas von Aquin», *Divus Thomas* [F], 7(1929), 147–183, 279–300; 8(1930), 40–59, 129–206, 381–405. Gustave THIBON, «La psychanalyse freudienne et la psychologie scholastique», *Revue Thomiste*, 14(1931), 488–521. Albert PLÉ, «S. Thomas et la psychologie des profondeurs», *Vie Spirituelle*, Suppl. 1951, 402–434, with a revised English version in *Dominican Studies*, 5(1952), 1–34. Paul NOLAN, *St. Thomas and the Unconscious Mind*, Abstract of a Dissertation at the Catholic University of America (Washington, 1953). Felix BEDNARSKI, «Vis concupiscibilis et irascibilis in luce psychologiae <profundi>», in *De homine: Studia hodiernae anthropologiae* (Rome, 1972), II, 60–64. Georges COTTIER, «<Libido> de Freud et <appetitus> de Saint Thomas», in *L'anthropologie de Saint Thomas*, ed. N. A. Luyten (Fribourg [Sw.], 1974), 91–123.

⁴ Matthias MEIER, *Die Lehre des Thomas von Aquino De passionibus animae in quellenanalytischer Darstellung*, B. G. Ph. M. 14/2 (Munster, 1912). Michael WITTMANN, *Die Ethik des hl. Thomas von Aquin* (Munich, 1933), especially pp. 195–216. Constantin ŠVORČIK paraphrases *Summa theologiae* I–II, qq. 22–23, 25–30 and 32–33, but does not attend much to the sources for these passages. See his «Die Theorie der Gefühle (passiones) nach dem hl. Thomas von Aquin», *Studien und Mitteilungen aus dem Benediktiner und Cistercienser Orden*, 23(1902), 16–20 and 243–260. In his *Saint Thomas d'Aquin* written for the series «Les moralistes Chrétiens», Etienne GILSON provides (pp. 109–158) a commented anthology of texts on the passions (taken chiefly from *De verit.* q.26, *Summa theol.* I–II qq.23–25, 31, 38, 40–41, 44–46). The synthetic and introductory character of the book prevents Gilson from doing detailed exegesis.

tracing of sources or parallels but a re-discovery of the choices made in framing a composition. Such choices obviously include judgments on possible sources and an arrangement of topics, but they also include what is decisive theoretically, that is, a selection of which questions are to be treated as crucial. No treatment in Thomas's *quaestiones disputatae* or in the pedagogically controlled anthologies which are his *summae* pretends to cover every possible issue. An analysis of their textual construction tries to recover the speculative reasons for inclusion or exclusion. This sort of analysis is particularly helpful in asking about the morality of the passions because Thomas's discussions of that question depend for their adequacy upon a decision about what can really be at issue in it. Faced with traditions contradictory in purpose and content, Thomas constructs his moral account of the passions with presupposed criteria for rigor and extent. These criteria come to light in an analysis of the account's construction.

The essay which follows is divided, then, into five parts. The first will be concerned with a typology of Thomas's sources for the doctrine of the morality of the passions; the second, with the contexts of that doctrine in three major works. The third and fourth sections will interpret the fullest texts, namely those from the *Summa theologiae*. The final section, the fifth, will examine what seems to be a missing argument in these texts. It will argue from this seeming omission to a more general conclusion about Thomas's intention in constructing an account of the passions.

I. SOURCES FOR THE MORAL DOCTRINE OF THE PASSIONS

The main texts in which Thomas explicitly treats the morality of the passions are five. Listed in chronological order with the received dates for the pertinent sections, they include: two passages in the *Scriptum* on the third Book of the *Sentences* (1255–56); the twenty-sixth Question *De veritate* (1258–59); brief arguments in the tenth and twelfth Questions *De malo* (1266–1270); a long chain of Questions in the *prima secundae* of the *Summa theologiae* (1269–70); and separated but coherent remarks in the commentary on Aristotle's *Nicomachean Ethics* (1271)⁵. It would be

⁵ The dating is done after the «Brief Catalogue of Works» in James A. WEISHEIPL, *Friar Thomas d'Aquino* (with addenda and corrigenda, Washington, 1983). I will use for

tempting to divide these texts into two periods, roughly 1255–59 and 1266–1271, and then to look for signs of doctrinal <development> in their construction. A study of the sources in the various texts, however, prohibits such an easy arrangement. Leaving aside the Aristotle commentary, where the academic genre restricts the range of citations and prescribes certain antecedents, Thomas's *auctoritates* in these texts show remarkable continuities and suggest a constant compositional intention.

Some of these persistent citations very much determine the substance of the doctrine of the passions. Thus, John Damascene's definitions of the passions anchor each of the major discussions⁶. Boethius's metrical list of the four chief passions is also quoted as a *sed contra* in each of the major texts⁷. Others of the repeated citations are used to secure philosophical tenets of more general application. For example, Aristotle's dictum that good and evil are in things while truth and falsity are in the mind re-appears⁸. Aristotle's *Topics* is regularly used to object on a point about the relation of passion to substance⁹; Damascene secures the classification of types of sadness¹⁰; Ps-Dionysius is introduced as justifying the language of passion in regard to divine illumination¹¹. There are even textual repetitions at the level of emblematic fragments. Thus, a phrase from *Romans* and a line from Sallust return from text to text¹².

works by Thomas the versions in *Sancti Thomae Opera Omnia*, ed. R. Busa (Stuttgart and Bad Canstatt, 1981). Citations will use only the medieval text divisions; quotations will add the volume, page, and column numbers of the Busa edition (hereafter abbreviated as <EB>). Any significant differences between Busa's version and those Leonine editions published after 1972 (abbreviated as <EL>) will be noted.

⁶ John Damascene, *De fide orthodoxa*, cap. 36 (=Migne II.22), tr. Burgundio of Pisa, ed. E. M. Buytaert (Louvain and Paderborn, 1955), pp. 132–134. Compare *Sent.* III d.15 q.2 a.1 sol.1 and sol.2, where it seems mis-attributed to Remigius; *De verit.* q.26 a.3 sc.1 and corp.; *Summa theol.* I–II q.22 a.3 sc.

⁷ Boethius, *De consolacione philosophiae*, I metr.7. Compare *Sent.* III d.26 q.1 a.4 sc.; *De verit.* q.26 a.5 sc.2; *Summa theol.* I–II q.25 a.4 corp.

⁸ Aristotle, *Metaphysics*, VI.4, 1027b25. Compare *Sent.* III d.15 q.2 a.1 sol.2, d.26 q.1 a.3 ad 4m; *De verit.* q.26 a.3 corp.; *Summa theol.* I–II q.22 a.2 corp.

⁹ Aristotle, *Topics*, VI.6, 145a4. Compare *Sent.* III d.15 q.2 a.1 qc.1 sc.1; *Summa theol.* I–II q.22 a.1 obj.3.

¹⁰ John Damascene, *De fide orthodoxa*, cap. 28 (=Migne II.14), tr. Burgundio, p. 121. Compare *Sent.* III d.26 q.1 a.3 corp.; *De verit.* q.26 a.4 obj.6; *De malo* q.10 a.1 obj.1.

¹¹ Ps-Dionysius, *De divinis nominibus*, cap. 2, ed. P. Chevalier in *Dionysiaca* (Paris, 1937), p. 104, versio <S>. Compare *Sent.* III d.15 q.2 a.1 sol.2; *De verit.* q.26 a.3 obj.18; *Summa theol.* I–II q.22 a.3 obj.1.

¹² *Romans* 12:12, to which compare *Sent.* III d.26 q.1 a.2 obj.3 and *Summa theol.* I–II q.25 a.1 corp. Sallust, *Catalinaria* 51, to which compare *De verit.* q.26 a.7 obj.3 and *Summa theol.* I–II q.24 a.3 obj.1.

Indeed, the only significant shift in the structure of the citations is the introduction of repeated references to Augustine's *De civitate Dei* beginning with the *De veritate*. These passages come to play such a large role in that disputed question and the *prima secundae* that one must wonder why they do not figure as prominently in the *Sentences*-commentary. It may be that Thomas was not as familiar with the Augustinian text as he would shortly become, though there are citations elsewhere in the *Sentences*-commentary to the pertinent books of Augustine¹³. A more exact reason may be that the discussions of passion in the *Sentences* were written under the influence of Albert's *De bono*, in which the Augustinian passages play a negligible role¹⁴. I will come back to the relation with Albert in a moment. Whatever the reasons for the absence of Augustine, however, his later introduction does not alter the doctrine on the passions so much as it affects Thomas's historical construction of that doctrine. With the Augustinian texts in hand, Thomas is able to frame the discussion within the ancient opposition between Stoics and Peripatetics¹⁵.

For all of Thomas's texts taken together, the most frequently cited authorities are, in descending order, Aristotle's *Nicomachean Ethics*, Augustine's *De civitate Dei*, John Damascene's *De fide orthodoxa*, and Aristotle's *On the Soul*, *Physics*, and *Metaphysics*. On the basis of a similar census of citations for the texts of the *prima secundae*, Matthias Meier argued that Aristotle must be considered the chief authority in Thomas for the doctrine of the passions¹⁶. His argument is not entirely persuasive. In the texts on the general theory of the passions, at least, Aristotle appears most often in support either of a particular feature of the passions or of some principle borrowed from physics or metaphysics. Aristotle is the source of innumerable details and applicable maxims, but not of the concrete definitions or elements of a doctrine of the

¹³ See Charles H. LOHR, *St. Thomas Aquinas, Scriptum super Sententiis: An Index of Authorities Cited* (London, 1980), pp. 216–17.

¹⁴ In Question 5 of the third *tractatus* of the *De Bono* by Albert, Augustine's *De civitate Dei* seems to be cited twice, but neither time by title. See Albertus Magnus, *De bono tract. 3 q. 5 a. 2*, ed. Carolus Feckes, *Opera omnia*, XXVIII (Munster, 1951), p. 197, line 83, and p. 201, l. 76.

¹⁵ There is no explicit mention of the Stoics at all in the *Sentences*-commentary. See the *Index Thomisticus*, Sectio II, Concordantia Prima, vol. 21, no. 77474.

¹⁶ MEIER, *Die Lehre*, p. 7. Meier is not to be accused of doing a merely mechanical census, since he also includes a much stronger rhetorical argument from the placement of the authorities in the composition of the articles.

passions. One can see this by considering that Aristotle's most technical definition of the passions, that in the *Rhetoric*, is cited only once in the general construction of the theory of the passions¹⁷. Clearly the main elements for the construction come from elsewhere.

A better account of their origin can be found in Ghislain Lafont's discussion of sources for the *prima secundae*. Lafont lists three sources: the «problematic» of Peter Lombard's *Sentences*, the «moral perspective of the first Franciscan masters» as epitomized in that *Summa* usually attributed to Alexander of Hales, and an «Aristotelian tradition» given importance by the work of Albert the Great¹⁸. Lafont elsewhere speaks more specifically of a «Stoic-Christian» influence on the doctrine of man and of the passions particularly; the influence is felt through Nemesius and John Damascene¹⁹. Lafont's discussion corrects Meier's so far as it shows the importance not only of explicit citations but of their lines of transmission. Large networks of authoritative opinions already surround most problems by the time they reach Thomas. There are in the *secunda secundae*, for example, the textual dependencies on the *Summa de casibus* of Raymond of Peñafort. Leonard Boyle has mentioned these for several cases; they are also found in others²⁰. Raymond provides not only an arsenal of authorities, but a schema for approaching an issue. Of course, the concrete intention of Raymond's pastoral genre prevents him from giving a more speculative account of the foundations of moral life. The same would be true of similarly intended works. For the passions, then, Lafont's description of source-classes seems to stand.

There are more specific antecedents for the speculative passages. One important antecedent text can be found in Albert's *De bono*²¹. This text, assigned to the years before 1246 when Thomas would first have met Albert in Paris, sets forth not only the lines of questioning but also a

¹⁷ It appears at *Summa theol.* I–II q.23 a.3 corp.

¹⁸ Ghislain LAFONT, *Structures et méthode dans la Somme théologique de saint Thomas d'Aquin* (Paris, 1961), p. 207, and pp. 207–216 generally.

¹⁹ LAFONT, *Structures*, pp. 195, 199–200, and 214, note 3.

²⁰ Leonard E. BOYLE, *The Setting of the Summa theologiae of Saint Thomas*, Etienne Gilson Series 5 (Toronto, 1982), p. 7 and pp. 20–23.

²¹ Albertus Magnus, *De bono*, tract.3 q.5 aa.1–7, ed. Feckes, pp. 195–216. For a discussion of Albert's doctrine here and in related works, see Pierre MICHAUD-QUANTIN, *La psychologie de l'activité chez Albert le Grand*, Bibliothèque Thomiste 36 (Paris, 1966), 91–113.

specific table of authorities²². Albert contains no specific citations to Augustine's *De civitate Dei*, as Thomas does not in the *Sentences*-commentary. More importantly, Albert establishes his decisive authorities by explicit statement. In introducing the questions on the passions, he writes: «videtur utile determinare de passionibus, praecipue quia sancti, scilicet Gregorius Nissenus et Johannes Damascenus determinant de illis»²³. Turning to the classification of the passions, Albert adds: «Invenisse autem tres auctores distinxisse passiones, scilicet Aristoteles in VIII Ethicorum, qui totus non pervenit ad nos, sed excepta vidimus, et Gregorius Nissenus et Iohannes Damascenus»²⁴. Albert's remarks circumscribe the essential authorities for Thomas's discussion in the *Sentences*, which Thomas will then modify only by the addition of Augustine's *De civitate Dei*.

The simplest authority is provided in the conjunction of «Gregory of Nyssa» and John Damascene²⁵. The «Gregory» here is, of course, the author of the treatise known to the medieval latins as *De natura hominis*; it is now attributed to Nemesis of Emessa. In *De veritate*, Thomas notes that «Gregory» and John Damascene use the same terminology in speaking of the passions²⁶. In fact, the section on the passions in Damascene is largely a compilation of texts from Nemesis, though he is never mentioned²⁷. The definitions in both provide a series of rudi-

²² On the dating of Albert's *De bono*, see James A. WEISHEIPL, «The Life and Works of St. Albert the Great», in *Albertus Magnus and the Sciences*, ed. J.A. Weisheipl (Toronto, 1980), pp. 13–51, especially p. 22; and Albert, *De bono*, ed. Feckes, p. XII. For the extent of Albert's relation to Thomas at this period, see WEISHEIPL, *Thomas d'Aquino and Albert His Teacher*, Etienne Gilson Series 2 (Toronto, 1980), pp. 3–6.

²³ Albert, *De bono*, tract.3 q.5 prol.; ed. Feckes, p. 195.

²⁴ Albert, *De bono*, tract.3 q.5 a.2 prol.; ed. Feckes, p. 197, 11.31–35.

²⁵ The Damascene's importance for fundamental psychology in thirteenth-century Latin writers has been described generally by Odon LOTTIN, «La psychologie de l'acte humain chez saint Jean Damascène et les théologiens du XIII^e siècle occidental», as in *Psychologie et morale aux XII^e et XIII^e siècles*, I (2nd ed., Gembloux, 1957), 393–424, with pp. 414–423 on Thomas particularly. It is to be regretted that Lottin never devoted a monographic study to the history of the doctrine of the passions in Thomas's predecessors, as he did in so many other topics of moral theory and psychology. He makes observations pertinent to the treatment of the passions in Albert and Thomas when discussing *sensualitas*; see *Psychologie et morale*, II (1st ed., Louvain and Gembloux, 1948), 572–584.

²⁶ Thomas, *De verit.* q.26 a.3 ad 10m: «Damascenus enim et Gregorius Nyssenus idem verbum proponentes [*EL* proponens] loquuntur de passione corporali...» (EB 3.159.3; cf. *EL* 22/3, p. 758, 11.380–382).

²⁷ See the source apparatus for cap. 36 in the Greek edition of Bonifatius KOTTER, *Die Schriften des Johannes von Damaskos*, II (Berlin and New York, 1973), pp. 87–92; and Burgundio's Latin version, ed. Buytaert, pp. 132–142.

mentary truths about the passions, their divisions, and their place in the economy of the soul. It is noteworthy that neither Nemesius nor John refers in the general discussion to any author except Aristotle. Nemesius's chapter on the definition of passion does sketch three contrasting views, including a neo-Platonic doctrine of a separate passionate soul and a Stoic doctrine of passion as movement contrary to nature. But it is only Aristotle who is named and only his doctrine that is given prominence²⁸. In John Damascene, even Aristotle is not named explicitly; the discussion is conducted with the anonymity of a systematizing textbook²⁹. Indeed, both texts are compendia, in some sense, and so lack the subtler elaboration required either by technical development or historiography. Moreover, the absence of references in Thomas to 'Gregory' apart from John Damascene, and particularly to Nemesius's fine chapters on the morality of the passions, makes it seem unlikely that Thomas was attending to the full text of the *De natura hominis*. A truncated reading or an excerpted text would only reinforce the defects of the textbook presentation.

The Aristotelian authorities are not so simple, of course. Their scattered character and the complexity of the commentary tradition make them very difficult indeed. The most prominent Aristotelian *loci* are *On the Soul* I.1, *Rhetoric* II.3, and *Nicomachean Ethics* II.5, III.6–7, and VII.3–10. It will be noticed at once that these texts have very different purposes. The passions are treated in *On the Soul* as an example of physical and philosophical definition or as a topic in the relation of mind to body³⁰. The passions in the *Rhetoric* are sketched so far as they are useful to persuasion. The treatments in the *Ethics* concern not so much the nature of the passions as their relations to virtue and especially to continence. The clearest Aristotelian definition of passion occurs in the *Rhetoric*. Thomas does not make use of that passage until the *Summa* and then for its remarks on anger³¹. Aristotle does not provide definitions, then, so much as maxims. The main maxims concern the integration of

²⁸ Nemesius of Emessa, *Peri physeos anthropon*, ed. C.F. Matthaei (Halle, 1802), rptd. PG 60:503–818. See especially PG 60:673A–676D. For Nemesius on the passions, see Boleslaw DOMANSKI, *Die Psychologie des Nemesius*, B.G.Ph.M. 3/1 (Munster, 1900), pp. 114–120.

²⁹ John Damascene, *De fide orthodoxa*, cap. 36, tr. Burgundio, pp. 132–142.

³⁰ Aristotle, *On the Soul*, 403a3–403b4. Compare Averroes, *Commentarium magnum in Aristotelis De anima*, lib.1 text.12–16, ed. F. Stuart Crawford (Cambridge, Mass., 1953), pp. 16–24; and Thomas, *Super De an.* lib.1 lect.2.

³¹ Aristotle, *Rhetoric*, 1378a20–21; compare *Summa theol.* I–II q.23 a.3 corp.

passions into a unitary model of the soul, the metaphysics of *passio* as reception or passibility, and the analysis of particular passions in a moral psychology. These principles are applied in Albert and in other writers of the Aristotelian tradition. I have already mentioned their appearance in Nemesius. Similar uses can be found in Averroes³². Avicenna had incorporated consonant principles in his *De anima*, but without explicit reference to Aristotle³³. Among Thomas's contemporaries, John Blund typifies the Aristotelian principles at work in the description of the passions³⁴.

Still, it remains true that the greater power of the Aristotelian maxims does not provide a well-ordered moral account of the nature and structure of the passions. This is provided more satisfactorily by Augustine in *De civitate Dei*. Since Augustine figures so largely in texts from the *Summa* to be analyzed below, I will postpone detailed considerations of his texts. It should be noted, however, in completing the sketch of the main authorities, that it is only when he has the Augustinian texts that Thomas is able to construct the question about the morality of the passions in an illuminating historical perspective. This construction depends upon seeing the question as one which provoked a long and central controversy in the ancient schools. Once he has the Augustine, Thomas uses its contrast between Stoics and Peripatetics in every major discussion of the passions³⁵. Happily, Augustine's resolution in favor of the Peripatetics allows Thomas to move without interruption from the Augustinian texts into those of the Aristotelian tradition. Moreover, since Aristotle is also the explicit basis of the account in Nemesius, all three chains of authority are linked together.

The choice of any group of authorities is a selection in at least three interesting senses. First, it is a selection of certain passages within an

³² For example, Averroes, *In Aristotelis De anima*, lib.1 text.12 comm., ed. Crawford, p. 17, ll.36–44; text.14 comm., p. 21, ll.19–44.

³³ For the metaphysics of *passio* as applied to sensation, see Avicenna, *De anima*, ed. S. Van Riet (Louvain and Leiden, 1972), pars 1 cap.2, p. 55 l.8; pars 2 cap.2, p. 128 ll.56–58 and p. 129 ll.66–69; pars 2 cap.3, p. 137 ll.76–78. For the integration of the passions into a unitary model of the soul, see pars 1 cap.5, p. 82 l.43 to p. 83 l.55 and p. 101 ll.0–2.

³⁴ Ioannes Blund, *Tractatus de Anima* cap. 7; ed. D. A. Callus and R. W. Hunt (London, 1970), pp. 18–22. There are three explicit references to Aristotle in this chapter (§§ 63, 64, 77) and two to Avicenna on the *De anima* (§§ 64, 73).

³⁵ *De verit.* q.26 a.8 ad 2m, 9m; *Summa theol.* I-II q.24 a.2; *Sent. Lib. Eth.* lib.1 lect.16 n.10.

author's corpus; it is, in other words, the choice of an interpretation. A selection of authorities is, second, the elevation of certain authors over others. Thus, beginning with *De veritate* Thomas uses the Augustine rather than the Damascene or the Nemesius as the controlling locus. Finally, third, a selection of authorities is necessarily the selection of certain approaches to the question at hand. The choice of Damascene, Aristotle, and Augustine is a choice against alternate ways of constructing the doctrine of the passions. This third selection establishes for Thomas's treatment both its way of inquiry and its way of presentation.

The force of Thomas's selection of authorities for a doctrine of the passions may be seen in acts of exclusion, both particular and general. One telling exclusion of a particular text is that of the so-called *De spiritu et anima*. This late twelfth-century Cistercian treatise contains several discussions of the passions and provides for their classification as well as their training³⁶. The treatise began early to circulate under the name of Augustine; it thus became a potent authority for discussions of the passions. Bartholomaeus Anglicus cites it as Augustine for the division and genesis of the *potentiae animae*³⁷. It is cited in the *Summa Halensis* on the place of *sensualitas*³⁸. John of La Rochelle uses it for the priority of the distinction between irascible and concupiscible³⁹. The same treatise is quoted in Vincent of Beauvais's *Speculum naturale*, with an attribution to Hugh of St-Victor, on the right ordering of passions among the holy⁴⁰. By contrast, Thomas asserts the Cistercian origin of the *Liber* and follows Albert in rejecting its authority on many disputed matters⁴¹. He

³⁶ On the authorship and dating of the treatise, see the summary in *Three Treatises on Man: A Cistercian Anthropology*, ed. Bernard McGinn (Kalamazoo, Mi., 1977), pp. 63–74. Compare Leo NORPOTH, *Der pseudo-augustinische Traktat: De spiritu et anima*, Phil. diss. Munich 1924 (rptd. Cologne and Bochum: C.E. Kohlhauser, 1971).

³⁷ Bartholomaeus Anglicus, *De proprietatibus rerum*, lib.3 cap.2, ed. R. James Long (Toronto: PIMS, 1979), p. 26, ll.23–40.

³⁸ «Alexander Halensis», *Summa theologica*, lib.1–2 inq.4 tract.1 sect.2 q.2 tit.2 mem.1; II (Quaracchi, 1928), p. 439.

³⁹ Jean de la Rochelle, *Tractatus de divisione multiplici potentiarum animae*, pars 2 cap.12, ed. Pierre Michaud-Quantin (Paris: J. Vrin, 1964).

⁴⁰ Vincent of Beauvais, *Speculum naturale*, lib.27 cap.74 (Douai, 1624; rptd. Graz, 1964), col. 1969A.

⁴¹ Thomas, *Sent.* IV d.44 q.3 a.3 sol.2 ad 1m: «liber ille negatur a quibusdam esse Augustini; dicitur enim fuisse cuiusdam cisterciensis qui eum ex dictis Augustini compilavit, et quaedam de suo addidit; unde quod ibi scribitur, pro auctoritate habendum non est» (EB 1.649.3). Compare *Quaest. de anima* a.12 ad 1m. See also Albert, *Sent.* I d.8 a.25 ad 2m, ed. Borgnet, XXV (Paris, 1893), p. 257. For other passages in which Thomas and

does not use it in constructing a theological anthropology and rejects attempts to introduce it⁴². Thomas's particular exclusion of the *Liber* sets him over against many of the similar twelfth-century anthropologies, with their mixture of intentions and schemata. It places him rather within the speculative project of a fundamental clarification of the ground for a morality of the passions.

More general exclusions take place in regard to whole genres of writing, but indicate the same positive intention to place the treatment in a certain project. One can see this by recalling what other genres of sources Thomas could have used in constructing his treatment. I will mention only five of them. The enumeration is neither exhaustive nor detailed. It is meant to suggest the range of <methods> and rhetorics that Thomas could have used, but chose not to use.

The first of the alternate genres contains what might be called the physiology of the passions. It appears partly in Nemesius, but more emphatically in certain sections of the Aristotelian corpus. For example, there are discussions of the passions in the books on animals – as Albert well knew⁴³. Similar treatments could be found in Galen or Hippocrates, whence they pass on to such medieval medical textbooks as the *Isagoge* of Johannitius⁴⁴. Anciently related to the medical view by its metaphors and analogies, but separated from it in medieval handling, would be the second set of sources, the moral pathology of the Stoic writers. Thomas knows something of this through Cicero and Augustine, as will be seen⁴⁵. But he does not take up in any detailed way the elaborate Stoic analysis of the passions. The analysis would have been

Albert reject the treatises's authority, see Gabriel THÉRY, «L'authenticité du *De spiritu et anima* dans S. Thomas et Albert le Grand», *Revue des sciences philosophiques et théologiques*, 10(1921), 373–377, esp. pp. 374–375.

⁴² For example, *Summa theol.* I q.77 a.8 ad 1m; q.79 a.8 ad 1m; q.79 a.10 ad 1m; q.82 a.5 ad 2m.

⁴³ Aristotle, *De motu animalium*, I.8, 702a3–21; Albertus Magnus, *De motibus animalium*, lib.1 tract.2 cap.4, ed. Borgnet, IX (Paris, 1890), pp. 274–275. For the status of Albert's text as a <pseudo-commentary> on the Aristotle, see MICHAUD-QUANTIN, *La psychologie de l'activité*, pp. 47–49.

⁴⁴ For the Galenic sources, see DOMANSKI, *Nemesius*, p. 116, note 1. Compare Johannitius, *Isagoge*, cap. 10 (Venice, 1469), f. 1v col.1; cap.31, f. 2v col.1. In some medieval manuscripts (e.g., Wellcome Library MS 801A), these chapters bear the titles «De virtute animali» and «De passionibus animae», respectively.

⁴⁵ For the Stoic doctrine of the passions as it is mediated by the early Fathers, see Michel SPANNEUT, *Le Stoïcisme des Pères de l'Eglise*, *Patristica Sorbonensia* 1 (rev. ed., Paris, 1969), pp. 232–235.

available to him in Seneca, who is authoritative for the doctrine of the passions in the twelfth century⁴⁶.

A third source for the treatment of the passions comes in rhetorical treatises, both practical and theoretical. I have already noted what slight use Thomas makes of Aristotle's definitions in the second book of the *Rhetoric*. He uses little more of Cicero and none of Quintilian⁴⁷. Perhaps this is because the passions are scarcely treated in the medieval rhetorics known to Thomas⁴⁸. Still, he could have learned of the rhetorical views on the passions from a number of ancient sources. More pointedly, he could have had them in a related set of sources, a fourth type, that of preaching and pedagogical works. It is not necessary to go far here; there are many examples close to hand in the Dominican authors of the thirteenth century. Humbert of Roman's *De eruditione praedicatorum* not only presupposes the distinction of irascible and concupiscible passions, but contains specific discussions of the effects and dangers of preaching for the passions generally⁴⁹. A longer discussion of the passions in pedagogy can be found, for example, in Vincent of Beauvais, *De institutione puerorum*⁵⁰. Thomas seems not to draw on works in either of these genres.

A fifth and final excluded source could be found in pastoral manuals. I have already recalled Boyle's comparisons between Raymond of Peñafort's *Summa de casibus* and Thomas's *secunda secundae*. But there is a much wider field of penitential and casuistical works. Many of them contain reviews of the passions as occasions or adjutants in sin, not to mention preventative counsel. The more theoretical articulation of the

⁴⁶ See Klaus-Dieter NOTHDURFT, *Studien zum Einfluß Senecas auf die Philosophie und Theologie des zwölften Jahrhunderts* (Leiden and Cologne, 1963), pp. 87–92; and Gerard VERBEKE, *The Presence of Stoicism in Medieval Thought* (Washington, 1983), pp. 8–11.

⁴⁷ Cicero, *Tusculanarum Quaestionum*, III.4, at *Summa theol.* I–II q.24 a.2 corp.; *De officiis* at *De verit.* q.26 a.7 obj.8. But there is no use of such passages as Cicero, *De oratore*, II.195–196, or Quintilian, *Institutio oratoria*, VI.2.28–31.

⁴⁸ This lack is corrected at least with the commentary by Aegidius Romanus on Aristotle's *Rhetoric*, written after Thomas's death towards the end of the thirteenth century. For an introduction, see James J. MURPHY, *Rhetoric in the Middle Ages* (Berkeley and elsewhere, 1974), pp. 98–99.

⁴⁹ Humbert of Romans, *De eruditione praedicatorum*, in *Opera de vita regulari*, ed. Joachim Joseph Berthier, II (Turin and Rome, 1956), pp. 373–484. For the distinction between irascible and concupiscible, see pars 1 cap.5, p. 389 ll.5–6, and pars 6 cap.27, p. 443 ll.32–33. For the dangers of exciting the passions by preaching, pars 6 cap.25, p. 440 ll.13–18, and pars 6 cap.27, p. 443 ll.21–31.

⁵⁰ Vincent of Beauvais, *De eruditione filiorum nobilium*, cap. 31 and cap. 36; ed. Arpad Steiner (Cambridge, Mass., 1938).

same concern could be found, for example, in theological discussions of the passions in relation to sin or liberty. This is a topic which had great currency in the twelfth-century schools⁵¹.

Out of the mass of traditional material, then, Thomas has chosen but a small section. He has excluded particular works popular in the tradition and whole genres of traditional investigation. The reasons for Thomas's selection are neither convention nor ignorance, I think, but a deliberate and speculative decision. His is a choice for a narrow group of sources united in their detached and fundamental concern for the question of the morality of the passions. In choosing them, he chooses a distance from the urgencies of practice and so adopts the task of speculative clarification. The construction of the doctrine of passion in Aquinas is a clarification of constitutive relations that is importantly impractical as regards its immediate intention. This choice made in the selection or exclusion of sources can also be seen in the structural placement of the consideration of the passions.

II. CONTEXTS FOR THE DOCTRINE OF THE PASSIONS

Of the five main texts in which Thomas treats the morality of the passions, two are so dispersed as to resist contextual analysis. In the *De malo*, the passions appear only as special cases or apparent exceptions within other topics. Thus, Question 10 concerns the sinfulness of envy, while Question 12 investigates the evil in anger. As for the commentary on the *Ethics*, its remarks on the passions are tied to the elliptical and particular order of the Aristotelian original. There remain three works, then, in which the structural contexts for the doctrine of the passions might be significant. These are the *Sentences*-commentary, *De veritate*, and the *Summa theologiae*.

In the third Book of the *Sentences*, Thomas brings forward the passions in two very different contexts. The first is that of the Lombard's discussion in Distinction 15 of the way in which Christ took on human infirmities. More specifically, the text of the *Sentences* argues that Christ

⁵¹ See, for example, the disputes over concupiscence recorded in D. E. LUSCOMBE, *The School of Peter Abelard* (Cambridge, 1970), pp. 139, 176, 177, 193, 195, 248, 295.

must be understood as suffering fear and sadness only as «propassio» and not as «passio»⁵². In this context, then, the issue of passion arises quite obviously and Thomas follows tradition in putting his questions about Christ's passions⁵³.

The second occasion in the *Sentences* is not obvious and its use may show the influence of Albert. Distinction 26 in the third Book concerns hope – its nature, its difference from faith, and its status in certain special cases. The word «passio» does not occur in Peter Lombard or in his sources except at the end of the text and then only as referring to the event of Christ's crucifixion⁵⁴. There is little warrant in Alexander of Hales for introducing a more general discussion of the passions at this point, though he does handle an objection which claims that hope is *affectio* and not *expectatio*⁵⁵. So the connection between passions and virtues may come rather from Albert. In the *De bono*, the short excurses on the passions already mentioned comes at the end of a *tractatus* on temperance and immediately following the question on clemency and modesty. Of course, there is no explicit treatment in the *De bono* of the theological virtues; hope is mentioned only as one of the three passions natural to the soul and as equivocal between virtues and passions⁵⁶. Perhaps these few mentions suggested to Thomas the place of a comment on the passions in connection with a treatment of hope. Or perhaps it was Albert's own commentary on the *Sentences*⁵⁷. Bonaventure, by contrast, seems to provide scant support for Thomas's way of raising the question about the passions out of the text of the *Sentences*⁵⁸.

⁵² *Sent.* III dist.15 textus; ed. Mandonnet, p. 340, § 8.

⁵³ Compare Alexander of Hales, *Glossa in quatuor libros Sententiarum*, III (Quaracchi, 1954), dist.15 in versions AE, L, and E, pp. 150–170; *Summa Halensis* lib.3 pars 1 tract. 5 q.1 m.2 c.2, IV (Quaracchi, 1948), p. 203, § 147; Bonaventure, *Sent.* III d.15 a.2 qq.2–3 and dubia 3–4 (editio minor, Quaracchi, 1941), pp. 331–36.

⁵⁴ *Sent.* III d.26 textus; ed. Mandonnet, p. 812, § 5.

⁵⁵ Alexander of Hales, *Sent.* III d.26 (AE) n.2b, p. 312; compare d.26 (L) n.14, p. 316.

⁵⁶ Respectively, *De bono* tract.1 q.5 a.1 ad 12m; tract.2 q.2 a.4 ad 7m; and, in the question on the passions itself, tract.3 q.5 a.2 ad 38m.

⁵⁷ Albert, *Sent.* III d.26 aa.1–5, but see especially the remarks on hope as a passion in d.26 a.1 corp and on its place within the irascible power in a.3 corp, ed. Borgnet, XXVIII(1894), pp. 491 and 495.

⁵⁸ Bonaventure replies tersely to an objection that «spes» is equivocal as between a passion and the habit controlling the passion; *Sent.* III d.26 a.1 q.1 sc.1 and ad 1m, pp. 548–549.

Whatever warranted Thomas's introduction of the passions in Distinction 26, it is clear that the connection is less obvious in that text than in the earlier discussion of Christ's passion. On the other hand, that early context is a limiting case approachable only by means of theological authorities. If the topic of hope is too slight an occasion, the discussion of Christ's passion is too narrow and too much determined by direct theological precedents to permit a fundamental theoretical treatment. What is perhaps more important, both contexts in the *Sentences*-commentary introduce the passions as a minor corollary in a discussion arguing for very different theses. Thus Distinction 15 comes at the end of the treatment of Christ's nature and just before the description of His redemptive mission. Distinction 26 occurs, as one would expect, in the analysis of the three theological virtues that follows upon the doctrine of Christ's work. This section is followed by distinctions on the cardinal virtues, the gifts, and the ways of life. Neither Distinction 15 nor Distinction 26 is fully appropriate as a context for a fundamental clarification of the morality of the passions.

The construction of the treatment of the passion in *De veritate*, q.26, may be seen as an attempt to compromise between the theological contexts and the fundamental issues about passion. It also tries to combine the Christological and virtue-centered occasions for discussing them. The question on the passions appears at the end of a group of questions on the will, free choice, and the good (qq.21–26). This group itself follows a series of questions on special problems in cognition (qq.10–20); it is followed in turn by three final questions on grace (qq.27–29). Within Question 26, the loose order of articles inserts the moral treatment of the passions (aa.2–7) between an article on the separated soul (a.1) and three articles on the passions in Christ (aa.8–10). The fundamental discussion of the passions is thus framed by special theological questions at both ends.

The order of the central articles within Question 26 is not much different from that of Albert's questions in *De bono*. If one subtracts Albert's two questions on *voluptas*, the matter of which has already been treated by Thomas in the preceding question, then both sets of articles follow the pattern of definition, division, and morality (i.e., merit)⁵⁹. Of

⁵⁹ The equivalencies would be as follows: Albert a.1=Thomas aa.2–3. Albert a.2=Thomas aa.4–5. Albert aa.5–7=Thomas aa.6–7. I am not suggesting an equivalence of doctrine so much as a similarity in structure.

course, such an order is inherent in any reflective approach to the question. What is of more interest in *De veritate* is to watch the fundamental reflection assert itself over against the specific, occasional topics which give rise to it. The change in structure from the *Sentences*—commentary to *De veritate* is a change in the direction of a more pedagogical, because more explicit construction of the question of the passions.

In the *Summa*, the pedagogical motive dominates. There are reasons internal and external to the particular text for thinking this about the whole of the *Summa*⁶⁰. Within the *prima secundae* itself, the pedagogical innovations of structure give the discussion of the passions a proper independence as a topic in the moral account of human life. The whole of the *prima secundae* is dedicated prospectively to the consideration of man as the image of God insofar as he is the *principium* and *potestas* of his work⁶¹. It is described, retrospectively, as the «communem considerationem de virtutibus et vitiis et aliis ad materiam moralem pertinentibus»⁶². Under the latter description, a common consideration is contrasted with the more particular and therefore more useful consideration of the *secunda pars*. We have in the *prima secundae*, then, something like a fundamental philosophical anthropology designed to undergird a moral treatment of human life in particular.

The explicit treatment of the passions holds a place in the preamble to the common consideration of virtues and vices. The preamble comprises five questions on human beatitude (qq.1–5); twelve questions on volition, its circumstances, causes, and reasons (qq.6–17); four questions on the ascription of good and evil in human acts generally (qq.18–21); twenty-seven questions on the passions (qq.22–48); and seven questions on habit in general (qq.49–54). It will be seen that the questions on the passions take up almost half of this prologue to the many later questions on virtues, gifts, sin, law, and the grace of God.

The substantive consequences of this arrangement will be discussed below in the actual reading of the texts. It is enough for the moment to conclude that the arrangement in the *Summa* frees the consideration of the passions from the narrow contexts of the two earlier works. This new position brings into prominence the fundamental, the definitory

⁶⁰ On the external evidence of Thomas's pedagogical intention, see L. E. BOYLE, *The Setting*.

⁶¹ *Summa theol.* I–II prol. Note that the authority here is John Damascene.

⁶² *Summa theol.* II–II prol., EB 2.523.3.

questions about the passions. Chief among these in a moral treatise must be the question, to what extent the passions are subject to moral judgment. The approach to that question in Thomas presupposes not only a structural, but a doctrinal context.

III. THE PASSIONS AMONG THE POWERS OF THE SOUL

The doctrinal context for showing the morality of the passions is set in the *prima pars* of the *Summa*. There Thomas describes the soul and its powers as a part of the sketch of the creation which comes, already differentiated, by God's act. In the pertinent section, Thomas begins with a list of the soul's powers according to one of the Aristotelian arrangements in *De anima*: the five powers are given as the vegetative, the sensitive, the appetitive, the motive, and the intellective⁶³. Both the vegetative and the sensitive powers are variously sub-divided by Thomas⁶⁴. Within these further sortings, the passions appear under the appetitive power. The division proceeds from that point by symmetrical halvings. Appetite is divided into intellective appetite and sensitive appetite or *sensualitas*⁶⁵. Intellectual appetite is divided into *voluntas* and *libertum arbitrium* which are related as insight to discursive reasoning⁶⁶. Sensitive appetite is divided into the concupiscible and irascible; within these there will appear, some several hundred pages later, the particular passions⁶⁷. Having given this neat schema, I must now analyse each of its main divisions in order.

In beginning with the text where it treats the arrangement of powers, I have skipped the famous controversy about the distinction between powers and essence in the soul. I would note only that the powers are distinguished from one another *per se* by act and by object⁶⁸. Every potency is as such ordained to actuality and so potency is divided by the division of act, which is in turn divided by its *objectum*, that is, by a

⁶³ *Summa theol.* I q.78 a.1.

⁶⁴ *Summa theol.* I q.78 aa.2–4.

⁶⁵ *Summa theol.* I q.80 a.2.

⁶⁶ *Summa theol.* I q.83 a.4.

⁶⁷ *Summa theol.* I q.81 a.2.

⁶⁸ *Summa theol.* I q.77 a.3.

principium or a *causa movens* or a *terminus et finis*. There are also accidental differences of *objectum* which do not make for different species of potency. The essential difference can only arise in the specific direction or vector of the potency. Thus, the whole schema of powers in the soul depends upon a set of teleological notions that color every level in the model: potencies, their intended acts, the latter's intended *objects*, and so on into the network of multiple causal relations.

Appetite is understood by Thomas as a consequence of just this immanent teleology of natural forms: «*quamlibet formam sequitur aliqua inclinatio*»⁶⁹. Such an inclination is natural appetite and is found in every substantial entity. The immanent teleology may be appropriated or participated at various levels, depending on the complexity of the active form. In human beings, that is, in subjects possessed of the freely appropriative capacity of intellect, the natural appetite is participated freely as an appetitive force (*vis*) directed at apprehended objects, towards which it tends so far as they are «*conveniens aut bonum*»⁷⁰. It is important to note in all of this that *appetitus* remains a primitive term logically speaking; it is closely connected with the other primitive terms *forma* and *natura*, so that Thomas is perfectly willing to speak of appetite non-technically whenever he will speak of form or nature.

The next distinction, that between intellective appetite and sensitive appetite, is a distinction between two moments in a single power. The cognitive moment of appetite consists in the presence to the apprehending being of the apprehended *objectum*; the sensitive moment consists in the actual inclination to what is apprehended⁷¹. The one is like rest, the other like motion. As the physical analogies make clear, this distinction ought not to be reified as a distinction between two faculties, much less two entities. On the other hand, to speak of two *states* or *conditions* does not capture the essential interconnectedness, the implicit teleology. For Thomas, the apprehensive moment is always tending toward the sensitive.

The final distinction, between the irascible and the concupiscible, also rests on a reference to teleology, now conceived as directly sought or indirectly defended⁷². The concupiscible power seeks the good

⁶⁹ *Summa theol.* I q.80 a.1 corp., EB 2.303.1.

⁷⁰ *Summa theol.* I q.80 a.1 ad 2m, EB 2.303.2.

⁷¹ *Summa theol.* I q.81 a.1 corp.

⁷² *Summa theol.* I q.81 a.2.

directly by pursuing it or by fleeing from what is harmful. The irascible power, a kind of active inertia, serves the good indirectly by resisting what would attack it. The irascible is thus itself teleologically subordinate to the concupiscible, from which it begins and in which it ends.

Thomas concludes the division of sensuality with an article that asks whether the irascible and concupiscible powers obey reason⁷³. He suggests the determination of the question already in the *sed contra*, where the quotation from John Damascene describes the lower powers as persuadable by reason. This locus is famous in the Latin tradition and provides the structure for the discussion of passion in the *Summa Halensis* and Vincent of Beauvais's *Speculum naturale*, among others⁷⁴. Thomas develops the metaphor of persuasion in the body of the article. The sensitive powers are said to be directly actuated by that rational faculty called in Thomas the *vis cogitativa* or *ratio particularis*. This faculty collates individual intentions, that is, it apprehends individuals⁷⁵. The particular reason is directed and guided by a universal or syllogistic reason which is thus the remote cause of sensitive appetite. More interesting is the control exercised by the will over irascibility and concupiscibility. The lower appetites wait upon the «imperium» of the higher, of the will. In reply to an objection, Thomas extends the political image back over the whole relation of *ratio* to sensitive appetite. That relation is not despotic, he says, but political and regal⁷⁶. Political or regal rule is characterized by freedom, by a certain autonomy, which allows the possibility of refusal. Men experience such refusals when they imagine or sense as good what in fact is not.

Here, then, there appears a hiatus in the teleological chain. It is a hiatus bridged by what Thomas describes as the political or legal rule of reason. That sort of rule, his quotation from John Damascene suggests, requires persuasion or instruction. If the concupiscible and irascible powers are obedient to reason only within the limits of what is likened to a non-despotic polity, if they are the locus of a certain autonomy which is other than freedom in intellect or in choice, how are they to be

⁷³ *Summa theol.* I q.81 a.3.

⁷⁴ See *Summa Halensis*, lib.1–2 inq.4 tract.1 sect.2 q.2 tit.2 memb.2, II, pp. 444–445; and Vincent of Beauvais, *Speculum naturale*, lib.27 cap.64, 1961D–1962B.

⁷⁵ *Summa theol.* I q.81 a.3.

⁷⁶ *Summa theol.* I q.81 a.3 ad 2m.

brought over into the teleological actualization of the soul? This can be re-stated as the question, how in fact are the passions to be made morally responsible by acts of intelligence? The moral account of the passions depends upon a satisfactory answer to the question.

IV. THE MORALITY OF THE PASSIONS

The entire *prima secundae* is put under the teleological governance of the highest human end. The *pars* begins with the end of human life because it is only the end that renders the rest intelligible. The sequence of articles is then dictated by approach to that end, beginning with the primary possibility of choice and ending with the uniquely efficacious gift of grace⁷⁷. More strictly, one begins to approach the human end more nearly by acts that are specifically human than by acts that are both human and animal. Specifically human acts are characterized by relation to the rational will; acts both human and animal are called passions of the soul⁷⁸. In other words, the passions appear as the region of marginally human action – that is, just as the embodiment in act of the appetite in animate natures, to recall the language of the *prima pars*. The passions figure in the approach to the human end as subordinate, generic means. Already in this, their contextual locus, one has stated the teleological problem about incorporating the passions into the rational, that is, into morality.

The moral problematic is raised explicitly for the passions in a single question entitled «de bono et malo in animae passionibus»⁷⁹. The question occupies a middle place in the questions that define, classify, and assign teleological rank to the passions. It is a short question which has a limited and telling sub-structure of *auctoritates*. The hinge of each article in the question, as I have noted above, is a quotation in the *sed contra* of one of two passages in Augustine's *De civitate Dei*⁸⁰. Even when not cited, these two passages underwrite Thomas's historical descriptions of alternative views of the passions and even his analysis of them.

⁷⁷ *Summa theol.* I–II q.6 prol.

⁷⁸ *Summa theol.* I–II q.6 prol.

⁷⁹ *Summa theol.* I–II q.24 tit., EB 2.388.1.

⁸⁰ Augustine, *De civitate Dei*, IX.4–5 and XIV.7–9.

The two passages from Augustine withstand the objections' contrary citations (and mis-readings) of Ambrose, John Damascene, Ps-Dionysius, Sallustius, and Scripture itself. The citations to Augustine usually stand alone, though Aristotle is introduced in the last article for further support. The dialectical play of authorities is more complicated than any simple opposition, of course. Still, it remains true at the end of the dialectic that the passages from *De civitate Dei* determine the framing of the issues. We shall come to their exact content in a moment. I note now that these passages connect the issues with a decisive contest in ancient philosophy, the struggle over the moral efficacy of a «conversion» to the philosophic life.

The first article of Question 24 asks whether one can find moral good and moral evil in the passions. Thomas distinguishes. Considered in themselves, as a harmful change in the appetite that is accompanied by a physical alteration⁸¹ – indeed, by an alteration in the motion of the heart⁸² –, the passions are neither morally good nor morally bad. It is only so far as they «subjacent imperio rationis et voluntatis» that moral qualities can be ascribed to them⁸³. The political connotations of «imperium» are neither particularly emphasized nor particularly excluded here. We have already seen Thomas use explicitly political analogues in discussing the relation of sensitive appetite to reason. Throughout this question, he uses words with political resonances, such as «imperium» or its verbal forms, «obedire», and the images of limits, ordination, and regulation from reason⁸⁴.

The second article of Question 24 asks whether all passion is evil. The objections and the *sed contra* are from Scriptural sources, but the frame of the article is a recitation of the ancient quarrel between Stoics and Peripatetics. Indeed, already in the Augustinian quotation for the *sed contra*, Thomas had introduced a list of the four Stoic passions⁸⁵.

⁸¹ *Summa theol.* I–II q.22 a.1 corp.

⁸² *Summa theol.* I–II q.24 a.2 ad 2m.

⁸³ *Summa theol.* I–II q.24 a.1 corp., EB 2.388.2.

⁸⁴ For example, q.24 a.1 corp., «quod a voluntate imperantur» (EB 2.388.2); q.24 a.1 ad 1m, «quod a ratione imperantur» (EB 2.388.2); q.24 a.3 corp., «possit obedire ratione» (EB 2.388.3); q.24 a.4 ad 1m and ad 2m, «obedit rationi» (EB 2.389.1); q.24 a.2 corp., «limites rationis» (EB 2.388.2); q.24 a.1 ad 3m, «a ratione ordinantur» (EB 2.388.2); q.24 a.3 corp., «inordinatos motus», «per rationis regulam» and «regulatae per rationem» (all EB 2.388.3).

⁸⁵ From Augustine, *De civitate Dei*, XIV.9, ed. Dombart-Kolb, *Corpus Christianorum Ser. Lat.* 48 (Turnhout, 1955), p. 426, ll. 9–12; cf. Virgil, *Aeneid*, VI.733. Augustine

More broadly, he paraphrases a doxography from Augustine: The Stoics held all passions to be evil, but this resulted from their failure to distinguish sensory appetite from rational will. They judged all passions evil because they considered them corrigible. The Peripatetics, correctly distinguished the two faculties, were thus also able to distinguish moderate from immoderate emotion. Though Thomas follows Augustine in considering the disagreement partly verbal, since 'passions' becomes equivocal, he also echoes Augustine in correcting the Stoic view. Yet Thomas abbreviates and softens Augustine's attack. The *De civitate Dei* offers two longish chapters on the merely verbal character of the dispute between Stoics and Peripatetics, then a refutation of Stoic *eupatheia* and *apatheia* from Scripture⁸⁶. After describing the passionate life of the saint, Augustine writes: «Hi motus, hi affectus de amore boni et de sancta caritate venientes si vitiae vocanda sunt, sinamus, et ea, quae vere vitia sunt, virtutes vocentur» – let us, that is, invert the moral order⁸⁷. Aquinas is more moderate, even in handling the dogmatic passages in Cicero. The moderation may not be an incidental part of his project of clarification.

The third article in Question 24 asks whether passion adds to the goodness or badness of an act. Thomas begins again by setting aside the Stoics, but then turns to the positive description of various ways in which passions contribute to the good. Most simply, so far as the passions are brought under right reason, they increase the exercise of reason and so nearness to the good. More specifically, passions contribute to the good either by overflow of intensity downwards or by positive disposition⁸⁸. The more intense an act of will, the more it causes an accompanying passion. Alternately, one might cultivate an emotion precisely in order to make an act of will easier and more intense.

Finally, in the fourth article, Thomas asks whether there are whole species of emotions that are bad. Here the direction of the dialectic reverses somewhat, since Thomas does want to hold that some passions are, when considered as participating in the voluntary and the judgment of reason, simply good or bad. In other words, some types of passion conform *per se* to the rational teleology while others contradict it. His

attributes the passage to Virgil in XIV.7 (ed. Dombart-Kolb, p. 43, l.60) and quotes it from him in XIV.8 (p.425, ll.74–77)

⁸⁶ Augustine, *De civitate Dei*, IX.4–5 and XIV.8–9, respectively.

⁸⁷ Augustine, *De civitate Dei*, XIV.9, ed. Dombart-Kolb, p. 427, ll.59–61.

⁸⁸ *Summa theol.* I–II q.24 a.3 ad 1m.

example for a passion good in species is modesty; for a passion evil in species, envy. Thomas is even willing to extend the principle by analogy to animals, which have a «quaedam similitudo moralis boni»⁸⁹ so far as they are led teleologically through an estimative power instructed by divine providence.

The exegesis of these four articles has advanced the question about morality of the passions by supplementing the political analogy for reason's rule with reminders of the corporeal limits in passions and with suggestions for specific lines of rational pedagogy or persuasion. The dialectical motion of the articles can be read in this way: The first claims some part of passion for the realm of reason, but the second rejects any attempt to claim all of passion. The third article asserts a morally positive mutual causality linking reason and passion, but the fourth reminds that some types of passion are excluded from the positive causality in principle.

What remains unclear in the dialectic is precisely the starting point, that is, the assertion of a certain, quasi-political dominion of reason over the passions. Yet this is the question at the heart of the disagreement between the Stoics and Peripatetics. It is, then, on Thomas's own account, the decisive philosophic question about the morality of the passions. The character of reason's relation to the passions will be worked out in commenting on the various particular passions. It is Thomas's custom to supply in concrete cases what his abstract description has left unsettled. But it is not possible to descend to moral cases with the passions until their susceptibility to rational control has been established. The text of Question 24, which promised by its sources and its contexts to clarify the fundamental relation of passions to reason, seems to have assumed the most important thing it was to have shown. This is only an appearance, however. The absence of an explicit argument in Question 24 does not mean that Thomas is blind to the issue that animates his ancient authorities. It means only that he puts the issue elsewhere than one might expect.

⁸⁹ *Summa theol.* I–II q.24 a.4 ad 3m, EB 2.389.1.

V. THE «PROOF» OF MORALITY IN REGARD TO THE PASSIONS

In the first two passages from *De civitate Dei* quoted by Thomas, Augustine re-tells a story from Aulus Gellius, whom he calls, perhaps ironically, «vir elegantissimi eloquii et multae undecumque scientiae»⁹⁰. The story tells of a Stoic travelling on a ship that is overtaken by a severe storm. The other passengers watch the Stoic's reaction with morbid curiosity; they see him pale. Once the storm has passed, they begin taunting him with a lack of philosophic discipline. The man has a quick retort for the crowd, but is willing to speak with Aulus Gellius at greater length. The Stoic excuses himself with a technical explanation. There are, he says, certain bodily affections which cannot be resisted even by the wise, though they do not influence the mind. The story ends with the two men poring over this explanation as propounded by Epictetus.

Now Augustine uses the story to chide the Stoics for their easily resorting to technical and terminological obfuscation. But he sees quite clearly that the main point of the story is the question, whether the passions can be controlled by reason. The same question is at issue in the passages from Cicero mentioned by Augustine, as in the verses quoted by him from the *Aeneid*⁹¹. The question of the command of reason is precisely, in Augustine, the question whether reason can command. It is not only a question of possibility, but of how to enact the possibility after suitable moral training or in the reception of grace.

Despite its prominence for Augustine, the questions seem not to have arisen explicitly for Thomas in Question 24. He works in Augustine's text on all sides of the story without mentioning it. He faults Cicero for siding with the Stoics, but does not comment on Cicero's reiteration of the Stoic urgency with regard to the capacity of reason to command the passions. When Thomas paraphrases Augustine, he transcribes the Stoic words and so picks up on the image of the passions as sickness, but he does not pick up the related images of passion as insuperable force. The reader is driven back to the first article in search

⁹⁰ Augustine, *De civitate Dei*, IX.4, ed. Dombart-Kolb, p. 252, l.32.

⁹¹ Augustine, *De civitate Dei*, IX.4, quoting Cicero, *De finibus*, III.20; *Tusculanarum Quaestionum*, III.4; and Virgil, *Aeneid*, 4.449.

of an argument by which Aquinas demonstrates that reason has *imperium* over the passions.

There is no such single argument. The place of such an argument is taken by the construction of the treatment in the text. That construction is secured not by Scripture (as in Augustine), nor by appeals to experience, but by that very teleological ordering of the soul that was described in the *prima pars* and used as the principle of sequence in the *secunda*. Thus, to take the first point, the description of the soul saw it as expressed in an ascending order of powers directed to the end of the highest of them. Again, to take the second point, the place of the «treatise» on the passions is determined by their subordinate relation to the sought end. Within the text of the four articles on the morality of the passions, the assumption of the teleological hierarchy – by which I mean a hierarchy of operations ordered by capacity for the end – appears in the spatial metaphors, in the claim of participation, and in the allusions to divine providence. The spatial metaphors are ubiquitous. The passions «subjacent» reason, are «propinquier» to reason than to one's limbs, are the «inferiores vires» of appetite; a passion need not «declinet ab ordine naturalis rationis»; finally, the estimative faculty is animals «subiicitur rationi superiori, scilicet divinae»⁹². These metaphors are given more precise meaning in the repeated claim that the passions participate in reason and will to some extent⁹³. The logic of participation is quite complex in Thomas's full elaboration of it, but it is certainly true that participation is typically a relation of asymmetrical dependence that grounds a hierarchy. Finally, if this were not clear enough, there is the explicit mention of subordination in animals to the higher reason of God⁹⁴.

The absence of a particular argument for the subordination of passions to reason, the fact that its place is taken by structure and made manifest in the metaphors or language used, all of this accounts for what may appear to be a certain logical circularity in the articulation of the four articles of Question 24. The passions are, Thomas says, subject to

⁹² For example, *Summa theol.* I–II q.24 a.1 corp., «subjacent» and «propinquier» (both EB 2.388.2); q.24 a.1 ad 2m, «inferiores vires» (EB 2.388.2); q.24 a.2 ad 2m, «declinet ab ordine» (EB 2.388.3); q.24 a.4 ad 3m, «subiicitur rationi» (EB 2.389.1).

⁹³ *Summa theol.* I–II q.24 a.1 ad 2m, «participant aliquantulum rationem» quoting Aristotle (EB 2.388.2); q.24 a.4 corp., «participant aliquid de voluntario et iudicio rationis» (EB 2.389.1).

⁹⁴ *Summa theol.* I–II q.24 a.4 ad 3m.

moral analysis so far as they fall under the command of reason. But they are shown to fall under the command of reason precisely through examples of moral analysis. The possibility of control is established from the customs of moral discourse. Nonetheless, this is not a vicious circularity, because it discloses a fundamental datum; the emotions are subject to moral control precisely because they appear within the configuration of the soul's teleology. The ground behind the 'assumption' of control is the ground of the unity of the soul's form in its teleological ordination.

It seems, then, that the decisive ancient question of the morality of the passions is transformed in Thomas by the pervasive ostension of hierarchical teleologies. One sees such teleologies in the model of the soul's powers, in the justifications for the sequence to topics, in the language (both technical and metaphoric) of specific articles, and – most vividly – in the assertion of divine providence. But the ancient dispute about the command over passion is also intimately connected with the question of moral pedagogy. It is not only that moral pedagogy aims to produce command – or fails to produce it, as in the story from Aulus Gellius. It is also that moral pedagogy begins with an address to the uncommanded passions. This is obvious in any number of Greek works. An explicit statement of the principle is found in the *Nicomachean Ethics*, where Aristotle excludes the young and the incontinent from ethical study. The entire importance of philosophic protreptic, of the hortatory induction of the new student into philosophy, derives from the need to have the passions properly engaged by the philosophic end.

Seen against this ancient connection, it is remarkable that the construction of the doctrine of the passions in the *prima secundae* is not at all protreptic. There seems to be no attempt to engage the passions of the reader or to test that they have been properly engaged. If one looks to the whole *prima secundae*, the discourse is begun by a presentation of the end of human life in beatitude. This is no exhortation; it is a clarification, an ostension. The good is set forth as plainly as it can be so that one might distinguish ways of approaching it. The whole drive of the *prima secundae* is not to lead one to choose the good, but to place in one's possession a clear knowledge of the ways that lead to a good already chosen. In the place of protreptic, one has epideixis or – more exactly – epagoge.

The shift of the rhetorical pattern in the construction can be connected, as before, with the hierarchical teleology. Since Thomas insists

that the human end is preeminently contemplative, he wants to present not the erotic persuasion of passion but the pellucid ostension of rational control. This is true – and yet is only half the reason. The other half is that Thomas assumes that his readers, being students of theology, have already been passionately converted by the Gospel. There is no need for the Greek conversion of passions, because there has been a conversion to Christ. This assumption transforms the order of moral teaching, especially in the crucial case of the passions. Indeed, it may be that the shape of the *Summa*'s treatment of moral matters is the most eloquent – and the most pointed – argument for the teleology that makes possible a reasonable control over the passions.

