

Zeitschrift: Museum Helveticum : schweizerische Zeitschrift für klassische Altertumswissenschaft = Revue suisse pour l'étude de l'antiquité classique = Rivista svizzera di filologia classica

Herausgeber: Schweizerische Vereinigung für Altertumswissenschaft

Band: 40 (1983)

Heft: 4

Artikel: Rival traditions on a Rhodian stasis

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DOI: <https://doi.org/10.5169/seals-31117>

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Rival Traditions on a Rhodian Stasis

By H. D. Westlake, Cambridge

In 391 B.C. a characteristically Greek outbreak of inter-factional strife occurred at Rhodes. It led to fighting continuing for some three years, perhaps longer, in which both Sparta and Athens became involved. Accounts of this episode by Xenophon¹ and Diodorus² disagree so fundamentally that they are widely considered to be irreconcilable. Almost all modern scholars have chosen, where discrepancies arise, to give preference to the version of Xenophon³, who, besides being personally acquainted with leading characters in the episode, includes plenty of circumstantial detail agreeably presented. He also claims to be aware of the reasons for Spartan and Athenian action (20. 22. 23. 25). A few scholars have favoured the version of Diodorus⁴, whose narrative on the last decade of the fifth century and the early decades of the fourth is certainly independent of Xenophon and is derived, indirectly through Ephorus, from the 'Hellenica Oxyrhynchia'⁵. This paper will suggest that the account of Xenophon is highly suspect in several respects, whereas that of Diodorus, while not providing an entirely satisfactory or complete picture, deserves to be regarded as the more trustworthy.

Before discussing the two versions it is necessary to outline the situation in the area of the eastern Aegean as seen from Sparta, Athens and Persia after the series of negotiations conducted in 392 had failed to produce the basis for a generally acceptable peace. The Spartans remained at war with Persia and yet had now hardly any prospect of safeguarding the autonomy of the Greeks on the Asiatic mainland, which had at the outset been the aim of their military

1 *Hell.* 4, 8, 20–25. Hereafter references to Xenophon are to *Hell.* 4, 8, unless otherwise stated.

2 14, 97, 1–4 and 99, 4–5 (cf. 94, 2–4 on the expedition of Thrasybulus). Hereafter references to Diodorus are to Book 14, unless otherwise stated.

3 For example, K. J. Beloch, *Gr. Gesch.* 3, 1 (Berlin 1922) 87–88; C. D. Hamilton, *Sparta's Bitter Victories* (Ithaca, N.Y. 1979) 293–296; R. M. Berthold, *Historia* 29 (1980) 39–40. R. Seager, *Journ. Hell. Stud.* 87 (1967) 108–110, without referring to any discrepancy, seems to accept the version of Xenophon. A. Momigliano, *Riv. fil.* 14 (1936) 51–54, and P. Funke, *Festschrift Friedrich Vittinghoff* (Cologne 1980) 65–66, do not commit themselves and make some attempt to reconcile the two versions.

4 Notably, because he wrote before any papyrus fragments of the *Hellenica Oxyrhynchia* were discovered, G. Busolt, *Jahrb. f. class. Phil., Suppl.* 7 (1873–75) 671–673.

5 On the period between the battle of Cnidus and the Peace of Antalcidas see S. Accame, *Ricerche intorno alla guerra corinzia* (Naples 1951) 5–20, though I do not find all his conclusions convincing.

intervention there. The Athenians, after the withdrawal of Persian support for Conon, could not feel sure that they had sufficient resources to continue the plan, evidently favoured by the more optimistic of them, to build the foundation of a new maritime empire⁶. The Persians had abandoned the now unprofitable policy of maintaining a fleet in the Aegean, but the efforts of Tiribazus to negotiate peace in the area were rejected by the Great King, who sent Struthas to replace him with orders to renew the war against Sparta. Struthas is not known to have attacked the Spartan troops still serving in Asia or any of the few cities remaining under Spartan control, but his attitude was certainly hostile. Accordingly Sparta sent out a substantial army, though perhaps without much enthusiasm, since its commander was Thibron, whose previous mission to Asia had been almost wholly unsuccessful. This force resumed offensive operations against the King by plundering his territory (Xen. 17; Diod. 99, 1).

It may possibly have been this renewal of Spartan military activity on the nearby mainland that encouraged the Rhodian 'friends of Sparta' (Diod. 97, 1-2), who were evidently oligarchs⁷, to attack the democrats, who had been in control of Rhodes for the last four years. On the other hand, the outbreak of violence was certainly not deliberately instigated by the Spartans and seems to have originated from purely local dissensions⁸. Indeed Xenophon and Diodorus both give the impression that neither Sparta nor Athens was eager to intervene and that each chose to do so mainly to deny to the other a strategically valuable base⁹.

A. Xenophon

Some light may be thrown on the discrepancies between the two traditions on this episode by first summarizing the account by Xenophon and noting factors which give rise to doubts whether it is entirely trustworthy. The substance of his version is as follows. Rhodians exiled by the democrats come to Sparta and point out the disadvantages to the Spartans if Rhodes becomes totally controlled by Athens. The Spartans appreciate that a democratic victory will leave the entire island in Athenian hands, whereas an oligarchical victory

6 The extent to which the plan had been developed, with surreptitious aid from Conon while in Persian service, is not at all clear, doubtless because extreme caution was necessary. An Athenian inscription relating to Carpathos, hitherto dated c. 393 (I.G. 12, 1, 977 = Tod, *Greek Hist. Inscr.* 110) suggests considerable Athenian influence over a wide area in the south-eastern Aegean, including Rhodes, but the inscription is now thought to date from the fifth century, cf. D. M. Lewis, *Sparta and Persia* (Leiden 1977) 144 n. 55.

7 Xenophon (20) refers to their wealth.

8 Funke (above n. 3) 65-66, is convincing on this point.

9 The situation is totally different from that of 395, when Conon, who was on the spot, secretly supported the democratic coup (*Hell. Ox.* 15, Bartoletti).

will leave it in their own. Consequently they send out eight ships under their nauarchos Ecdicus (20)¹⁰, who does not proceed beyond Cnidus on hearing that the democrats are in complete control by land and sea and have twice as many ships as he has (22). Teleutias is then sent with twelve ships to replace Ecdicus and obtains seven more from Samos before reaching Cnidus, where his fleet now numbers twenty-seven. After intercepting and capturing ten Athenian triremes, he eventually arrives at Rhodes and supports the local friends of Sparta (23–24). The Athenians, alarmed by the revival of Spartan naval power, prepare forty ships under the command of Thrasybulus, who, after sailing from Attica, suspends assistance to the Rhodian democrats and proceeds instead to the Hellespont. His reasons (25), which are fully defined, will be considered below. After a long series of operations elsewhere, he hastens to reach Rhodes but is killed at Aspendus (30). Agyrrhius is appointed to replace him (31). Hereafter Xenophon ignores the Rhodian situation, apart from a statement that Teleutias, whose withdrawal from the island is not mentioned, hands over his ships off Aegina to the nauarchos Hierax, who leaves some there and sails back to Rhodes with the rest (Hell. 5, 1, 2–5).

There are two general considerations suggesting that this narrative should not be accepted without careful scrutiny. First, it belongs to a section of the *Hellenica* prefaced by the somewhat naive statement that in recording the course of the war at sea and in the coastal cities the author will deal with events that are worthy of mention and will omit those that are not (1). Readers familiar with the *Hellenica* may justifiably suspect that he does not intend to make searching enquiries about matters in which he has little interest, even though they may be of some importance¹¹. Secondly, the protagonist in his account of Spartan measures taken in support of the Rhodian oligarchs is Teleutias. Not only was Teleutias the brother, or half brother, of Agesilaus but he belongs, like Agesilaus, to the select band of military leaders eulogized in the *Hellenica* for their proficiency in winning and retaining the loyalty of troops serving under their command¹². The amount of attention paid to these ideal commanders is

10 At the same time, Diphridas is sent to assume command on the mainland, where Thibron has been defeated and killed.

11 H. R. Breitenbach, RE 9 A 2 (1967) 1700, justly concludes that his knowledge of the events to which he refers in his statement (1) must have been very superficial. He could surely have collected more information if he had made the necessary effort. He tends throughout the *Hellenica* to devote insufficient attention to operations conducted wholly or largely at sea (see below p. 249 with n. 39).

12 In *Essays on the Greek Historians and Greek History* (Manchester 1969) 208–209, originally in Ryl. Bull. 49 (1966) 251–253, I cite two extravagantly eulogistic passages (5, 1, 3–4 and 13–18), though also pointing to criticism of Teleutias for the imprudent rage that led to his death (5, 3, 5–7). He was doubtless an energetic and popular officer but hardly a historical character of major importance. Diodorus refers to him only once but mentions his reputation for bravery (15, 21, 1–2).

perhaps overgenerous. Some doubt may indeed be felt whether Xenophon would have considered this Rhodian stasis to fall within his category of events worthy of mention if Teleutias had not been involved in it. He nowhere refers to the overthrow of the oligarchical government by the democrats in 395, of which the Oxyrhynchus historian gives a detailed account (*Hell. Ox.* 15), and yet he can hardly have been unaware of that earlier putsch¹³, which was presumably the occasion when the Rhodians who appealed to Sparta in 391 became exiles. When he refers to their appeal (20), he gives no explanation of the situation at Rhodes at the time. He is evidently using Spartan sources and is content to reflect the Spartan point of view.

The delay at Cnidus by Ecdicus is doubtless authentic¹⁴, but the reasons attributed to him for his decision to remain there – that, as noted above, the democrats were in complete control by land and sea and had twice as many ships as he had (22) – suggest, rightly or wrongly, that he made the most of his difficulties¹⁵. A contrast between him and Teleutias seems to be implied. Xenophon gives the impression that the Spartans, not being entirely satisfied with the leadership of Ecdicus, sent not merely a reinforcement but also an officer to replace him who could be trusted to show more enterprise. Teleutias was ordered to send Ecdicus home (23, ἀποπέμψαι), but the latter does not appear to have been dismissed as nauarchos. His term of office had probably expired.

The authority possessed by Teleutias when he sailed to Asia is not clearly defined. Because he succeeded the nauarchos Ecdicus and was himself succeeded by the nauarchos Hierax, he might appear to have held the nauarchia during his mission to Rhodes. He can, however, hardly have been nauarchos at this time, because he had very probably already held that office, which no one was permitted to hold twice (*Hell.* 2, 1, 7)¹⁶. Xenophon tends to give his favourite characters credit for all the achievements in which they played any part, and Teleutias is not mentioned by Diodorus in his account of the Spartan expedition which will be considered below. Thus it is even possible that Teleutias may not

13 Breitenbach (above n. 11) 1682, suggests that this event occurred when Xenophon was still serving in Asia Minor so that he did not hear of it. This explanation also involves a charge of carelessness, though of a different kind.

14 He could well have had to use part of his slender force to support Diphridas, who was initially in a difficult situation (21).

15 It seems unlikely that the Rhodian democrats had as many as sixteen ships ready for active service (see below n. 29). In neither of his two passages dealing with the situation at Rhodes (apparently relating to different stages) does Xenophon give a direct report: here (22) he refers to what Ecdicus was told, later (25) to what Thrasybulus believed.

16 Beloch (above n. 3) 2, 2, 279, maintains that he had been nauarchos in 392/1 but suggests that he might, like Lysander in the Ionian war, have now served nominally as epistoleus while really being in supreme command. Some mystery surrounds his tenure of the nauarchia, as is shown by V. Ehrenberg, *RE* 5 A 1 (1934) 400, perhaps a consequence of determination by Xenophon to make him as prominent as possible, cf. 5, 1, 13.

have commanded the whole Spartan and allied fleet operating in Rhodian waters but only the squadron which he had brought from the Corinthian Gulf¹⁷. He was apparently responsible for obtaining the seven Samian ships on his voyage to Cnidus (23) but was not necessarily in supreme command when the Athenian squadron was captured (24).

It is difficult to believe that, if Teleutias had won notable successes after reaching Rhodes, Xenophon would have neglected the opportunity to pay further tributes to him. Hence it is very likely either that his efforts on behalf of the oligarchs proved fruitless or that they were in the happy position of having little need of assistance from him. The latter explanation is perhaps preferable, since the entire Spartan squadron was later withdrawn and only part of it sent back under Hierax (Hell. 5, 1, 2–5)¹⁸.

The passage in which Xenophon introduces the expedition of Thrasybulus is exceptionally puzzling. The Athenians sent him out with his fleet to check Spartan naval resurgence (ἀντεκπέμπουσι); thereupon ἐκπλεύσας τῆς μὲν εἰς Ῥόδον βοήθειας ἐπέσχε (25)¹⁹ and went instead to the Hellespont, where there were no enemy forces (26). A marked distinction appears to be drawn between what he was instructed to do and what he actually did: he might indeed be thought to have chosen to ignore orders issued by the Athenian government and, for reasons of his own²⁰, have taken action for which he had no authority. Although the passage suggests that he acted on his own initiative²¹, it is certain-

17 Philodocus, who is not otherwise known, is mentioned by Diodorus (97, 3) as a colleague of Ecdicus when the first expedition was sent. He could have been appointed to succeed Ecdicus in command and was perhaps the otherwise unattested nauarchos for 390/89. G. L. Cawkwell, *Class. Quart.* 26 (1976) 272 n. 14, suggests that the nauarchia was in that year held by Chilon, who, according to Aeschines (2, 78) was defeated in a sea battle by the Athenian Demaenetus. Cawkwell, rejecting the identification of this sea battle with a skirmish in 396/5 (*Hell. Ox.* 8, 1–2) in which Demaenetus eluded the harmost of Aegina, whose name appears as Milon, argues that Aeschines is referring to a later and greater occasion of which no record has survived. Aeschines is, however, seeking credit for himself by mentioning patriotic services by his uncle to the Athenian state. It is consistent with rhetorical practice to magnify a mere skirmish into a sea battle and a mere harmost into a nauarchos. Nor can he have been much concerned whether the defeated Spartan was named Chilon or Milon. The conclusions of Ed. Meyer, *Theopomps Hellenika* (Halle 1909) 42, on this point are fully justified. The nauarchos of 390/89 is likely to have been involved in the largest naval operation undertaken by Sparta in that year, which was the expedition to Rhodes.

18 This second explanation conflicts with the view attributed by Xenophon to Thrasybulus that, when Teleutias was at Rhodes, the democrats held the upper hand (25), but reasons for feeling some scepticism about that passage will be given below.

19 This phrase does not make clear at what stage of his voyage across the Aegean he decided to change course and make for the Hellespont, cf. Seager (above n. 3) 109. Perhaps Xenophon did not know.

20 These will be discussed in the next paragraph.

21 W. Judeich, *Kleinasiatische Studien* (Marburg 1892) 92: “wie es scheint ganz aus eigener Initiative”. The question whether in sending out Thrasybulus the Athenians were actuated by

ly not intended to convey censure of him on that account. Xenophon, because of his preoccupation with leading personalities, likes to represent commanders of expeditionary forces, such as Dercylidas and Agesilaus, as almost wholly independent. Here his account of Athenian operations in the Hellespont and elsewhere is largely a vindication of Thrasybulus (26–30)²², who is so favourably presented in the *Hellenica* that a place might be claimed for him among its ideal commanders. The passage recording his death is followed by a valedictory compliment (31).

Xenophon gives two reasons why Thrasybulus decided to divert his expeditionary force from intervention at Rhodes: (a) he would not easily crush the friends of Sparta because they held a fortress and had the assistance of Teleutias with a fleet; (b) the friends of Athens would not be subjugated by their opponents because they held the cities, were far superior in numbers and had been victorious in battle (25). This explanation is unconvincing. If Thrasybulus had believed the democrats to be enjoying the preponderance with which they are here credited, would he, with his powerful fleet and its force of marines (28), have despaired of being able to overcome the oligarchs, even though they were protected by their fortress and the ships of Teleutias? His past record does not suggest any lack of confidence or determination. Furthermore, his experience of civil strife must have made him well aware that the situation at Rhodes might be unexpectedly transformed before he could complete his plans for action elsewhere and could turn his attention to aiding the democrats.

Xenophon is so well informed about the actions of Thrasybulus in the Hellespont and elsewhere (26–30) that he may be thought to have obtained reports from Athenian sources. He does not, however, seem to have been able to consult anyone sufficiently close to Thrasybulus to know why the decision was made to divert the fleet from Rhodes. The very unsatisfactory explanation of this decision cited above may have been conceived by some informant, or even by Xenophon himself, without an adequate understanding of special considerations influencing the movements of the Athenian fleet and without access to accurate reports on the situation at Rhodes. Thrasybulus may well have sailed northwards because he planned to lay the foundation of a revived Athenian

imperialist ambitions at this time lies outside the scope of the present investigation. Cawkwell (above n. 17) 270–277, has made out a good case for believing that Thrasybulus himself intended to create what amounted essentially to a revival of the Delian Confederacy, though this intention is not attributed to him by Xenophon or indeed by Diodorus, who does attribute it to Conon (39, 3). That virtually all Athenians shared the imperialist aims of Thrasybulus, as is maintained in detail by P. Funke, *Homonoia und Arche* (*Historia Einzelschrift* 37, 1980) 148–161, seems to me to be much more doubtful.

22 He may have been aware that, as is shown by Lysias, 28 (*Against Ergocles*), 2 and 8, some actions of Thrasybulus during this campaign were severely criticized by opponents at home. His colleagues were recalled and some of them, including Ergocles, were prosecuted.

empire. This project is not, as already noted²³, explicitly mentioned by Xenophon or Diodorus, but another factor undoubtedly contributing to the decision of Thrasybulus to defer intervention at Rhodes is discernible from scattered references to finance in the accounts of both historians²⁴. The expedition was most inadequately financed²⁵. Accordingly Thrasybulus had to obtain funds from whatever source he could before embarking on what could have proved a lengthy and expensive campaign in support of the Rhodian democrats.

B. Diodorus

The narrative of Diodorus on the Rhodian stasis is somewhat sketchy compared with that of Xenophon but raises fewer problems. A feature of it which does not inspire confidence is that the chronological arrangement of events is thoroughly confused. The Spartan expedition to Asia under Thibron is assigned to 390/89 (99, 1–3), the sending of Diphridas, who replaced him after his death, to the preceding year (97, 3)²⁶. The dispatch of Thrasybulus with his fleet is assigned to 392/1 (94, 2), his death at Aspendus to 390/89 (99, 4): the dating of the former is certainly too early and conflicts with the dating of the latter, since his operations can hardly have extended over two years. This chronological confusion is, however, attributable to Diodorus himself and scarcely affects the evaluation of a narrative so largely dependent upon its sources²⁷.

The opening section of his account describes the outbreak of the Rhodian stasis as follows. The friends of Sparta attack the democrats and expel from the city those favouring Athens, who band together and make an armed attempt to regain their position but are defeated with heavy loss. The survivors are banished. The victors at once appeal to Sparta for assistance, 'taking precautions lest certain of the citizens should take revolutionary action' (97, 1–2). The citizens mentioned in this last phrase had evidently taken no part in the counter-attack launched by the militant friends of Athens; they must have been others, probably more numerous, who, being thought to have democratic sympathies, posed a potential threat to the oligarchs.

These opening sentences appear to conflict with the version of Xenophon (20) on two important issues and unquestionably do on one. In the first place,

23 See above n. 21.

24 Xen. 28 and 30; Diod. 94, 2 and 99, 4; cf. Dem. 20, 60.

25 Seager (above n. 3) 111; S. Perlman, *Class. Phil.* 63 (1968) 264–265; Berthold (above n. 3) 40 n. 32.

26 Diphilas here is obviously an error for Diphridas, just as Eudocimus is for Ecdicus.

27 Funke (above n. 21) 94–97, proposes the following chronological reconstruction, which seems to be soundly based: that Ecdicus sailed in the second half of 391; that Teleutias reached Cnidus in the early summer of 390; that the mission of Thrasybulus began in the summer of 390 and continued into the following year.

according to Diodorus the appeal of the oligarchs to Sparta followed their coup but according to Xenophon apparently preceded it. Neither version is here demonstrably preferable to the other. Diodorus and Xenophon seem to be referring to the same appeal, but there may conceivably be no discrepancy, since the oligarchs could have appealed to Sparta more than once. On the second point, Diodorus credits the oligarchs with immediate and striking success not only in seizing power but also in crushing a democratic reaction, whereas according to Xenophon they were believed by Ecdicus (22) and later by Thrasybulus (25) to be so much weaker than their opponents that their prospects were most unfavourable. The positions of the two factions are thus seen to be to a large extent reversed in the accounts of Diodorus and Xenophon. This factor virtually precludes any compromise, even though the situation could have fluctuated rapidly. Fortunately the task of making a choice between the two versions on the opening stage of the stasis is rendered less formidable by scraps of evidence from a third source. In a long discussion in the 'Politics' on the causes of revolutions Aristotle refers to an outbreak at Rhodes, which is widely believed to be that of 391. The upper classes (οἱ γνώριμοι) attack the demos in order to forestall unjust treatment to which they expect to be subjected through prosecutions brought against them (Pol. 5, 1302 b 23)²⁸. A later passage explains more fully how this situation arose: demagogues prevent the payment of sums owed to the trierarchs and bring prosecutions against them so that the latter are compelled to unite and overthrow the democracy (ibid. 1304 b 27)²⁹. Evidently the trierarchs, probably all being members of the upper classes, took the lead in attacking the demos.

In these passages about Rhodes Aristotle follows his normal practice of giving no information to indicate the date of events to which he refers in substantiation of his theories on the sources of political revolutions. Accordingly identification of this rising by Rhodian oligarchs with that of 391, though accepted by most scholars³⁰, does not rest upon his authority; but the circumstances to which he refers in his passages about Rhodes do appear to support this identification. There is, however, known to have been another coup by Rhodian oligarchs against the demos, which occurred in 357, shortly before powerful members of the Second Athenian Confederacy, including Rhodes, took up arms against Athens. Some scholars have maintained that this was the

28 In the next sentence (b 32) Aristotle briefly adduces contempt for the demos before this insurrection as a reason why it occurred.

29 This passage shows that the Rhodian demos possessed some ships at the time, as is attested also by Xenophon (see above n. 15), but they can hardly have operated effectively if deprived of the trierarchs who were in command of them.

30 F. Susemihl, *Aristoteles Politik* (Leipzig 1879) 2, 319, n. 1511; W. L. Newman, *Politics of Aristotle* 4 (Oxford 1902) 299–300; Momigliano (above n. 3) 54.

occasion to which Aristotle refers³¹, but the alternative identification which they prefer is virtually invalidated by a crucial factor inherent in the situation in 357. The oligarchical rising of that year was, largely at least, the outcome of external pressure exerted by Mausolus, as is clearly shown by the speech of Demosthenes, 'On the freedom of the Rhodians' (15, 3, cf. 14), and even more clearly by the Hypothesis to that speech. It is equally clear that the Rhodian stasis to which Aristotle refers originated from internal dissensions and was precipitated by the leaders of local factions³². There is a possibility that Aristotle could be referring to yet another overthrow of the Rhodian democracy by oligarchs of which no other evidence has survived, but this possibility is a very remote one. Only about seventy years elapsed between the establishment of a single Rhodian state through synoecism and the latest events mentioned in the 'Politics' (c. 408–c. 336 B.C.), and the two oligarchical coups considered above, those of 391 and 357, took place within that period. Consequently, especially as the synoecism after some years of unrest evidently brought stability and prosperity to the island, it seems hardly reasonable to postulate the occurrence of a third otherwise unattested oligarchical coup within the same period.

If the arguments in favour of identifying the coup to which Aristotle refers with that of 391 are valid, his evidence lends substantial support to the first section of the account by Diodorus (97, 1–3). Aristotle and Diodorus agree that the oligarchs were successful and imply that their success was gained rapidly. According to Xenophon, on the other hand, they long remained the underdogs, even after receiving Spartan aid (22. 25), and indeed at no point in his account does he expressly credit them with having gained the upper hand. On this opening phase of the Rhodian stasis there is good reason to prefer the version of Diodorus to that of Xenophon.

In its next section the account of Diodorus does not conflict so fundamentally with that of Xenophon, though there is some disagreement. The Spartans send out seven triremes under Ecdicus, Philodocus and Diphridas, who after winning over Samos, reach Rhodes and take charge of the situation there.

31 A. Schaefer, *Demosthenes und seine Zeit*² (Leipzig 1885) 1, 472 with n. 3; S. Hornblower, *Mausolus* (Oxford 1982) 127. Berthold (above n. 3) 39 n. 30 and 40 n. 34, rejects the 391 dating on the ground that it is questionable whether in the four years since the democratic coup in 395 the oligarchs can have recovered sufficiently to have expelled the democrats from the city. This argument is unconvincing: in 395 the oligarchical faction, although ousted, was treated with unwonted leniency and not by any means destroyed (*Hell. Ox.* 15, 2–3). In the relatively new Rhodian state, which had been created by the synoecism of three independent cities less than twenty years earlier, political fluctuations were not unnatural.

32 Momigliano (above n. 3) 53–54, whose convincing argument against identification with the stasis of 357 is adopted here. If the Spartan intervention in 412 caused a change from democracy to oligarchy, Aristotle cannot be referring to that occasion because, as well as being subjected to external pressure, Rhodes had not yet become a single state.

Success encourages the Spartans to devote attention to the sea, and by putting pressure on their allies, including Samos, Cnidus and Rhodes, they gradually build up a well-equipped fleet of twenty-seven ships with an excellent force of marines (97, 3–4). This section corresponds with part of the account by Xenophon (23–24), undoubtedly dealing with the same series of events³³, though more briefly and more vaguely. No specific reference is made to the delay by Ecdicus at Cnidus or to the reinforcement sent from home waters: indeed Sparta embarks on a more ambitious naval policy because of success and not of weakness. Yet the increase of the Spartan fleet is seen to have been accomplished only after a considerable interval and in consequence of a decision by the Spartan government, as is recorded by Xenophon. Significantly there is no panegyric of Teleutias or implied criticism of Ecdicus, which, as noted above, are prominent and somewhat disturbing elements in the version of Xenophon. Teleutias is not even mentioned. Diodorus lays emphasis on the contributions to the naval force extracted by the Spartans from their allies, and on this point he may be more accurate than Xenophon, who focuses attention so largely on Teleutias.

The narrative of Diodorus on the expedition of Thrasybulus, which, as already noted, is chronologically misplaced, is shorter than that of Xenophon and evidently based on another tradition, since it includes a few details not mentioned by Xenophon³⁴. Thrasybulus sails first ‘to Ionia’, a broad term often used inaccurately but not an obvious choice if his initial destination had been Rhodes. He then collects money from allies³⁵ and moves on (94, 2 ἀνέζευξε). Much later, after a series of operations in the Hellespont and Lesbos, he sails ‘in the direction of Rhodes’ (94, 4). This account is free from the obscurities found above in that of Xenophon. Thrasybulus is seen to have been sent out under orders, which he seems to have obeyed meticulously, first to collect as much money and naval support as possible, and, after completing this task, to intervene at Rhodes. If the superiority enjoyed by the oligarchical faction there was as marked as is stated by Diodorus in another passage (97, 2), the Athenians must have needed all the resources that they could muster in aid of the democrats.

Finally, Diodorus describes how Thrasybulus after collecting money at Aspendus is murdered there. The panic stricken trierarchs³⁶ sail off in haste to

33 Funke (above n. 3) n. 29.

34 Most notably the loss of twenty-three ships in a storm off Lesbos (94, 3). Diodorus may be felt to be here guilty of some error or at least of exaggeration. Even if most of the crews were saved, a disaster involving more than half of the fleet could have caused the abandonment of plans for intervention at Rhodes, and Lysias might have been expected to refer to it in his speech *Against Ergocles* (28).

35 It was probably at this stage that the fleet visited Halicarnassus, Lys. 28, 12 and 17.

36 That only trierarchs were left to command the fleet is confirmed by Lysias (28, 5), who mentions the recall of Ergocles and fellow commanders by the Athenian assembly.

Rhodes, where in collaboration with the democratic fugitives, who have seized a fortified position, they wage a prolonged war against the oligarchs holding the city. Agyrrhius is sent to replace Thrasybulus (99, 4–5). This section carries the account of the operations at Rhodes beyond the last mention of them by Xenophon, apart from his bare reference to the return thither of a Spartan squadron under Hierax (5, 1, 5)³⁷. The absence of extant evidence on further developments may be fortuitous but perhaps indicates that a stalemate continued until the King's Peace put an end to external intervention. Antalcidas, the successor of Hierax, did not sail to Rhodes but to Ephesus, whence he evidently visited Tiribazus while sending most of his ships under his epistoleus to Abydos (5, 1, 6)³⁸.

C. Conclusion

This paper may be felt to be unfairly critical of Xenophon and to exaggerate his tendency to pay too much attention to what interests him and too little to what does not. It is, however, undeniable that the reputation of the 'Hellenica' has for many years been declining, as its shortcomings in comprehensiveness, objectivity and accuracy have been progressively exposed. This shift of scholarly opinion has been influenced to some extent by the discovery and meticulous examination of new evidence. In particular, as more scraps of the 'Hellenica Oxyrhynchia' have come to light, the trustworthiness of that sober work has been increasingly recognized, as well as the indirect dependence of Diodorus upon it. Where parallel accounts, especially of operations conducted wholly or mainly at sea, are found in the 'Hellenica' and in the 'Hellenica Oxyrhynchia' or, more frequently, in the tradition dependent on it represented by Diodorus, scholarly opinion has for some time been moving markedly in the direction of preferring the latter tradition³⁹. No one would claim that Diodorus is a historian of higher quality than Xenophon: his limitations have often been pointed out and indeed soon become conspicuous even to the most casual reader. Among

37 Momigliano (above n. 3) 54, infers from this passage that the oligarchs had been completely victorious. This conclusion seems unwarranted, though they doubtless held the upper hand, as indeed, according to Diodorus, they had from the outset.

38 The entire fleet of forty Athenian ships originally sent out under Thrasybulus, or what was left of it (cf. n. 34), does not appear to have remained long in Rhodian waters. According to Xenophon (5, 1, 7) thirty-two ships were assembled from localities in the northern Aegean in 388 to blockade Abydos: this fleet can hardly have consisted wholly of newly built ships and very probably included some withdrawn from Rhodes.

39 Examples are: on Cyzicus, R. J. Littman, *T.A.P.A.* 99 (1968) 265–272; on Cyzicus, Mytilene (in 406) and Notium, P. Pédech, *Rev. Et. Gr.* 82 (1969) 43–55; on Aegospotamoi, C. Ehrhardt, *Phoenix* 24 (1970) 225–228; on Notium and Cyzicus, A. Andrewes, *Journ. Hell. Stud.* 102 (1982) 15–25. On the land battle near Sardis in 395, where there are fundamental disagreements between the accounts of Xenophon and the Oxyrhynchus historian, scholarly opinion is divided, as I have noted in *Historia* 30 (1981) 267 n. 32.

his faults is an addiction to rhetorical clichés, especially in battle narratives⁴⁰. More damaging is his tendency, in epitomizing detailed works, to dwell upon sensational trivialities and ignore important facts. The value of his work lies in reflecting, directly or indirectly, the substance of histories wholly or largely lost, notably those of the Oxyrhynchus historian and Hieronymus of Cardia. Here an attempt has been made to extend the present trend of opinion about the relationship between the 'Hellenica' and the tradition represented by Diodorus and to establish its validity in an additional area, that of the stasis at Rhodes from 391 onwards, on which most scholars have been prepared to accept without hesitation the version of Xenophon.

40 An example occurs in one of the passages discussed above, where Thrasybulus ἀγωνισάμενος λαμπρῶς kills (seemingly with his own hand) a Spartan commander in a battle near Methymna (94, 4).