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## ENGLISH SUMMARIES

M.-S. YANG, The political philosophy of neo-confucianism as distinguished from western, notably Christian, tradition, RThPh 2011, p. 209-222.

*This article concentrates on neo-confucianism: different from ancient Confucianism in that it introduces the reality of a principle, yet without losing an intrinsic immanentism, the principle being only moral. Through comparisons with western history, be it with regards to the legacy of Plato or to Christianity, the author shows that both Confucianist and neo-confucianist immanentism does not make way for a radical criticism of a given, which would mean decentralising the world and the viewpoint, political that is, of the well-being it requires. He also particularly shows, and from his viewpoint this is linked, that the Confucianist tradition can thus only ignore the neutrality of a civil society and of the existence of its individuals, its vision being entirely and thoroughly moral, not related to a neutral given, referring to what is beyond it or transcendent to it, but, on the contrary, being totally identified with the use of this very given.*

J.-P. SCHNEIDER, Exhortation to philosophy and praise of mathematics. Concerning a recent work, RThPh 2011, p. 223-244.

*The first part of this study will present the work of S. Van der Meeren followed by a brief critique. The second part is an exposition and discussion on the two texts he gives as an appendix to his book, the one inspiring the other, the first being Proclus (5th c.), the second, Jamblique (3rd-4th c.). It consists of a praise of (speculative) mathematics responding the attacks of certain critics of this science. The aim of this study is to confront the two texts and to clarify the nature of each and their relation to each other. It will also be shown that each may be studied for its own merits, independently of the question of their supposed correlation to Aristotle's Protrepticus.*

S. BOARINI, The casuist in his study. Casuistry and curiosity, RThPh 2011, p. 245-256.

*In spite of the abundance of publications (anthologies, courses, dictionaries, conferences), theologians and particularly casuists have never provided a definition of the notion of conscience. Nor have they bothered to clarify their system of resolving cases of conscience, even less so a method of resolving such cases. The relation between the notions of case and curiosity might explain the absence of methodological reflection. The picturesque case, or the sum total of the infinite differences in collections is the case of "curiosity", in the genre of the Collections. The case of curiosity, or the extreme singularity of the Dictionaries which adopt the mode of fiction to produce and compose cases, is the case of systems. It is only in considering the case as a singular and typical example, and in subtracting it from this world of surprising singularity with no consequence, that casuistry could take a different direction, that of a method of resolution. However, casuistry has only been able to pass from the status of method to that of methodology by forgoing interest in curiosity during the 17th c. Thus, paradoxically, it owes a lot to the complaints of the Provinciales.*

- B. BAERTSCHI, Neurosciences and moral responsibility: arguing for compatibilism, RThPh 2011, p. 257-272.

*Freedom and responsibility are two characteristics of our classical understanding of human action, even if at times they have been questioned in the name of the physical determinism of the universe. Recently however, they have been under fresh attack from the realm of neuroscience, so much so that hard-line determinists have felt that this time they could and should be definitively removed from our understanding of human action. In this essay, I support the contrary: that studies in neuroscience are obliging us to take seriously the notion of intention, which gives a solid argument in favour of a compatibilist position (physical determinism being compatible with human responsibility and a form of liberty) against the incompatibilist position of hard-line determinism.*

- P.-A. STUCKI, The philosophy of recognition and the question of religion. On P. Paroz, Recognition, a search without end?, RThPh 2011, p. 273-283.

*The writer presents the latest book of Pierre Paroz, on the search for recognition, by proposing a re-reading from four points of view : the comparative study of religions, the taking up of recognition by philosophy, the setting of a new form of systematic theology and the effort to confront the difficulties of protestant theology in modern context. This quadruple re-reading permits him to show the originality and the argumentative force of the ideas in this work.*