

English summaries

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ENGLISH SUMMARIES

- J. GREISCH, "What may I hope?" a shortcoming in the anthropology of fallibility, RThPh 2014/I, p. 9-26.

A comparison of Heidegger's interpretation of Kant to that which underlies Ricoeur's *L'homme faillible* exposes the profound difference between a "Dasein metaphysic," interested in the idea of finiteness, and the anthropology of disproportion with its centre of gravity in the concept of fallibility. This does not stop either philosopher from elaborating his hermeneutics of the self. Just as important is the fate reserved by the anthropology of finiteness and the hermeneutics of the self for Kant's question "What may I hope?"

- A. GRANDJEAN, Grace and freedom. Kant, Ricoeur and the dialectic of saving faith, RThPh 2014/I, p. 27-42.

According to Kant, the "saving faith" in the ideal of a humanity receptive to God sets before human reason "a remarkable antinomy". By analysing this antinomy, it is shown that if Ricoeur well understood human freedom's dependence upon grace, he omitted Kant's deduction of the reality of freedom from the fact of reason, showing grace to be the very reason for freedom, in the framework of a religion whose hermeneutic make-up is ultimately contingent.

- C. SERBAN, Will and power: Kant and Ricoeur on the problem of grace, RThPh 2014/I, p. 43-58.

This analysis starts from the articulation of will and power in his practical philosophy which leads Kant to maintain the incomprehensibility of grace while admitting its possibility. We find in Ricoeur, in the light of the asymmetry between will and power introduced by fallibility, the same relation to grace as an object of hope. Moving from the philosophy of will to the hermeneutics of the self, it is the idea of self-identity which becomes fundamental in a (paradoxical) answer to the problem of grace. This idea shows effort and giving to be one and the same seen in the prism of the affiliation of the self and the other.

- R. EHRSAM, Ricoeur's hermeneutics of religion, with or without Kant?, RThPh 2014/I, p. 59-76.

This article assesses the rapport of Ricoeur to Kant, not in his philosophy taken as a whole or in his philosophy of religion, but specifically in his hermeneutics of religious texts. We maintain that Ricoeur's hermeneutics of religion, far from simply prolonging Religion Within the Limits of Reason Alone, takes a decisively different path (though Ricoeur minimises or denies the swerve). For Kant, the effort of interpretation is subordinate to a) the desire to improve humanity and b) a critical approach to religious texts by rational faith. In contrast, for Ricoeur, the hermeneutics of religion (a) proceeds from a theory of meaning unconnected with any edifying vision, and (b) esteems that the philosophy of evil and of hope must be made up "according to the symbols" rather than

as a lever for the critique of symbols. We conclude that in spite of the heritage claimed by Ricoeur, the contrast of his approach to that of Kant creates an intersection in the philosophy of religion which offers no direction for synthesis.

N. MAILLARD, "Here I stand, I can do no other". On H. G. Frankfurt's notion of "volitional necessity," RThPh 2014/I, p. 75-94.

Sometimes it happens to us to explain our decisions by saying "we just couldn't have done otherwise." In some cases, we use this formula to express an incapacity or a constraint linked to exigencies of a personal nature. What characterizes this sort of constraint upon our choices is, first of all, that it does not compromise our capacity as an agent of decision or of action. Secondly, this experience of necessity is linked to our identity. Thirdly, it is often lived, paradoxically, as being relevant to a high degree of liberty. In this article we study this type of incapacity by notably exploring the idea of "volitional necessity" expanded by Harry G. Frankfurt.