Regional Disparities in Divorce Rates Within one Country: The Case of Switzerland[1]

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1   Introduction

Sociological and demographical research focusing on divorce risks can be roughly divided into three groups: (1) institutional context analysis and legal research, (2) the impact of several micro and macro factors and (3) life course factor analysis. In addition, a fourth group can be distinguished: comparisons between countries. Indeed, previous research points to substantial differences in divorce patterns between countries (e. g. Kalmijn 2007); such differences have mostly been studied in Europe. Research on the impact of macro factors has shed light on various aspects, notably cultural impacts (Toth and Kemmelmeier 2009), levels of modernization (Wagner and Weiss 2006), normative tolerance (Kalmijn and Uunk 2007), women's education level (Diekmann and Schmidheiny 2001; Härkönen and Dronkers 2006), wives' employment (Cooke and Gash 2010) and so on.

While cross-national disparities in divorce rates are currently a fairly common research topic, regional differences have seldom been studied. Most regional comparative analyses are in fact cross-national analyses. Different countries, with their own specific history, culture and law, obviously have different divorce patterns. But what about cross-regional analyses within one country? As argued by Mortelmans et al. (2009), the differences in divorce behaviour within one country should not be considered an anomaly. In fact, they offer an opportunity to analyse the impact of micro and macro factors without having to take into account huge differences in legislation and institutional settings, as these are usually identical in all regions within one country. These factors can therefore be controlled, thus offering the possibility of analysing the net effect of regional differences on divorce patterns.

This paper presents a cross-regional analysis of Switzerland's divorce rates and its determinants. Aside for some early analysis in the Unites States (cf. Glenn and Shelton 1985), research on regional divorce patterns has only very recently started to attract interest (Böttcher 2006; Mortelmans et al. 2009; Wang and Zhou 2010;

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Kulu 2012). Very little research has so far been carried out on divorce in Switzerland. However, due to its considerable cultural, economic and political diversity, Switzerland is a good case example for the study of differences within one country. Comparisons between Swiss cantons will fill an important gap in the Swiss literature on divorce as well as contribute to a better understanding of the factors responsible for national and international trends in divorce rates – such as social policies or cultural background. This will particularly be the case if Swiss cantons show unusual divorce patterns.

This paper is organized into 4 sections. Firstly, a theoretical section presenting the Swiss case example and its overall context will look into the development and dynamics of Switzerland's divorce patterns, its political and legal system and previous research focusing on the country (section 2). Secondly, after a section on methodology (section 3), section 4 will describe and compare disparities in divorce rates and divorce trends. Finally, section 5 will analyse and discuss demographic, socioeconomic and cultural factors, and cantonal disparities.

2   Cross-regional divorce disparities in Switzerland

Research on divorce in Switzerland is scarce and mostly consists in descriptive analyses from the Swiss Federal Statistical Office (FSO) (Neury 1979; Zingg 1997; Flaugergues de 2009; Heiniger et al. 2009). These provide an overview of general divorce patterns in Switzerland and serve as a basis for more detailed analyses, which can be divided into two groups. On the one hand, sociologists have mainly focused on explanations based on family structure, life course and life transitions (Wanner 2002; Widmer et al. 2003; Kellerhals and Widmer 2005). On the other hand, demographers and psychologists have emphasized underlying micro and macro factors and identified several interesting connections between social determinants and divorce behaviour (Charton and Wanner 2001; Bodenmann et al. 2006). Very few sociologists focus on macro factors to explain the diversity of divorce patterns in Switzerland and even fewer take geographical factors into account.

However, Switzerland is an excellent case example for the study of differences within one country as each of its 26 cantons can be examined individually. Indeed, cross-cantonal comparison has been used as a basis for two research projects: Wanner's (2000) on the first demographic transition and Lesthaeghe and Neels' (2002) on the second demographic transition. Analysis of the first demographic transition shows that Switzerland did not undergo one but several transitional situations which differed widely from one region to another (Wanner 2000). Lesthaeghe and Neels' work (2002) on the second demographic transition confirms the assumption that each Swiss canton changes in its own individual way and that two sets of cantons can be distinguished: conservative and progressive. Yet none of this research focuses on

divorce patterns. To our knowledge, regional divorce rates in Switzerland have only been studied once, by Schaub and Sermier (1984), based on data from 1980. This study explains differences in cross-cantonal divorce rates through several contextual factors, including financial situation and cultural-normative factors. Schaub and Sermier (1984) conclude – as do the above-mentioned analyses on demographic transition – that Switzerland is an economic as well as a cultural mosaic.

In order to understand regional disparities in divorce patterns in Switzerland, first we need to look at the Swiss context and the country's overall demographic development over time. The following subsections will start with an overview of Swiss history, law and general divorce trends, then examine divorce behaviour in the context of the second demographic transition and finally comment on the explanatory factors chosen to explain divorce patterns in Switzerland in more detail.

2.1 Divorce in Switzerland

Modern Switzerland has its legal origin in the Federal Constitution of 1848. Since then, the institutions and political system have changed very little. However, due to the country's history and in particular to its strong federalist tradition, history, culture, population structure, family policy, local institutions, modernization patterns and economic growth vary considerably among its 26 cantons. This diversity may probably explain why, despite the existence of a central and unified national divorce law, substantial disparities in divorce patterns persist at cantonal level. In fact, since the law was enacted in 1874 and enshrined in the Civil Code in 1907, divorce has been legal in every canton guaranteeing the same access to divorce, though each was able to maintain its procedural and application specificities. The 1874 law remained unchanged until 2000, mainly because it already provided for a so-called "weak-fault regime" (González and Viitanen 2009). Divorce could be obtained if the marriage had irretrievably broken down, without any need to invoke breach of marital contract. This allowed for a degree of flexibility in the interpretation of the legal text. Hence despite the law remaining unchanged over the course of the 20th century, Swiss divorce trends followed European ones.

If we look at divorce trends from 1876 (year when statistical records began) to 2010, five stages can be distinguished (see Figure 1). The four first stages have been analysed extensively by Neury (1979) in his work on the variations of the divorce rate. Started with a low and stable rate (1876–1903), divorce rate explode in 1967 and almost fourfold up to 1999. During the fifth stage, from 1999 onwards, the curve is less regular and the divorce rate is mainly affected by changes in the legislation. With each new amendment (2000, 2004, 2010), the pattern of the curve changes abruptly, with a higher rate the previous year and a lower rate the following, or conversely.

In 2010, Switzerland's crude divorce rate stands at about 2.8‰, clearly above the European average of 2.0‰ (EU-27). Swiss figures were comparable with Bel-

Figure 1   Swiss total divorce rate 1876–2010

1876–1969: Retrospective calculation from the FSO based on VZ and BEVNAT (rates up to 1919 are estima-
tions); 1970–1979: ESPOP; since 1980: PETRA. The four lines (1903, 1950, 1967 and 1999) distinguish the
five stages of the divorce trends in Switzerland.
Source: own calculation based on FSO 1998, 74 and FSO 2011.

gium's and Czech Republic's. Only the Lithuania's rate was higher, whereas all other
European countries had lower rates (Eurostat 2013).

2.2   The second demographic transition

Lesthaeghe and Van de Kaa first mentioned the concept of a second demographic
transition in their article of 1986. Indicators on family behaviour followed similar
patterns in several European countries, but trends defied expectations. Divorce is
one facet of family behaviour that characterises the second demographic transition
and its progression may have brought about one of the most significant changes in
Swiss family structures. The marriage rate declined and Swiss people got married
later; the number of cohabitating couples rose as did the number of divorces; the
birth rate declined but the number of out-of-wedlock births expanded and women
remaining childfree became increasingly common (Flaugergues de 2009). These
changes were similar to those affecting other European countries (Van de Kaa 2002),
despite some Swiss specificities. For example, despite a rise in out-of-wedlock births,
the proportion is still low (18.6%) compared to European standards.

Such particularisms can be observed when comparing countries but also when comparing cantons. Leasthaeghe and Neels (2002, 348) show that the second demographic transition is positively correlated "with Protestantism, early secularisation, a rejection of local particularism and a stronger stress on female autonomy." Thus, they distinguish two sets of cantons: those at the "forefront of innovation" (BS[2], BL, ZH, and SH) and the more conservative ones (VS, FR, OW, NW, UR, AI, and GR). Such disparities are not surprising since each region has its own cultural history and since "the reaction to the diffusion of innovative forms of behaviour [depends] partly on how well new ideas can be incorporated into existing patterns and traditions" (Van de Kaa 2002, 30). Furthermore, we must highlight the fact that each canton has its own specific family characteristics and that there were already substantial disparities between cantons during the first demographic transition (Wanner 2000).

The second demographic transition is "grounded in the rise of the higher order needs" and the development of "individual autonomy and self-actualisation" (Lesthaeghe and Neels 2002, 334–335). Tolerance becomes a prime social value. People seek emotional recognition and work enabling self-realisation, disengage themselves from civic and community-oriented networks and increasingly spurn authority and allegiance to a political party. Within the family, this leads to increased symmetry in gender roles and to greater flexibility in life course planning. Furthermore, considerable growth in life expectancy means individuals can have more than one fresh start in life. Life choices are no longer seen as permanent. As a result, the impact of social pressure has subsided, traditional family values have receded and egalitarian gender relations have become an important social goal, all the more so in urban areas. Over the course of a century, marriage has changed irrevocably from an institution defined by social pressure and the need to survive to one offering the possibility of living as a couple based on love and individual values (Perrot 1987; Prost and Vincent 1987; Singly de 2011). In Van de Kaa's (2002, 24) words "what we see in demographic behaviour is a 'translation' of cultural representations."

2.3   Explanatory factors

According to the second demographic transition theory, periods of social change are characterised by three distinct dimensions: socioeconomic transformation, changes in value systems and technological improvements. Previous research has shown the impact of these dimensions on divorce patterns and regional disparities thereof. Research on the case of Belgium (Mortelmans et al. 2009) revealed the significant role played by cultural-religious traditions and socioeconomic factors. Two Chinese projects (Zeng and Wu 2000; Wang and Zhou 2010) demonstrated the manifold influence of economic growth on the regional rise in divorce rates. An Austrian case study (Kulu 2012) focused on urban-rural differences, socioeconomic characteristics and urbanisation level. In Germany, Böttcher (2006) discussed the

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2   Cantons full names can be found in "Appendix 1: Key data used."

effect of women's employment on marital stability. Accordingly, one would expect Swiss divorce patterns to be equally influenced by demographic, socioeconomic and cultural factors. This article will analyse these three dimensions to understand disparities in Swiss divorce rates.

1. Demographic factors: Since divorce behaviour is a component of the second demographic transition, we expect the other variables of population change to have an impact. The divorce rate should fluctuate alongside marriage rate and fertility trends (Flaugergues de 2009): indeed, it is widely accepted that married couples with children are less likely to get divorced than childless couples (e. g. Charton and Wanner 2001; Mortelmans et al. 2009; Kulu 2012); in addition, marriage is a prerequisite for divorce. Over the past thirty years, indicators of population change maintained the same trends but their development slowed down: the crude birth rate declined moderately from 12‰ to 10‰ while the crude marriage rate intensified then whittled down again before stabilising at around 5.5‰ (FSO 2012a). As for the divorce rate, it rises constantly. Consequently, crude birth rate and crude marriage rate could be expected to have the same impact on the divorce rate than shown in Schaub and Sermier's (1984) analyses, though in a less pronounced manner than in the 1980s.

2. Socioeconomic factors: The second demographic transition is partly a consequence of society's increased wealth. The socioeconomic situation should therefore have a substantial impact on divorce rates since it indicates the level of satisfaction of basic material needs. In other words, the better the socioeconomic situation, the higher the divorce rate (Wang and Zhou 2010; Kulu 2012). This should especially hold true for Switzerland where "the second demographic transition is most clearly connected to urbanity and economic development" (Lesthaeghe and Neels 2002, 349). Moreover, this should entail regional disparities as economic growth differs widely from one canton to another. We therefore expect weakly urbanised agricultural cantons to have a lower divorce rate and cantons with a good socioeconomic situation to have a higher divorce rate.

3. Cultural factors: Finally, it is expected that divorce patterns would be influenced by cultural values, and particularly individualism and non-traditional families values (Toth and Kemmelmeier 2009), as previous research has shown that cultural factors play an important part in explaining fertility and family behaviour (cf. Kulu 2012). In the past few decades, Swiss family structures underwent a sea change and individual behaviour and expectations were deeply modified (Stutz et al. 2008). This goes hand in hand with cultural and social transformations and a reorganization of family structures. Individualism and non-traditional values could therefore be expected to have a strong impact on divorce in Switzerland. Previous analyses demonstrated that Swiss cantons can be classified according to their attitude to religious and family

values, with one group characterized by traditional family values and a high proportion of Catholics and the other by a higher proportion of Protestants and a more open-minded mind-set (Schaub and Sermier 1984; Lesthaeghe and Neels 2002). The former are expected to have a lower divorce rate and the latter a higher one.

To sum up, regional disparities in divorce patterns should be influenced by three dimensions: family behaviour, socioeconomic situation and cultural values. Cantons should therefore form two distinct groups: on the one hand the less urbanized cantons with traditional familial behaviour, a rural economy and conservative values; and on the other hand, the more urbanized cantons with a more modern attitude towards the family, a stronger tertiary sector and a progressive outlook.

3　　Data and method

This research is based on data which consists of various demographic, political, economic and value-based indicators at cantonal level. Each three analysed dimension is covered by several variables, which are based on the Swiss federal census and on register data at regional level provided by the FSO[3]. The year of reference for the analyses is 2010, but trends over the past twenty years are also taken into consideration as this research aims to explain long-term regional disparities in divorce rates rather than short-term fluctuations.

Divorce as a dependant variable is operationalized by the total divorce rate. This is "the proportion of marriages which will end in divorce for each length of marriage, should the divorce patterns of the reference year persist" (FSO 2012b), and is expressed in percentage. We chose this indicator over the crude divorce rate because the number of divorces is expressed in relation to the number of marriages rather than the total population. Moreover, as this research uses aggregate data at cantonal level, the total divorce rate fits better with the analyses. Nevertheless, the crude divorce rate is also used in the analyses as it provides divorce metrics in real time and not just projections. Both of these indicators have some weaknesses – population it refers to and cases which are not taken into account – which should not be forgotten when it comes to interpretations of further analyses.

The selection of the explanatory factors was made in accordance with the second demographic transition theory, but it also was significantly influenced by data availability at cantonal level. Unfortunately, data on a number of variables is only available for groups of three to five cantons. For instance, it was not possible to analyse the impact of women part-time work but only the impact of women full-time work on divorce. Another difficulty arose from differences between cantons.

3　　Details about variables and their source can be found in the "Appendix 2: Variables."

In AI, for example, the political system does not take into account political parties. This canton could therefore not be included in the multivariate analyses. However, the explanatory variables were chosen in such a way that each of the three dimensions would be operationalized with enough variables for them to be relevant and in order to have a coherent set of data. For this article, 19 variables have been selected, and each of the three dimensions is covered by six or seven variables in the analyses.

1. Demographic behaviour: The dimension of demographic behaviour is mainly represented through three family events – marriage, birth and divorce – which are of great importance in the second demographic transition. Two variables represent each event: the situation in 2010 (crude marriage rate, rate of out-of-wedlock births, and crude divorce rate) and the trend since 1990 (variations in the crude marriage rate, in the crude birth rate, and in the total divorce rate). All trends indicators are calculated by subtracting the 1990 level from the 2010 without taking into account the initial level. Finally, as an indicator of all three family events, the average number of people per household in 2010 was used.

2. Socioeconomic situation: The variables chosen have to be significant enough to cover "the accentuation of individual autonomy and self-actualisation" (Lesthaeghe and Neels 2002) and changes brought about by increased female participation in the workforce. Variables therefore cover the urbanisation process, social policy and women's employment. We chose the seven following: percentage of urban population in 2010, rate of tertiary-educated individuals in 2000, rate of primary sector workers in 2008, numbers in day-care centres per 1 000 children under the age of seven from 1985 to 2008, rate of individuals receiving social assistance benefits, unemployment rate, and percentage of women working full-time, the last three for 2010.

3. Cultural values: The factors used have to be relevant for measuring individualism and family values. According to the literature, religious and political indicators would be adequate (Inglehart and Baker 2000; Mortelmans et al. 2009; Kulu 2012). Analyses were based on the percentage of Catholics, percentage of people with no religious affiliation (2000 figures) and Christian Democratic Political Party (CDP) representation in cantonal parliament (2010 figures). Religious indicators point to traditional or less traditional attitudes towards the family, community cohesion and degree of importance granted to the community, while Christian Democrats are known to support traditional family values. Finally, cultural background could also be operationalized through the votes Swiss people have to take part in. We chose three different votes on family issues: the 2002 vote on abortion, same-sex registered partnership in 2005 and child benefit in 2006. The percentage of "yes" answers was retained as an indicator for the three votes. Vote 1: A broad majority voted in favour of an amendment unifying the abortion laws and introducing a 12 weeks deadline. The CDP opposed this amendment, as did most religious associations, invoking

the value of every new life. Vote 2: Registered partnership provided same-sex couples with a legal framework as well as a new set of rights. The opponents mostly focused on upholding the traditional values of marriage and family. Unsurprisingly, the referendum committee included fundamentalist Christian associations and traditional right-wing parties. Vote 3: A minimum standard was introduced for child benefit to recognise the fundamental social role played by families and the solidarity parents deserve. Those arguing against this law were the conservative parties and especially those opposing new taxes for businesses and individuals.

The methodological approach in this article is quite similar to Schaub and Sermier's (1984) and Lesthaeghe and Neels' (2002), and allows temporal comparisons over the last thirty years. Results are divided into two main parts. Firstly, regional disparities of divorce rates within Switzerland are presented (i. e. between cantons). This focuses on descriptive statistical analyses in order to situate each canton in relation to the others and to the Swiss average. Secondly, major factors that might contribute to regional disparities are analysed. Emphasis is placed on explanatory factors drawn from the three above-mentioned dimensions; these are discussed based on correlation matrices, factor analysis and linear regression (OLS). As several independent variables are highly correlated, regression analyses are based on the factors obtained from the factor analysis (cf. Dubach et al. 2009). Furthermore, as the database contains only 26 cases, it is accepted that only two to three explanatory factors should be used for the regression (cf. Bonoli 2008). Therefore, different models were built, each taking 2 factors into account.

Several limits of the following analyses have to be mentioned. Firstly, macro-analysis on aggregate data always presents some risks of ecological fallacy. Some of the results presented below may result from a logical fallacy in the interpretation of the statistical results. Furthermore, the analyses will permit to make assumption on macro-trends to differ cantonal patterns, but they will not permit to explain individual reasons for breaking a union. Nevertheless, even with this weakness, similar analyses present interesting results when comparing cantons and this article should bring the same quality of information (e. g. Bühler 2001; Bonoli 2008; Manatschal 2011). It is also to notice that micro-data available for cantonal comparison are missing in Switzerland. Secondly, when comparing cantonal disparities it is important to remember that individuals are moving. The question of inside-migration could be of great importance concerning the limits of theses analyses. However, previous researches showed that inside-migration regarding couple-behaviours seems to be selective migration but that it does not influence the spatial differences in divorce patterns (cf. Gautier et al. 2009; Kulu 2012). Lastly, divorce, besides being a social phenomenon, is an individual decision that implies emotions, personal values and the couple's history. This article will not discuss theses aspects in the comparison between cantons. It will not either take into account the events that lead to the decision of divorcing.

4   Cantonal divorce behaviour and divorce trends

Divorce patterns show significant and stable differences between cantons. The following two figures should clarify the position of the cantons in relation to each other and give a more precise overview of their specific developments. Firstly, the 2010 crude divorce rate is cross-tabulated with 1990–2010 divorce variations and secondly, crude divorce rates are compared over the past twenty years. This enabled us to form groups of cantons with similar evolutions and to compare them to other groupings resulting from previous research (Schaub and Sermier 1984; Lesthaeghe and Neels 2002).

Ever since the establishment of a cantonal report of demographic statistics in Switzerland, there have been substantial regional differences in divorce rates. Traditionally, Switzerland was, and still partly is, divided into two categories of cantons: historically Protestant cantons with a high level of industrial development; and mainly Catholic cantons with a majority of agricultural workers. Differences seem to have intensified in the past decades and are quite sharp today (Rothmayr 2004). However, concerning divorce, Schaub and Sermier (1984) assumed that cantonal disparities will tend to fade over time. In fact, when reiterating their analysis thirty years on (see figure 2), the correlation between the 2010 crude divorce rate and its variation over time has declined from strongly negative in 1980 (–0.66) to statistically insignificant in 2010 (0.173).

Taking the Swiss average as a reference, the cantons can be divided into four groups corresponding to each quadrant:

1. NE, BS, SO, JU, and AR;
2. TG, TI, VS, FR, AI, NW, SG, SZ, UR, BE, and AG;
3. GE, ZH, and VD;
4. BL, SH, ZG, GR, LU, GL, and OW.

These four groups differ from those presented by Schaub and Sermier (1984). Thirty years on, several cantons are positioned in other quadrants in relation to the Swiss average. For instance, JU and NW were both below the Swiss average in 1980. Today, JU's crude divorce rate and growth are higher than the Swiss average, whereas NW, with what has remained a low crude divorce rate, is well over the Swiss average in terms of growth. Nonetheless, the major finding of Schaub and Sermier (1984) is still true: cantons with a low divorce rate have a high increase, suggesting that some sort of homogenization is still at work. Cantons with a lower crude divorce rate and a higher growth in relation to the Swiss average are the largest of the four groups; most of them have a Catholic majority – except for BE and TG – and are mostly agricultural.

However, the position of the 26 cantons in relation to the Swiss average has not changed drastically over the past twenty or even thirty years, which would tend

Figure 2   Crude divorce rate in 2010 and its evolution since 1990 in the
                  Swiss cantons

Source: BEVNAT (see Appendix 1).

to confirm that differences between cantons remain stable. On the one hand, the crude divorce rate rose in all cantons – in fact the correlation between the 1990 rate and the 2010 rate is strong (0.778**), which is an evidence of the generalization of divorce – and, on the other hand, the gap between the cantonal rates and the average Swiss crude divorce rate shrank slightly. The gap between highest and lowest crude divorce rate receded from 2.6 in 1980, to 2.2 in 2010 (maxima 3.6‰ in NE and minima 1.4‰ in UR), but disparities between cantons in 2010 remain significant.

If the 2010 crude divorce rate is cross-tabulated with 1990 figures (figure 3) and cantons positioned in relation to the Swiss average, four groups are obtained. These are fairly similar to those described by Schaub and Sermier (1984, 477).

1. GE, ZH, BS, NE, VD, and SO. They already featured in this category in Schaub and Sermier's (1984) analyses.
2. JU and AR.
3. BL and SH.
4. ZG, TI, SG, VS, GR, LU, SZ, FR, NW, AI, OW, GL, UR, BE, TG, and AG. These remain in the same position as thirty years ago, except for four of them (BE, AG, ZG, and TG).

Figure 3   Crude divorce rate 1990 and 2010 in the Swiss cantons

Source: BEVNAT (see Appendix 1).

Presenting data this way allows us to place each canton into either of two main groups (quarter 1 and 4), as only four cantons have changed position over time (quarter 2 and 3). Thus the "progressive" and "conservative" groups described by Lesthaeghe and Neels (2002, 348) appear. Only BL and SH no longer fit in the same group (progressive) and are now categorized as "outsiders." The second noteworthy fact is the small number of cantons in group 2 and 3. This is a clear indication of stability and an evidence of persistent differences in divorce patterns.

To summarize, two main results are of particular importance up to this point: stability and disparities. The relative position of several cantons in relation to the Swiss average has not changed much since the first studies on the subject: cantons remain in the same progressive or conservative category. Despite a trend towards gradual homogenization, differences between cantons persist and remain significant in 2010. In Switzerland as in other countries, the context seems to matter and analysing regional disparities will therefore be relevant to understand macro factors influencing divorce.

5   Factors explaining divorce disparities

The Swiss cantons differ from each other in terms of demographic, socioeconomic, and cultural background. The previous descriptive analyses suggest that permanent differences exist between cantons and that they can be broadly divided into two main groups. As a reminder, according to the second demographic transition theory and previous researches about Switzerland, these two groups should be confirmed by further analyses on divorce determinants.

   With regard to demographic behaviour, a high divorce rate, a decrease in the number of marriages, a declining birth rate, growing numbers of out-of-wedlock births, and a lower number of people living in a same household should normally be associated. In terms of socioeconomic factors, cantons with a high divorce rate should have experienced a greater increase in the number of day-care centres, have a higher percentage of tertiary-educated individuals, women working full-time and urban population, and low rates of agricultural workers, social assistance and unemployment. Regarding cultural attitudes, we expect a high divorce rate to be associated with less traditional views on family issues and therefore with a higher number of positive votes on the three aforementioned votes, a higher proportion of people with no religious affiliation, and a lower percentage of Catholics and CDP representatives.

   The next three subsections present the results of the correlation matrices and discuss each variable. A fourth subsection presents the findings of the factor analysis and regression analyses.

5.1   Demographic behaviours

Regarding the bivariate correlation between total divorce rate and the 6 independent variables selected (Table 1), only four relations are statistically significant. This suggests that the demographic dimension has a weaker explanatory capacity on cantonal disparities than could have been suspected following the second demographic transition's theory and previous researches.

   Unsurprisingly, the crude divorce rate is strongly correlated with the total divorce rate, but this is not the case for total divorce rate variations between 1990 and 2010. As discussed in section 4, this can indicate homogenization between cantons. Variations in the crude marriage rate are not correlated either. Instead, attitudes regarding childbearing are correlated with the divorce rate. Cantons with a drop in the birth rate and a surge in out-of-wedlock births also have a high divorce rate. Consequently, fewer children, less marriages and more divorces are combined with a decreasing average number of persons per household.

   These results confirm that children are an important factor (Schaub and Sermier 1984; Mortelmans et al. 2009; Kulu 2012): where there are more children per family, and thus in all likelihood a more traditional fertility pattern, there are

Table 1   Demographic behaviours: Pearsons Correlation Coefficients

	Total divorce rate 2010	N
Crude divorce rate 2010	0.913***	26
Out-of-wedlock births 2010	0.545*	26
Evolution in crude birth rate 1990–2010	0.529*	26
Average number of people per household 2010	−0.481*	26
Evolution in total divorce rate 1990–2010	0.252	26
Evolution in crude marriage rate 1990–2010	0.165	26

Sign. Levels: $* \leq 0.05$; $** \leq 0.01$; $*** \leq 0.001$.
Source: Own calculation. Data sources: see Appendix 2.

also fewer divorces. The influence of children over individuals divorce decision is largely documented in sociological research. However, there is an on-going debate about the postponement of divorce: do children really reduce the risk of divorce, or do they only delay it? Swiss research on this topic opts for delay (Charton and Wanner 2001; Forney 2009; Wanner et al. 2009): the risk of divorce increases as children grow older so that two periods appears to be critical for couples, three to five years after the youngest child's birth and when the oldest turns twenty. Nevertheless, the findings from the cross-cantonal comparison on aggregate data supports the assumption that children have a genuine impact on reducing divorce, as did results for Austria (Kulu 2012) and those for Belgium (Mortelmans et al. 2009). Even if this result should be explored in more details, as it could be ensuing of the interpretation at an aggregate level.

On the issue of marriage, the bivariate correlation indicates that divorce patterns have changed in the past thirty years or at least that other factors now play a more important role in explaining divorce differences between cantons. Today's divorce rate does not fluctuate alongside the marriage rate as used to be the case (Schaub and Sermier 1984; Flaugergues de 2009). A high or moderately reduced marriage rate no longer seems to be connected with a high divorce rate or a strong increase in divorce rate. If this trend continues, the number of married couples will plunge. On the other hand, looking at the long-term progression of total first marriage rate and total divorce rate, both are close to 60% but neither crosses that threshold (FSO 2012a).

5.2 Socioeconomic situation

Factors pertaining to the socioeconomic situation are more highly correlated with the total divorce rate than demographic behaviour variables (Table 2). This first observation fully meets the expectation that socioeconomic factors should have a substantial impact on divorce patterns in Switzerland. Six of the seven variables

Table 2   Socioeconomic situation: Pearsons Correlation Coefficients

	Total divorce rate 2010	N
Unemployment rate 2010	0.725***	26
Evolution in the number of day-care centres 1985–2008	0.654***	26
Urban population 2010	0.643***	26
Percentage of agricultural employees 2008	−0.589***	26
Social assistance rate 2010	0.579***	26
Percentage of tertiary-educated individuals 2000	0.502***	26
Women working full-time 2010	−0.385	26

Sign. Levels: * ≤0.05; ** ≤0.01; *** ≤0.001.
Source: Own calculation. Data sources: see Appendix 2.

are highly correlated (sign. level < 0.001). But the overview of this correlation hides surprising relations which run counter to the hypotheses allowed by the second demographic transition theory.

As expected, the greater the urban population, the higher the proportion of educated people and the higher the increase in the number of day-care centres, the higher the divorce rate. Conversely, cantons with a higher percentage of agricultural workers show a lower divorce rate. More striking is that higher rates of social assistance and unemployment are also correlated with a higher number of marriages breaking up, and that this is associated with a lower proportion of women working full-time. Nevertheless, according to Lesteaghe and Neels (2002), the Swiss second demographic transition is clearly correlated with urbanity and economic wealth. Though the correlation table supports the role of urbanity it does not indicate that a good socioeconomic situation leads to high divorce rates. On the contrary, it seems that economically unstable cantons have a higher divorce rate and that this factor has a great deal of influence. On this point, Switzerland differs from Austria, China, Belgium and other countries analysed in previous research (Mortelmans et al. 2009; Wang and Zhou 2010; Kulu 2012).

This fact can be explained by two options, following the idea that the first demographic transition brought about a substantial increase in economic well-being enabling people to focus on "higher order needs" during the second transition. Firstly, the second transition is over and Switzerland may now be entering a third transition which has yet to be defined. Secondly, as Switzerland has rather high standards of economic well-being compared to other countries, the three variables – social assistance rate, unemployment rate and women working full-time – are indicators for another important social phenomenon. The second explanation seems more convincing. Indeed, urbanity, economic wealth and divorce are generally associated with single-parent families and more specifically single-mothers with dependent children. This would suffice to explain why high divorce rates are correlated with

high rates of unemployment, social assistance and low rates of women working full-time. In fact, single-mother families are considerably overrepresented among those receiving social assistance benefits; single mothers also often go through a phase of unemployment after separating and are less likely to work full-time due to lack of time, insufficient childcare facilities and taxes family-arrangements (Stutz et al. 2008). Furthermore, this phenomenon is more common in urban centres than in rural areas. This hypothesis will be examined further in sub-section 4 using factor analysis. Nevertheless, the causality between these three variables and divorce rate could also be the other way around. Especially, financial troubles could initiate more tensions and so lead to divorce. But several recent researches tend to prove that economic hardship is a poor predictor of marriage dissolution (Andersen 2005; Harknett and Schneider 2012).

On the issue of urbanity the results of the correlation analyses fully meet expectations derived from the second demographic transition. The divorce rate appears to remain higher in cantons with a higher degree of urbanisation and a lower percentage of agricultural workers (Schaub and Sermier 1984; Lesthaeghe and Neels 2002). The relationship between these socioeconomic variables and divorce pattern remains unchallenged. But unlike other countries, urbanisation in Switzerland is less correlated with wealth and high income (Kulu 2012).

5.3 Cultural values

Contrary to what would have been expected according to Toth and Kemmelmeier (2009), the variables chosen to operationalize the cultural dimension are not that strongly correlated with the total divorce rate (Table 3). Only half of the six variables are. This result shows that cultural values only play a minor role in cantonal differences, but at least all correlation signs go the way they were expected.

A higher number of people with no religious affiliation, fewer Catholics and a higher acceptance of abortion in 2002 have a significant correlation with the total divorce rate, whereas the two other votes and CDP representation do not. Concerning correlation signs, all three votes show a positive correlation as does the proportion of people with no religious affiliation. In addition, percentages of Catholics and CDP representatives in parliament have a negative correlation. These results meet expectations derived from the second demographic transition theory, though they were expected to be more pronounced.

The influence of individualism on divorce variations no longer needs to be demonstrated. In accordance with Toth and Kemmelmeier (2009), correlations show that stronger individual values and therefore weakened community-oriented and traditional family values are associated with a higher divorce rate. The relationship between religion and divorce also remains unchanged (Schaub and Sermier 1984; Lesthaeghe and Neels 2002) and, as two of the three significant correlations, religious variables have a high differentiation capacity. Having said that, it is worth notic-

Table 3   Cultural values: Pearsons Correlation Coefficients

	Total divorce rate 2010	N
No religious affiliation 2000	0.584***	26
Pro-abortion 2002	0.528***	26
Catholics 2000	−0.409*	26
Pro child benefit 2006	0.353	26
Pro same-sex patnership 2005	0.316	26
CDP representation in cantonal parliament 2010	−0.383	26

Sign. Levels: $* \leq 0.05$; $** \leq 0.01$; $*** \leq 0.001$.
Source: Own calculation. Data sources: see Appendix 2.

ing that the influence of religion on the divorce rate is the subject of much debate, especially because religion is less important a factor in itself than as an indication of strong support for social norms (Charton and Wanner 2001).

Concerning the lack of significance of three political variables, it could be argued that politics have no bearing on family behaviour such as divorce. This would run counter to findings from previous research (Mortelmans et al. 2009; Kulu 2012). Either that or the chosen variables do not operationalize what they were expected to. The CDP is originally a catholic-conservative party focusing on traditional family values. It is conceivable that its supporters may have become more concerned with other issues, despite the party still stoutly defending traditional views. Acceptance of child benefit indicates that Swiss people tend to favour solidarity when it comes to supporting the social role played by families. A refuse would not necessary have meant a dismissal of family values but a rebuttal of a new tax. Finally, the issue of same-sex registered partnership may be too likely to give rise to individual feelings of homophobia to be considered as a question purely on traditional family values – even though arguments during the campaign did emphasize these.

The main point is that cultural values oriented through individualism and non-traditionalism are indeed related to divorce rates. This fits with the broad theory of the second demographic transition, even though this result is not very pronounced. However, the explanatory capacity of the cultural dimension on cantonal disparities in divorce rate is stronger for Switzerland than it seems to be for Austria (Kulu 2012).

5.4   The influence of four factors on divorce patterns

Having examined each of the three dimensions separately, the objective now is to find out which of the three plays the most important part in explaining cantonal disparities in the divorce rate. It will also be interesting to check whether the above interpretations are confirmed by further analyses.

Table 4   Factor loadings of principal component analysis

	Factor			
	1	2	3	4
Urban population 2010	0.890	0.107	0.068	−0.095
Percentage of agricultural employees 2008	−0.827	−0.338	−0.150	−0.178
Percentage of tertiary-educated individuals 2000	0.825	0.319	0.026	0.232
Evolution in the number of day-care centres 1985–2008	0.695	0.188	0.436	0.258
Average number of people per household 2010	−0.684	−0.481	−0.200	0.021
Crude divorce rate 2010	0.677	0.248	0.533	−0.266
No religious affiliation 2000	0.657	0.527	0.357	0.058
Pro same-sex partnership votes 2005	0.633	0.616	−0.081	0.119
Evolution in crude birth rate 1990–2010	0.601	0.344	0.417	0.399
CDP representation in cantonal parliament 2010	−0.263	−0.863	−0.151	−0.014
Catholics 2000	−0.289	−0.858	−0.023	0.050
Pro-abortion votes 2002	0.492	0.714	0.348	0.069
Social assistance rate 2010	0.409	0.589	0.560	−0.028
Pro child benefit votes 2006	−0.054	0.052	0.870	0.094
Women working full-time 2010	−0.039	0.051	−0.747	0.069
Unemployment rate 2010	0.434	0.119	0.746	0.153
Out-of-wedlock births 2010	0.329	0.340	0.685	0.021
Evolution in crude marriage rate 1990–2010	0.145	−0.275	0.150	0.758
Evolution in total divorce rate 1990–2010	−0.015	−0.488	0.146	−0.720
Explained variance	51.9%	12.5%	7.8%	6.7%

Note: Rotation: Varimax. Kaiser criterium, eigenvalue = 1. N = 25 (AI could not be integrated in these analyses). Source: Own calculation. Data sources: see Appendix 2.

Factor analysis (Table 4) was used to reduce the number of independent variables (19) and resolve the high correlation between several of them. 78.9 % of global variance can be explained by four factors. The first factor alone explains 51.9% of the dispersion and the second 12.5%. For the interpretation of the factors, focus is placed on the loadings which are higher than 0.50.

The first factor has a positive relation to urban population, tertiary-educated individuals, growth in the number of day-care centres, crude divorce rate, people with no religious affiliation, support for same-sex registered partnership and decrease in the crude birth rate; and a negative relation to the percentage of agricultural workers and to a high average number of persons within a household. The four strongest loadings are socioeconomic variables and more specifically the variable related to urbanity. Urban areas are well-known to have fewer persons per household, higher divorce rates, lower birth rates, a greater number of same-sex couples, as well as

more people with no religious affiliation (Bovay and Broquet 2004). This first factor therefore clearly stands for urbanisation process.

Factor 2 is negatively linked to percentage of CDP representatives and percentage of Catholics, but positively linked to pro-abortion and pro same-sex registered partnership votes, as well as to the social assistance rate and those with no religious affiliation. Considering that all variables, one excepted, belong to the cultural dimension, this factor is clearly linked to cultural-normative aspect. With regard to the direction of the links, factor 2 leans towards a modern or progressive attitude towards the family. It will therefore be referred to as "pro progressive family values." The only question is how rates of social assistance relate to this. This could be linked to the fact that "modern" families are often single-parent families or blended families, which both have to be considered as financial risk groups (Stutz et al. 2008).

The third factor is positively linked to votes in favour of child benefit, unemployment rate, out-of-wedlock births, percentage of social assistance and crude divorce rate, whereas it is negatively linked to women working full-time. It is hard to come up with a simple interpretation as variables belong to all three dimensions – demographic behaviour, socioeconomic situation and cultural values. The strongest links correspond to a cultural variable; three links are related to socioeconomic aspects and two to demographic behaviour. Regardless, it is interesting to note that this variable combination corresponds to the idea expressed in sub-section 5.2. As factor 3 includes a decline in the number of women working full-time, higher acceptance of child benefit, higher social assistance and unemployment rates, more out-of-wedlock births and more divorces, it is clearly related to single-parent families, and in particular to the support society provides to such families. As support with a progressive outlook would probably mean more rather than fewer women working full-time, factor 3 stands for a "traditional way to support single-parent families."

Finally, factor 4 is positively linked to variations in the crude marriage rate and negatively linked to variations in the total divorce rate. As both links indicate a decline – a decreasing number of marriages and an increase in the number of divorce – this factor represents a decrease of demographic couple-related behaviour.

Taking the four factors two by two to proceed to regression analyses, seven different explanatory models are built[4] (Table 5).

The factor which explains the greatest part of the distribution and with the greatest impact on disparities in divorce pattern between cantons is clearly factor 1: the urbanisation process. The influence of support for single-parent families directly follows whereas decline in couple-related behaviour has a weaker impact and progressive values even less. Factors 1 and 3 together explain over half of the disparities between cantons (0.676). There is a fairly simple reason for this, as factor 1 indicates a favourable or at least not obstructive context for divorce (urbanisation),

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4   The assumptions of the linear regression model have been verified, as have difficulties resulting from the small sample (N = 25).

Table 5   Linear regression (OLS) models. Dependent variable: total divorce
                     rate 2010, standardized coefficients

	Model 1	Model 2	Model 3	Model 4	Model 5	Model 6	Model 7
Factor 1: Urbanisation	0.661***	0.661***	0.661***				0.661***
Factor 2: Progressive family values	0.021			0.021**	0.021		0.021
Factor 3: Support for single-parent family		0.516***		0.516		0.516**	0.516***
Factor 4: Decrease in couple-related behaviour			−0.222	−0.222	−0.222	−0.222	
Adjusted r²	0.386	0.676	0.439	0.200	0.0	0.253	0.661

Note: H0 can not be rejected in Model 5 (ANOVA sig. = 0.572). Sign. Levels: * ≤ 0.05; ** ≤ 0.01; *** ≤ 0.001.
N = 25.
Source: Own calculation. Data sources: see Appendix 2.

whereas factor 3 indicates the opportunity costs of divorce, in other words, whether or not there are an enabling environment and enabling policy instruments. It is worth noting that r^2 has not increased (0.661) after adding factor 2 to the model (model 7). It would seem that even though factor 2 is a useful explanatory factor for cantonal disparities (12.5% of the variance), it can largely be explained by the urbanisation process (factor 1).

These results are consistent with the findings presented previously. The urbanisation process remains the main factor explaining cantonal disparities in total divorce rates, closely followed by the way cantons' social policy struggles with single-parent family issues. Demographic behaviour seems on the contrary to have lost some of its explanatory capacity over the past thirty years. Though Schaub and Sermier's (1984) results emphasized the importance of several types of behaviour such as fertility or marriage rate, results presented here downplay their importance and highlight the trend towards a decline of the couple; these results also put forward variables that belong more in the socioeconomic, political and cultural category to explain differences between cantons. On this point, the results of this paper tally with Lesteaghe and Neels' (2002), which pointed out that the second demographic transition in Switzerland is clearly linked to urbanisation and economic development. Even cultural differences between cantons concerning family values seem to result from the whole context of urbanisation.

Finally, cantons are ranked by their values for each of the four factors (see values in Appendix 1). For ranking on factor 1, the more urbanized cantons are BS, GE, and ZH and the less urbanized UR, GL, and OW. If factor 2 does indeed indicate progressive family values, then the forefront of innovation would be VD, NE, BE, and BL among others, whereas the more traditional group would include

VS, TI, OW, SZ, and NW, which are also distinctly catholic and agricultural cantons. Taking factor 3, cantons with the most support for single-parent families are JU, NE, TI, and VD, whereas ZG, NW, and GL have the most negative values. Finally (factor 4), OW, GE, ZH, and TI have the fewest instances of registered couple-related behaviour and NW, NE, and AR the most. To sum up, two groups can be highlighted. On the one hand, GE, VD, BS, ZH, and NE constitute a group with similar patterns: high divorce rate, progressive view of the family and more urbanised. On the other hand, NW, SZ, GR, and AR form a more traditional and rural group.

6   Conclusion

This paper presents a cross-regional analysis of Switzerland's divorce rates, which is a surprisingly uncommon type of comparison. The aim was to analyse the impact of three distinct dimensions – socioeconomic situation, demographic behaviours and cultural values – on divorce patterns and regional disparities thereof. According to recent research, this type of analysis should be conducted more often as it contributes to bring new momentum to the debate on divorce determinants responsible for national and international trends (Mortelmans et al. 2009; Wang and Zhou 2010; Kulu 2012). As said in the introduction, this will particularly be the case, regarding our analyses, if the 26 cantons show unusual divorce patterns.

The first finding of this paper is that there are still cantonal disparities in divorce patterns – doubtless a consequence of Swiss federalism – and no significant movement toward homogenization. In fact, the 26 Swiss cantons still display substantial differences, despite common trends in terms of rising divorce rates, divorce patterns, general attitudes towards the family and a unified national divorce law. It is worth noting that the position of the 26 cantons in relation to the Swiss average has changed very little and remains similar to what it was thirty years ago (Schaub and Sermier 1984).

When ranking Swiss cantons in terms of divorce patterns, the forefront is formed by progressive and urban cantons having the highest indices of economic hardship (GE, VD, BS, ZH, NE), whereas the group of cantons with the lowest divorce rates is made up of more traditional, rural and economically robust cantons (NW, SZ, GR). This grouping is consistent with the Lesthaeghe and Neels's (2002) reasoning on the second demographic transition, whereby demographic changes, such as a growth in divorce, result from greater female autonomy, increased urbanity, higher educational levels, more tertiary sector workers and so on. The only discrepancy concerns economic development. The second demographic transition theory points out the impact of wealth, whereas the findings of this article show that high social assistance and unemployment rates are correlated with high divorce rate.

This represents the first point to be discussed. Among the three chosen dimensions, the socioeconomic situation explains best the Swiss divorce disparities. But, Switzerland does not appear to follow the generally established model. Indeed, it is not the most economically developed cantons that have the highest divorce rate, but instead those experiencing economic difficulties. Nonetheless, Switzerland could be considered a wealthy country and its economic weaknesses could be seen as relative – which would be the easy explanation. Switzerland's socioeconomic failings are not that substantial, but they seem to be systematically focused on families. In fact, the results of this paper point on the impact of "support for single-parent families," in other words, on the impact of social policies. The cantons in which the level of support is higher also present higher divorce rate probably because the opportunity costs of divorce, mainly for women, are lower. This factor remains important under control of "urbanisation" and explains the divorce disparities far better than "progressive family values." Further researches should therefore investigate questions about social assistance, unemployment and the socioeconomic situation in more details. Furthermore, it would be interesting to analyse whether the explanatory capacity of social assistance rates weakens where social policies focus specifically on single-parent families and work-life balance, which, if it does, would be of great interest for policy makers.

Surprisingly, concerning the demographic behaviour dimension this paper shows that it is no longer a potent explanatory dimension in Switzerland. Though many researches about children's influence on divorce claim that married couples with children are at considerably less risk of divorcing than childless couples, Swiss cantonal disparities in divorce rate are mostly not related to birth rate or to marriage. The trend towards a decline in the number of married couples – due to fewer marriages and more divorces – has only a weak impact on cantonal differences. In addition, there are also indications regarding the importance of children, but on a more cultural level as this concerns out-of-wedlock births and the way Swiss people view children's importance in the society. Two points are here to be discussed: a logical fallacy when interpreting aggregate data and the specific relation between marriage and divorce rates. In fact, it is possible that the interpretation of children's importance at an aggregate level is biased by the importance of "urbanisation." The hidden mechanism should be explored more deeply especially if there are differences between individual and aggregate level – as it is supposed. Regarding marriage, since it is definitively a prerequisite to divorce, the lack of explaining power is probably due to a compensatory or selective effect. In both cases, more attention should be given to the effect of the first, second and following marriages and divorces in further researches.

Finally questions around cultural-normative values stay open. The regression analyses show the major importance of the socioeconomic dimension, which exceeds the relative impact of the others. This is why, despite its obvious influence,

the cultural dimension has little explanatory capacity. Nevertheless, results point out that the cultural factor explains a good part of cantonal disparities in divorce patterns: cantons with rather progressive family and fewer community-oriented values also show higher divorce rates. Even so, progressive cantons deal with issues pertaining to single-parent family using quite traditional policy instruments, such as child benefit and part-time work for women. To precisely define the impact of different cultural norms on divorce disparities in Switzerland, further analyses should probably exclude the socioeconomic factors and focus their interest on votes and commonly accepted idea.

Wealth does not explain everything; social policies have a great impact on family decisions such as divorce; and cultural values might underlie the whole trend. These findings open new perspectives allowing us to understand factors responsible for national and international trends in divorce rates. Further researches could explore the mechanism complexity and the variables linked to the urbanisation or post-modernisation processes. The influence of several socioeconomic variables on divorce should be specified, especially the order of causality should be analysed clearly as several possibilities are theoretically possible. For example, social assistance could be a result of higher divorce rates – because single-parent families are often in financial difficulties – or a trigger for divorce – because financial distress leads to more couple tensions. Questions about in- and outside migration and their impact over regional disparities could also be investigated in more details; particularly as country statistics seldom take into account this phenomenon. Finally, in Switzerland, it would probably be interesting to analyse the impacts of the diverse social policies oriented toward families over divorce trends. This could lead to very interesting results and useful recommendations for policy makers.

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8   Appendix

Appendix 1   Key data on Swiss cantons

Swiss cantons		Total divorce rate		Cantonal factor loadings on factors 1 to 4			
Abbre-viation	Full name	2010	1990	1: Urbani-sation	2: Progressive family values	3: Support for single-parent family	4: Decrease in couple-related behaviour
CH	Switzerland	54.4	33.2	–	–	–	–
AG	Aargau	57.7	30.1	0.44	0.06	−0.54	−0.71
AI	Appenzell Innerrhoden	43.9	12.7	–	–	–	–
AR	Appenzell Ausserrhoden	54.7	27.9	−0.48	0.54	−0.43	−1.05
BE	Bern	52.0	29.4	−0.54	1.27	0.62	−0.25
BL	Basel Landschaft	48.3	37.9	0.03	1.25	−0.17	0.38
BS	Basel Stadt	61.9	35.6	2.00	0.81	0.71	−0.44
FR	Fribourg	54.8	23.1	−0.40	−0.67	0.92	−0.77
GE	Geneva	59.0	49.1	1.69	0.29	0.78	1.91
GL	Glarus	41.7	21.5	−1.41	1.33	−1.24	0.10
GR	Graubünden	41.2	24.8	−0.94	0.70	−0.66	−0.52
JU	Jura	55.0	28.0	−1.01	−0.87	2.20	−0.52
LU	Lucerne	45.7	25.5	−0.40	−0.56	−0.14	0.66
NE	Neuchâtel	61.1	37.4	0.20	1.29	2.00	−1.16
NW	Nidwalden	49.5	16.6	0.82	−0.88	−1.41	−2.51
OW	Obwalden	40.8	21.6	−1.23	−1.00	−0.47	2.25
SG	St. Gallen	53.1	29.3	0.15	−0.57	−0.67	−0.15
SH	Schaffhausen	45.2	35.1	−0.14	1.04	−0.65	0.78
SO	Solothurn	58.9	33.6	0.43	−0.16	0.10	−0.51
SZ	Schwyz	47.0	25.0	0.04	−0.95	−0.95	0.00
TG	Thurgau	57.3	30.4	−0.46	−0.15	−0.32	−0.55
TI	Ticino	59.6	36.3	0.34	−1.43	1.43	0.92
UR	Uri	25.6	7.0	−2.20	−0.25	−0.33	0.44
VD	Vaud	58.3	42.6	−0.12	1.37	0.92	0.49
VS	Valais	55.5	25.9	0.17	−2.40	0.54	−0.33
ZG	Zug	49.1	30.9	1.48	−0.50	−1.61	0.40
ZH	Zurich	55.3	38.3	1.53	0.45	−0.63	1.13

Data sources: see Appendix 2.

Appendix 2   Variables used in the analyses

Dimension	Variable	Date	FSO source	Remark
Demographic	Total divorce rate 2010	2010	BEVNAT	
Demographic	Total divorce rate 1990	1990	BEVNAT	
Demographic	Evolution in total divorce rate 1990–2010	1990–2010	BEVNAT (own calculation)	Subtracting 1990 level from 2010 level
Demographic	Crude divorce rate 2010	2010	BEVNAT	
Demographic	Evolution in crude birth rate 1990–2010	1990–2010	BEVNAT (own calculation)	Subtracting 1990 level from 2010 level
Demographic	Percentage of all out of wedlock births	2010	BEVNAT	
Demographic	Evolution in crude marriage rate 1990–2010	1990–2010	BEVNAT (own calculation)	Subtracting 1990 level from 2010 level
Demographic	Average number of people per household	2010	Structural survey	
Socioeconomic	Evolution in the number of day-care centres per 1000 children under age 7 1985–2008	1985–2008	RE / ESPOP	
Socioeconomic	Percentage of tertiary-educated individuals	2000	Federal Census	
Socioeconomic	Percentage of agricultural employees	2008	JOBSTAT	
Socioeconomic	Social assistance benefits rate	2010	SAS / STATPOP	
Socioeconomic	Unemployment rate	2010	SLFS	
Socioeconomic	Percentage of urban population	2010	CENV	
Socioeconomic	Women working full-time 2010	2010	SLFS	Full-time means 90%–100%
Cultural	Christian Democratic Political Party representation in cantonal parliament	2010	Election statistics	AI has no indications
Cultural	Percentage of Catholics	2000	Federal Census	
Cultural	Percentage of people with no religious affiliation	2000	Federal Census	
Cultural	Pro-abortion	2002	Election statistics	"Yes" answer percentage
Cultural	Pro same-sex registered partnership	2005	Election statistics	"Yes" answer percentage
Cultural	Pro child benefits	2006	Election statistics	"Yes" answer percentage

Cohésion sociale et pluralisme culturel

Alexis Clotaire Némoiby Bassolé

L'agir clandestin

Agentivité de migrants ouest-africains

Les migrants en situation de clandestinité sont caractérisés par un statut provisoire qui introduit une suspension dans l'autorisation de se mouvoir, de demeurer et de faire sujet par sa présence. Statut qui transforme les conditions de survie en un condensé de fragilisations : manque de perspectives pour contenir l'attente, précarisation du mode de vie, potentialisation traumatique de l'incertitude sur le devenir, atteintes à la santé mentale et physique.

Ce livre analyse la tension d'ensemble entre mouvements transnationaux de populations et politiques nationales de gestion des flux migratoires. Il interroge, d'une part, les parcours de migrants ouest-africains qui se représentent la migration en Europe comme ultime voie de mobilité sociale et, d'autre part, les contraintes structurelles auxquelles se heurtent leurs projets migratoires. L'analyse s'articule autour de trois axes : les ressources mobilisées dans les parcours clandestins pour atteindre l'Europe ; l'instrumentalisation de l'asile comme ultime moyen de légitimation de présence sur l'espace européen ; les stratégies résidentielles de survie adoptées pour la réussite du projet migratoire.

L'ouvrage propose une perspective conceptuelle qui définit l'agir clandestin comme un agir faible et une perspective politique qui présente l'agir clandestin comme une normalité pour ce qui concerne l'accès et la résidence en Europe.

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