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and Mrs. Oboussier, Mr. and Mrs. Oggier, Mr. and Mrs. Oberhaensli and guest, Mr. and Mrs. Ochs, Mlle. Jaqueline Paravicini, Mr. V. Para-vicini, Dr. and Mrs. Pessini, Mr. Piquet, Mr. and Mrs. Pape and guest, Mr. Page and guest, Mr., Mrs. and Miss Pfirter, Mr. Roethlisberger, Mr. and Mrs. A. Rueff, Mr. and Mrs. Ryff, Dr. Rast, Mr. and Mrs. A. F. Suter, The Swiss Minister's Guests, Mr. and Mrs. Stauffer, Mr. Steinmann, Mr. H. Senn, Mr. and Mrs. Schobinger, Mr. and Mrs. Seinet, Mr. and Mrs. Stettler, Mr. and Mrs. B. Sigerist and Guests, Miss Steiger, Mr. Stonagel, Miss Simmon, Mr. Sturzenegger, Mr. and Mrs. Scheuermeier, Mr. and Mrs. Schorno, Mr. and Mrs. Scheuermeier, Mr. and Mrs. Sterchi, Mr. Stoll, Mr. Suter, Dr. Vogt, Mr. Vandendries, and guests, Mr. and Mrs. Wildi and guests, Mr. and Mrs. Werner, Mr. and Mrs. Wassmer, Mr. and Mrs. Werner, Mr. and Mrs. Wassmer, Mr. and Mrs. Werner, Mr. and Mrs. Wildi and guests, Mr. Zogg, Mr. Zehnder.

CITY SWISS CLUB BANQUET.

Nach dem einzig schöne Obe Wie im Grosvenor mer hei g'ha, Cha me gwüss am andere Morge. Nid anders als chly dänke dra.

Fründ si cho vo alle Orte London, Bärn u Liverpool, Basel, Manchester u Horge Viel dervo si zäme z'Schuel.

Gruess di wohl u how d'you do D'Zunge chunt ganz us em Gleis It's a long time since l've seen you Hello Hans u Max wie geits?

Prächtig wiederglänzt der Saal Vo Glück u schöne Fraue, D'Herre au si handsome all Stürmt eini im Vertraue.

Gwürzt mit viele weise Rede Isch a Gnuss das festlich Mahl, As guets Tröpfli git der Säge U heiteri Stimmig überall.

Verlockend spielt das Tanzorchester Gs'sprächig chömet Paar u Paar, Sogar die alte Gescht verschwindet I der fröhlich, zwirbelnd Schaar.

Im Walzertakt tue si sich drehe Uf em glänzige Parkett, Gar oft isch Tanz für Dame u Herre D's Vorspiel zum ideale Duett.

Tuet nur d'Fründschaft sorgsam walte Wo Not u Zwytracht d'Wält hei g'spalte Und's ach kei Zämehang me git. H.E.

BANKING IN SWITZERLAND. By WERNER G. J. KNOP-BOOTH.

(Bankers Magazine).

The problems of the Swiss banks are not of recent origin. They have their root in the waves of instability which periodically have been sweep-ing the world during the post-war period. The events of the last nine months in the Swiss bankevents of the last time months in the Swiss bank-ing world can, with the late Federal Councillor Schulthess, be described as the "manifestation of losses." Those losses, that is to say, which were incurred in the years of the world economic crisis are only now having to be written off in the barber belowe absorb banks' balance sheets.

banks' balance sheets. It must be borne in mind that, compared with the banking system in this country and Germany, the Swiss structure is relatively decentralised. Most foreign reviewers are inclined to ignore this point and assess the banking situation as a whole according to the position of the big banks alone. Actually, however, the Swiss structure includes four other groups; the Cantonal banks, the local banks, the savings banks and the Raiffeisen banks. They do not differ so much from each other in the nature of their business activity as in their relative importance within the national credit system and above all the size of their trans-actions. The total deposits of all Swiss banks at the end of 1934 amounted to frs. 15,900,000,000, while their Share Capital and Reserves aggrewhile their Share Capital and Reserves aggre-gated frs. 2,379,500,000. The following table shows the share of each group in the total funds.

	Deposits.		SHARE CAPITAL AND RESERVES.		
	In mill. frs.	In per cent. total	In mill. frs.	In per cent. total.	
Cantonal banks	7,010	44.14	826.5	34.73	
Big banks	3,810	24.01	958.0	40.26	
Local banks	3,350	21.10	490.6	20.62	
Savings banks	1,370	8.63	88.5	3.72	
Raiffeisen banks	0,340	2.12	15.9	0.62	
	15,880	100.00	2,379.5	100.00	

It is at once obvious from these figures that It is at once obvious from these figures that the big banks represent only the smaller part of the Swiss banking system. The Cantonal banks though ranging behind the big banks in their Share Capital and Reserves are far ahead of them in so far as the deposits are concerned. More-over the relative importance of the Cantonal banks in the Swiss credit system is growing daily. This, for instance, is shown by the fact that the largest bank in the country is the Zurich Can-tonal Bank with a balance sheet total of frs. 1,360,000,000, and no longer one of the "big" banks. The Cantonal banks enjoy the particular confidence of the small depositor.

confidence of the small depositor. The big banks are, therefore, not representa-tive of the whole Swiss credit system. They are also not typical for Swiss banking as they have their peculiar difficulties. But on the other hand the big banks are almost the only ones which have been concerned with foreign lending. Conse-quently their own particular troubles are so much more serious and complicated than those of the other banks. They are the most vulnerable part of the Swiss banking system, and as they, at the same time, represent a very large section in the whole credit organisation their present position and outlook are of the greatest significance for Swiss banking as a whole. Naturally the other banks cannot be disregarded. And though this survey has as its primary object the position of the big banks it automatically includes other groups whenever Swiss banking as a whole is dealt with. groups wh dealt with.


For many decades, thanks to the specific nature of the Swiss economic system, the Swiss banks have cultivated an important international business. Considerable amounts of foreign capi-tal have been entrusted to them and still larger sums have been invested by them abroad. As a sums have been invested by them abroad. As a large part of the Swiss population has to earn its livelihood in the export trade and through other international commercial activities, this would have been normal had it not been for the reper-cussions of the world economic crisis on the posi-tion of the debtors of the Swiss banks, both at home and abroad.

home and abroad. The economic structure of Switzerland is one of high capitalisation, both in industry and agri-culture. Expensive foreign raw materials to-gether with the high costs of freight and insur-ance — a direct consequence of Switzerland's geographical position — and high wages, necessi-tate a relatively much higher demand for indus-trial capital than in any other country. The same is true for agriculture, where the capital investment per hectar of cultivated soil amounts to as much as approximately frs. 8,000. On this basis Swiss banking, together with its extensive international business has developed into an organisation the relative size of which is reached in no other country. In the years of tottering currencies and

In the years of tottering currencies and general economic and political instability abroad, general economic and pointer instability about, Switzerland appeared to many as a happy oasis of stability and safety. Huge sums from coun-tries with unstable currencies found their way into Switzerland, where the maintenance of the stability of the currency was beyond question.

As there are no figures available about the Swiss balance of payments for the last few years, the extent of the total capital import is unknown. It is, however, estimated that the total amount of short- and medium-term foreign capital invested in Switzerland before the attack on the Swiss franc amounted to between frs. 800,000,000 to frs. 1 400 000 000 1,400,000,000.

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It was this influx of capital which confronted It was this influx of capital which confronted the banks with innumerable difficulties. The table below shows the effects of the capital import on the banks' balance sheets. Of course, the changes shown are not only due to capital move-ments, for other factors have contributed their share. If, for instance, Swiss exports between 1929 and 1935 have declined from frs. 2,097,000,000 to frs. 844,300,000 the accompany-ing shrinkage in Swiss business activity could not remain without influence on the balance sheet total of the bank. BLANCE SHEET TOTAL OF ALL SWISS BANKS.

BALANCE SHEET TOTAL OF ALL SWISS BANKS

(in mill. frs.)

1930. 1931. 1928. 1929, 1932. 1933. 1927.17,189 18,619 20,494 21,781 20,467 19,945 19,149 18,645

17,189 18,619 20,494 21,781 20,407 19,945 19,149 18,049 The grave question facing the Swiss banker was: What was he to do with this excess of foreign capital, which was only looking for a short-term refuge? To keep it as mere deposits was regarded as unbusinesslike. And to invest it in domestic industry was a possibility open only to a small proportion of the foreign capital. The very size of the Swiss economic system kept such investments within narrow limits.

The obvious way out, therefore, was to re-invest such refuge seeking money abroad. The Swiss banks have been blamed, and in some cases rightly so, for the extent of their foreign lend-ings. But on the whole the banks only did what ings. But on the whole the banks only did what every banker would have done in similar circum-stances. There was no precedent to warn them how, and with what effects, currency deprecia-tions can spread. The banks found themselves on entirely unknown ground. It can hardly be wondered that they seized the opportunity to regain their former position in the international credit computational credit organisation.

It must not be forgotten, when criticising the It must not be forgotten, when criticising the Swiss banks' foreign investment policy, that the export of capital is an economic necessity for the country. In order to maintain its economic equilibrium, Switzerland has to cover her adverse balance of trade by a corresponding item on the asset side of her balance of payments. The in-come derived from capial investments abroad is thus an essential factor for the maintenance of her standard of living.

Moreover, the banks' foreign investments of "refuge capital" is often considerably exag-gerated. Recognising its unreliability, the banks deposited part of it on giro account with the Swiss National Bank, where it was reflected in the form of rising gold holding. Between 1930 and 1932 the gold reserves of the Central Bank accordingly increased from frs. 607,3000,000 to frs. 2,546,000,000.

An indication as to the extent of the big An indication as to the extent of the org banks' foreign investments, and the lack fo dis-crimination employed in some cases, is offered by the recent history of the Banque Commerciale de Bâle, though it must be realised that the Banque Commerciale has been exceptionally "enterpris-ing" in comparison with the other big banks.

In 1922 the Banque Commerciale made its first attempt to obtain a footing in other coun-tries, by acquiring interests in the Viennese Bank Corporation and the State Bank of Bosnia and Herzegovina. In 1923 it participated in the foun-dation of the General Bank Corporation in Poland, and in 1928 in that of the General Bank Corporation of Yougo Slavia. It also acquired an interest in the Bohemian Union Bank of Prague. Prague.

Prague. These banking interests led in turn to the partaking in the foundation of the Union Finan-cière Polonaise of Brussels, the Banque Belge et International en Egypte and the Soc. Générale d'Exploitation Electriques de Lodz et Extensions of Brussels. Moreover, the Banque Commerciale was represented on the board of the Albanian National Bank in Tirana. Then again the Banque has been the founder of a large number of financ-ing trusts, such as the Bank Für Transportuerte, for the financing of railways in Austria; the Indelee, a financing company for electrical un-dertakings which was closely affiliated to the Biemens & Halske in Berlin. In addition the Banque Commerciale collaborated with the Ger-man mining concern Hoesch-Koeln-Neuessen in the formation of the Montan-Union A.G. In contrast the participations of the Banque

In contrast the participations of the Banque Commerciale in Swiss undertakings have been exceedingly small and among all the big Swiss banks the Banque Commerciale had the smallest internal business. These circumstances explain the difficulties of the Banque Commerciale. In particular the commitments in Germany sur-passed those of all other banks, and consequently the losses resulting are believed to have been ex-tremely heavy. tremely heavy.

The influx of large foreign funds not only reflected itself in a huge increase in the banks' balance sheet total, but also accelerated the growth in the number of banks. The primary cause for this growth are the general increase in business activity in the post-war years, but also the absence of a postal savings system. Thus a

number of small local branches have been large established, which, however, are not carrying out any real banking business except the collection of savings deposits. Partly too, statistical reasons are responsible for the increase shown in the table below in the number of banks, especially for the vears 1925 to 1930.

THE SWISS OBSERVER.

	NUMBER			
	OF ALL BRANCHES.			
	1932.	1930.	1925	1913.
Swiss National Bank	25	25	-	-
	0.55	000		
Cantonal banks	877	838	777	
Big banks	218	194	170	
Big local banks	537	343	226	
Medium and small local banks	168	162	114	-
Raiffeisen banks	572	516	375	<u></u>
Savings banks	305	287	377	<u> </u>
Mortgage banks		190	140	
Savings banks of the Christian				
social organisations	335	263	246	-

3,012 2,793 2,425 1,880

In every respect, both in the size of its organisation and the extent of its business activities, the Swiss banking system was at the height of its power when the world economic crisis started. At first Switzerland, while other countries were swept by the crisis, stood out as one of the few happy islands, apparantly un-touched by what was happening abroad. Pros-perity, it is true, came to a halt, but it did not disappear altogether. The international troubles seemed to have been largely arrested at the fron-tiars of Switzerland. tiers of Switzerland.

When, however, the crisis resulted in the When, however, the crisis resulted in the devaluation of an increasing number of curren-cies, the economic position of Switzerland began to be attacked from two sides. First by in-creased difficulties met with in the export trade, and then by the destruction of the domestic price structure. While the countries with devaluated currencies succeeded in reducing their real wage level, similar attempts in Switzerland as in all the gold bloc countries failed after a temporary success. success.

At home bank investments in the hotel, the machine and other export industries became frozen and large sums had to be written off. A far more serious menace to the banks than origin-ated from the internal economic deterioration, har more serious menace to the banks than origin-ated from the internal economic deterioration, arose directly in connection with the aggravation of the economic and financial position in a num-ber of other countries. On the one hand many foreign creditors withdrew their Swiss bank de-posits, such as in the case of the German creditors who by law were forced to repatriate their foreign deposits and investments. On the other hand the simultaneous introduction of exchange restric-tions and the declaration of transfer moratoriums abroad, and particularly in Germany, placed the Swiss banking authorities before an unpre-cedented dilemma. As shown in the following table the whole share capital and the reserves of the six leading banks, amounting to frs. fer, nestrictions. And by far the largest part of for restrictions. And by far the largest part of the big banks' foreign investments subject to transfer restrictions are frozen in Germany.

IN MILL, FRS., AT THE END OF 1934.

The second se			Investments.
na na sente a conserva da serva da ser En esta da serva da s En esta da serva da s	Share Capita and reserves.	Total.	Subject to transfer restrictions.
Banque Commerciale de Bâl	e 88	224	153
Banque Fédérale	. 107	172	143
Crédit Suisse	. 206	?	200
Leu & Co	. 47	102	100
Swiss Bank Corporation	. 200	?	150
Union de Banques Suisses .	. 112	190	108

Though under the circumstances these commitments in countries with transfer restrictions represent a very heavy burden for the banks conrepresent a very neavy ourden for the banks con-cerned, there is no reason to take too grave a view about their future. As regards the credits frozen in Germany the really bad debtors have been written off already before the outbreak of the crisis, and under the Swiss-German payments agreement interest payments are coming in regu-larly from the present debtors.

(To be continued).

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